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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis analyzed the Navy’s proposed Riverine Force (RF) structure and 
capabilities of 2006.  Systems Engineering and Analysis cohort 10 (SEA10) developed a 
cost-effective system of systems which increased battlespace awareness and situational 
responsiveness for 2010.  Riverine missions were decomposed into their functional, 
physical, and operational architectures using the detect-to-engage sequence.  This 
analysis determined critical RF functions.  Critical functions detect and engage were then 
physically represented by feasible force package alternatives that augmented the baseline 
RF.  SEA10 analyzed these alternatives using agent based models to identify baseline RF 
capability gaps and provide insights into possible solutions. 
 Reduction of modeling data indicated the baseline force was as effective 
as some upgraded force packages depending on the measure of performance (MOP) or 
scenario structure under scrutiny.  Sensor augmentation demonstrated significant 
improvements to baseline performance by increasing battlespace awareness.  Weapon 
augmentation alone did not significantly improve baseline performance by increasing 
situational responsiveness.  Combined sensor-weapon augmentation performed well 
across all MOP and scenarios.  The Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) was the most 
cost-effective alternative.  Dedicated helicopter support demonstrated the best 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user.  Furthermore, every attempt was made to 
collect the most accurate cost estimation figures, but these values should not be viewed as 
verified or validated, and should be thoroughly investigated before given consideration in 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Approximately 2.2 billion people live within 100 kilometers of coastline, and the 
highest population densities occur near major rivers and deltas1.  Riverine environments 
are strategically important areas for commerce and transportation.  Rivers are recognized 
battlegrounds in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and can be used for shipment of 
illegal drugs, human trafficking, weapons, and contraband which may support terrorist 
operations.  Systems Engineering and Analysis cohort 10 (SEA-10) was tasked to 
examine the structure of the Navy’s riverine force (RF), identify capability gaps, 
investigate feasible alternative architectures and propose system of systems 
improvements for the RF in 2010.  With the RF currently working to establish a 
command structure, train and equip its forces, and deploy to a combat zone all within the 
span of just over one year, SEA-10’s choice of the 2010 timeframe narrowed the 
investigation to existing or nearly mature development efforts that would be worthy of 
inclusion as an RF augment as the RF looks toward potential future tasking. 
SEA-10 was fortunate to have the opportunity to engage with RADM Don 
Bullard, Commander of the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), 
Commodore Mike Jordan, Commander River Group ONE (RIVGRU ONE), and 
members of their staffs to help refine the problem.  Two clear objectives emerged from 
these discussions: Where could the RF acquire the most useful combat capability for the 
least cost, i.e., what capability would return the “biggest bang for the buck,” and What is 
needed to defeat the “bend in the river” ambush?  These discussions were supplemented 
by in person interaction with other current riverine practitioners including Navy, Marine 
Corps, Special Forces, and riverine operators from other eras, as well as historical 
research of previous U.S. Navy riverine efforts.  These efforts, along with continuing 
dialog with NECC and RIVGRU ONE, focused SEA-10 on the specific combat critical 
objectives of “improving battlespace awareness” (improving sensor detection capability) 
and “improving situational responsiveness” (improving engagement capability). 
 
1 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force (DRAFT), 
30 August 2006, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. 
 xxx
Eleven alternative force packages with the potential to increase the RF’s detection 
and engagement capability were ultimately defined.  Each of these alternatives was 
modeled around the most likely riverine scenario (waterway patrol) and the most severe 
(ambush – “the bend in the river”).  Scenarios were modeled in MANA, an agent based 
simulation that accounted for terrain, line of sight, weapons characteristics, personality 
motivations, and communications capability.  Alternative performance parameters were 
entered into MANA and modeled against a level II opposing force.  Measures of 
performance such as time to first enemy detection and loss exchange ratio were collected 
from MANA.  A detailed statistical analysis was conducted to compare the performance 
of competing alternative architectures.  SEA-10 conducted an open source cost estimate 
for each alternative force package.  Procurement and operating and support costs were 
considered for each alternative over a ten year period beginning in 2010.  Each 
alternative’s overall cost and performance was then combined to determine which 
alternative provided the RF with the biggest “bang for the buck.”  The most significant 
findings include: 
• Addition of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) to the baseline force 
provided the greatest overall improvement system performance for the cost.  
• Addition of dedicated helicopter support to the baseline force generated the 
best performance, but was the most costly alternative. 
• In general, improved sensor capability had the greatest effect on overall 
system performance (versus improved engagement capability) for the 
associated cost.   
•  A single unmanned sensor option (USV, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 
or Unmanned Ground Sensor (UGS)) enhanced baseline force performance as 
well as networked sensor alternatives. 
• Addition of a ground combat element produced a measurable improvement in 
percentage of no hit runs and loss exchange ratio, but when limited to two 
scenarios (patrol and ambush) it did not significantly improve overall system 
performance. 
 xxxi
• Depending on the scenario and measure of performance all alternatives as 
modeled returned an improvement in battle space awareness or situational 
responsiveness over the baseline force.  None of the alternatives, when 
compared with the 10 year operating cost of the baseline are cost prohibitive, 
and should be considered feasible. 
Mobile sensor alternatives, the USV and UAV, increased battle space awareness 
and delivered the greatest increase in overall performance in simulated riverine missions.  
The low marginal cost of the USV allowed it to dominate all but the networked sensor 
and indirect fire alternatives.  One alternative that was not modeled, but analysis showed 
as an interesting alternative worth further investigation, was the pairing of a single sensor 
detection augment to baseline force with an indirect fire augment (mortar team or mortar 
barge).  Either of these alternatives has the potential to achieve parity or exceed the 
















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
                                                
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Approximately one third, or 2.2 billion, of the estimated 6.5 billion world 
population in 20062 lived within 100 kilometers of a coastline.  The highest population 
densities occurred near major rivers and deltas.3  Riverine environments are strategically 
important areas for commerce and transportation.  Rivers are battlegrounds in the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) and can be used for shipment of illegal drugs, human trafficking, 
weapons, and contraband which may support terrorist operations.  Systems Engineering 
and Analysis cohort 10 (SEA-10) was tasked to examine the structure of the Navy’s 
riverine force (RF), identify capability gaps, and provide feasible alternatives for the RF.  
This thesis utilized agent based models to support a system of systems concept of 
operations (CONOPS), construct an operational architecture, and develop alternatives to 
identify capability gaps of the riverine force and provide potential feasible solutions. 
This thesis was developed in parallel with the establishment of the Navy’s RF.  In 
early 2005, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark assembled a 
GWOT task force to develop ways the Navy could proactively participate in fighting 
terrorism.  Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 24 recommended 
expanding the Navy’s green and brown water capability to rebalance the force so that the 
United States Navy can better combat today’s green and brown water threats.  In his 
speech to the Naval War College in August 2005, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Mike Mullen emphasized the need for a balanced Navy that is capable of fighting across 
the spectrum of the maritime domain.  “I want a balanced force in every sense of the 
word…balanced to face the challenges of our age…balanced to operate in, and command, 
if need be, all things maritime…I believe our Navy is missing a great opportunity to 
influence events by not having a riverine force.”4
 
2 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. Table 001, Total Midyear Population. Retrieved 18 
September 2006 from the World Wide Web at: http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg. 
3 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force (DRAFT), 
p. 30, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 30 August 2006. 
4 Chief of Naval Operations remarks as delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 31 August 
2005, Retrieved 12 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/mist.asp?x=5.  
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Systems engineering is rooted in problem solving and seeks to apply an 
organized, analytical process to the development of solutions to complex problems.   The 
process begins with the identification of a want or desire for something and is based on a 
real or perceived deficiency5.  SEA-10 determined a primitive needs statement from the 
original tasking of “analyze riverine warfare” as:  
“Define alternatives and recommend a cost-effective system of systems that 
enables United States Navy Riverine Forces to project power, conduct Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and defend the force within the riparian 
environment.  The system will provide a tailorable, maneuverable, sustainable, organic 
force which is capable of integration with joint, coalition, and civilian agents up to 150 
nautical miles (nm) from a forward operating base. The architecture will consist of 
systems that are currently in service or deliverable by 2010.” 
The formal problem statement is more detailed than a primitive need statement. It 
should be quantifiable to ensure enough detail can be extracted to proceed with the 
process and to assure the results reflect the true customer desires6.  This problem 
statement was too broad and did not scope the topic of “riverine warfare” enough to 
enable detailed analysis or alternatives.  It did serve as the starting point to decompose 
the functions of the global riverine system, begin functional analysis, and work towards a 
revised problem statement. 
C. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN PROCESS 
SEA-10 utilized a combination of established systems engineering principles, 
architectures, and criteria to define, bound, and analyze riverine warfare in 2010.  SEA-
10 used Dennis M. Buede’s approach as described in The Engineering Design of Systems 
to separate riverine warfare into functional, physical, and operational architectures to 
provide an overall framework for analysis7.  These architectures enabled SEA-10 to 
examine riverine global functions, extract RF missions from these global functions, 
                                                 
5 B.S. Blanchard, & W.J. Fabrycky,  Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th Ed., pp. 55-56, Pearson 
Education Inc., 2006. 
6 Ibid 
7 D.M. Buede. The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods, p. 245, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
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identify quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOE) from RF missions, and finally 
develop alternatives that satisfy the RF revised problem statement.   
D. PRIMARY SPONSOR (STAKEHOLDER)  
In an effort to rebalance the force and contribute to the GWOT, the Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was formally established on 13 January 2006.  
“NECC serves as a single Functional Command to centrally manage current/future 
readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of the Navy’s Expeditionary 
Forces”8.  The objective of NECC is to increase the Navy’s capacity for conducting 
GWOT missions by “realigning expeditionary forces, improving war fighting 
effectiveness, and captures [sic] efficiencies and common synergies.”9   NECC brings the 
following commands under one common command structure: Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal (EOD), Mobile Diving and Salvage (MDSU), Construction Battalions 
(SEABEES), Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW), Port Handling/Expeditionary Logistics 
(NAVELSG), and Riverine Group One (RIVGRU ONE).  NECC plans to “fill gaps in the 
long-term GWOT mission set…and to temporarily relieve stress on the Marine Corps and 
Army missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”10
The RF currently proposed by NECC consists of one riverine group composed of 
three squadrons.  The riverine group is commanded by a Navy captain, and each 
squadron is commanded by a Navy commander.  Each riverine squadron will be capable 
of forward deployed operations and complete self-sufficiency for up to two weeks 
without re-supply (not including fuel).  The RF can operate from a sea base or a forward 





8 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Retrieved 27 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/about.htm.
9 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Retrieved 27 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/about.htm.
10 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Missions and Objectives, Retrieved 27 September 2006 
from the World Wide Web at http://www.necc.navy.mil/about.htm.
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coalition forces.11  The first riverine squadron will become active and deploy to Iraq in 
February 2007 while the second and third riverine squadrons are not expected to become 
active until FY-09/FY-10.12   
E. RECENT RIVERINE FORCE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Recent RF performance data is limited.  United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
Small Craft Company (SCCo) was the only conventionally structured functional RF with 
recent operational experience outside of units in Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM).  Army engineer bridge construction units patrolled areas surrounding critical 
infrastructure in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), but this is not typical 
employment.  SEA-10 relied on historical analysis, lessons learned, and contractor 
information for technical details to formulate the initial force baseline in 2007 and the 
expected force of 2010.  Extensive historical analysis, SCCo lessons learned documents, 
discussions with stakeholders at NECC, and functional analysis led SEA-10 to the 
conclusion that the current RF will have limited organic detection and engagement 
capability beyond visual range.  SEA-10 used the systems engineering process to develop 
architectures that provide the RF with increased ability to extend battle space awareness 
and engage the enemy with organic assets.   
F. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF RIVERINE FUNCTIONS 
1. Introduction 
 Riverine warfare is not a new mission for the U.S. Navy.  It has had episodic 
importance since the inception of the United States.  There are many examples of riverine 
warfare from the American Revolution to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and 
no two are the same.  Basic RF functions remain the same throughout each historical 
example despite varying operational environments, technological developments, logistics 
support capabilities, and deployment timeframes.  SEA-10 chose to analyze the Second 
Seminole War, the Vietnam War, and the war on drugs on the rivers of Colombia because 
all three conflicts required RF’s to adapt to an ever changing enemy.  RF’s in all three 
 
11 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(DRAFT), p. 28 , Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 30 August 2006. 
12 Interview with Riverine Squadron personnel, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA,16 August 
2006.  
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conflicts adapted their tactics to increase communications and engagement abilities, and 
took the fight to the enemy on the green and brown waters.    
2. Second Seminole War (1835-42) 
In 1830 the Indian Relocation Act initiated the effort to move Indians to 
reservations west of the Mississippi.  Although most of the tribes signed agreements to 
leave peacefully, some remained in Florida.  The Indians continued to live in Florida in 
relative peace until 1835 when the Army was deployed to the region to forcefully relocate 
the remaining Indians.  
Understandably, many of the Indians did not want to leave their ancestral 
homeland so they retreated deep into the Florida Everglades at the Southern tip of the 
Florida peninsula.   This environment provided the Indians with protection because the 
colonizers were unable to pursue them into the shallow mangrove-ridden swamps. The 
Indians received their logistics support through Spanish-funded lines of communication 
from the Caribbean Islands to the Everglades that brought weapons and supplies to the 
Indian camps. 
A first attempt at subduing the Indians was made by forming the Navy’s West 
Indian squadron to intercept supply lines. The squadron was composed of blue water 
vessels that were not able to penetrate into the shallow waters of the Everglades. 
Although the blockade operations were considered relatively successful, they did not 
solve the problem of relocating the Indians who were still residing on the land.  Troops 
had to be brought into the area to forcibly move the Indians. However, as the Army 
advanced into the swampy Everglades, it continually tried to impose Napoleonic-style 
warfare on the Indians by massing fires upon them.  These tactics proved highly 
ineffective because the Indians would not engage in these scenarios and would, instead, 
retreat to the safety of the swamps.  A change of tactics was needed to counter the 
guerilla style warfare that was brought upon the soldiers.   
In an attempt to bring troops closer to the Indians, three schooners, Flirt, Wave 
and Otsego, with embarked Army troops operated at the mouths of the waterways.  The 
draft of these ships prohibited access to the areas most populated by the Indians.  In 1839, 
Lieutenant (LT) J.T. McLaughlin took the initiative to build up a force composed of flat 
bottomed boats and canoes that were capable of navigating the mangrove-ridden 
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labyrinth of rivers and swamps13.  Smaller vessels that could act independently gave the 
Navy riverine force the ability to penetrate deeper into enemy territory.   
McLaughlin and his flat bottomed boats (mostly canoes) transported Army 
soldiers up and down the rivers to raid Indian villages and destroy their weapons caches 
and supply depots.  Moving inland also gave the riverine force the capability to collect 
intelligence on enemy strength, encampments and logistics paths14.  The raids had a 
devastating psychological effect on the Seminoles that left them demoralized.  Over time 
and with repeated patrols of the same areas, McLaughlin and his ‘Mosquito Fleet’ 
ultimately gained control of the waterways. Without a reliable supply system and 
demoralized by the brutal attacks on their families, the Seminoles eventually surrendered 
to the soldiers. 
a. Firepower 
  Firepower came in two varieties, specifically crew served weapons and 
naval gunfire.  The latter was mostly ineffective because the deep draft of the ships 
prevented the Navy ships from moving within the effective range of their weapons.  
Several innovations were implemented to compensate for firepower inadequacies, such as 
affixing a gun capable of shooting 12 pound rounds on a barge or Mackinaw boat (flat 
bottomed) for inland missions.   
Initially the riverine forces were dependent on the ‘volley and charge’ 
method of small arms fire.  As the war progressed, weapons technology matured which 
enabled commanders to change their tactics.  Advancement of the repeating shoulder 
weapon technology allowed the commander to “reduce the size of his unit without 
sacrificing the volume of fire…which prompted him to divide his riverine units into 
smaller independent task forces.”15  Table 1 summarizes the weaponry used during the 
Second Seminole War. 
 
13 Navy Department Naval History Division, Riverine Warfare: The U.S. Navy’s Operations on Inland 
Waters, p. 15, Washington: Government Printing Office, revised 1969.  
14 M. Freitas & B. W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 37. 
15 M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 36. 
 Table 1. Weaponry of the Second Seminole War16. 
 
b. Scouting 
  Riverine forces in the Everglades were unfamiliar with the territory and 
were, consequently, subject to ambush by Seminoles who were very familiar with the 
region.  “A lack of maps placed a premium on an intimate knowledge of the 
countryside.”17 Riverine forces relied heavily on guides from local villages or their own 
canoe scouts to gain situational awareness of the battle space.  Persistent patrol of the 
same areas was the most effective method for gaining an understanding of guerilla 
encampments.  However, due to the immense size of the Everglades region, 
approximately 2,500,000 acres,18 and the limited number of soldiers and sailors assigned 
to the mission (~500), the Indians would simply pick up and move their camps to avoid 
detection.  Riverine forces were constantly subject to ambush and became increasingly 
frustrated by an enemy that was nearly impossible to detect.  
                                                 
16 M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, pp. 35-47.
 17 M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 37. 
18 J.C. White, American Military Strategy in the Second Seminole War, Retrieved 15 September 2006 
from the World Wide Web at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/WJC.htm. 
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As the war matured, changes in command structure were initiated to bring 
a unity of effort between the riverine forces and the blue water forces.  Under LT 
McLaughlin, the riverine commander was put in control of inland and coastal forces. 
Integration with the Navy’s ‘blue water forces’ enabled faster dissemination of 
intelligence reports to inland forces about location Indian lines of communication (LOC) 
and supply caches.  Riverine forces worked with blue water forces to intercept guerilla 
supplies that were arriving from the Caribbean.   
3. Vietnam (1967-1975) 
 Riverine forces gained respect for their role in the Vietnam War.  In 1965 a 
helicopter pilot conducting a MEDEVAC mission over the Southern Coast of Vietnam 
noticed the movement of a North Vietnamese vessel to a shore-based logistics facility. 
Upon further investigation, large weapon caches and supply depots were discovered 
alongside routes that were frequently used by the North Vietnamese to infiltrate South 
Vietnam.  In response to this revelation, U.S. commanders established Task Force 115 to 
conduct coastal surveillance and to prevent the flow of supplies to the Vietcong from the 
Southern coast of Vietnam.  Shallow draft boats were needed to penetrate the murky 
waters of the Mekong delta.  After discovering that the inventory of small boats in the 
U.S. Navy was minuscule, Patrol Craft Fasts (PCF) were purchased from Sewart 
Seacraft, a manufacturer of water taxis used to service off shore oil rigs in the Gulf of 
Mexico19.  PCF’s, or Swift boats, worked with helicopter and Patrol Boat Riverine (PBR) 
units to intercept Viet Cong supplies from the coastal and inland waterways.  Although 
the blockade remained throughout the war it was only partially effective in deterring the 
flow of supplies into South Vietnam. It was discovered that the Viet Cong were actually 
receiving a majority of their logistical and personnel support from roadways originating 
in Cambodia and through the waterways of the Mekong Delta.  A plan was needed to 
prevent the transfer of supplies to the Viet Cong so Task Force 116 was established under 
the code name Game Warden. 
Despite TF 116 efforts, the Viet Cong were still receiving enough supplies to 
wage a substantial guerilla campaign against South Vietnamese and American forces. A 
different strategy that involved penetrating deep into the Mekong Delta’s rivers and 
 
19Patrol Craft Fast, Swift Boat Design Criteria, Retrieved 21 November 2006 from the World Wide 
Web at: http://www.pcf45.com. 
creeks was needed to further weaken Viet Cong forces.  In 1966 the Mobile Riverine 
Force (MRF) was established with the mission to “seek and destroy Viet Cong main and 
local force units, their resources, and their infrastructure, and to open the waterways of 
the Mekong Delta to commerce.”20,21  The establishment of the MRF marked the first 
true riverine force of the Vietnam War.  MRF forces were split into two groups, 
appropriately named Mobile Riverine Group A, which operated in the eastern delta, and 
Mobile Riverine Group B, which operated in the west.  Each of the groups, were later 
renamed as Riverine Assault Squadrons (RAS).  RAS composition is displayed in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2. Vietnam riverine assault squadron platforms22. 
 
The concept of the Mobile Riverine Force stated that the riverine force would 
conduct the following specific tasks: 
1. “Secure U.S. base areas and lines of communication required for U.S. 
operations 
2. Conduct offensive operations against Viet Cong forces and base areas 
that pose a threat to ….priority areas for rural construction... 
3. Isolate the most heavily populated and key food-producing areas from 
Viet Cong base areas 
                                                 
20 M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 54.   
21 W.C. Wells, Full Mission Profile.  Riverine Operations in Vietnam, pp 41-42, Naval Special 
Warfare Publication, 1992.  
22 R.B. Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare: The US Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a 
Tactical Doctrine 1775-1990, Appendix A, University Press of Florida, 2003.  
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4. Interdict Viet Cong supply routes 
5. Provide reserve and reaction forces in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in 
coordination with Vietnam armed forces”23 
According to the concept of operations (CONOPS), the brigade was the smallest 
unit that the U.S. could provide to the delta with minimal risk to safety of personnel but 
fit within budget constraints.24  The CONOPS also planned for the use of afloat mobile 
bases that provided a staging area for riverine operations.  Troops conducted ground 
operations in 3-4 day intervals and then retreated to the mobile afloat bases to rest and 
repair equipment.  Forces remained in an enemy controlled area for four to six weeks, or 
until the objectives were met, and then moved along the river to another enemy 
controlled area.  Operational reach from the mobile bases was approximately 50 km. 
Combined water, land and air power of the Mobile Afloat Force was capable of 
conducting full scale combat operations while providing safety for the vulnerable afloat 
bases. 
During the later years of the war the objective of the MRF was “to deny the 
enemy longitudinal and cross-waterway movement along numerous waterways 
surrounding and within the Kien Hoa province.”25 The operations in the Kien Hoa 
province presented special challenges to the MRF because of the significant limits on 
mobility due to the limited waterway network off the rivers.  This lack of navigable 
waterways and anchorages for afloat bases of operations prevented the MRF from 
operating as it had in previous engagements.  “According to intelligence reports, the 
enemy had formed special five-man teams in Kien Hoa to ambush the boats of the mobile 
riverine force…using rockets (RPG 2 and RPG 7, mostly), recoilless rifles, and small 
arms.”26  Countering the ambush threat required the joint effort of Army ground troops 
and Navy riverine craft.  Army troops would engage enemy guerillas while the assault 
 
23 W.B Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966-1969, p. 32,  Department of the Army, 
1969.   
24 W.B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966-1969, p. 35, Department of the Army, 
1969.   
M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 69 
26 W.B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966-1969, pp. 170-172, Department of the 
Army, 1969. 
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craft blocked the enemy’s escape routes.  The Mobile Riverine Force combined with 
ground troops and helicopters used this strategy to “break up enemy underground 
organization, disrupt enemy plans, demoralize enemy forces, and aid in pacification.”27
a. Firepower 
Considerations had to be made when planning and executing operations 
that required firepower to be brought upon the enemy.  The Vietnamese environment 
consists of thick foliage, high humidity, frequent rain, and hot weather.  Due to the 
extreme environmental conditions, crew served weapons and small arms would 
frequently fire erratically, jam or fail to fire.  Helicopters provided additional coverage to 
forces that were left unarmed due to equipment casualties.  A confounding factor in 
massing firepower on the enemy was the large rural population along the rivers that were 
vulnerable to poorly aimed fire. Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited U.S. forces from 
engaging civilians.  Despite ROE, it was not uncommon for non-combatants to come into 
the line of poorly aimed fire.  Table 3 outlines many (though not all) of the different craft 
used during the Vietnam conflict and their contributions to firepower.   
 
27 W.B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966-1969, pp. 170-173, Department of the 
Army, 1969.   
  
Table 3. Riverine Platform Engagement Capabilities28. 
 
  The riverine force imposed much of its lethality on the enemy using fires 
from air support platforms and artillery support.  Air support from UH-1’s or OV-10’s 
could mass fires directed at enemy encampments, and could also provide intelligence to 
riverine commanders on optimal routes to engage enemy positions and troop 
concentrations.  Supporting fires were also provided by Army artillery which brought 
significant firepower (with 105mm howitzers), but was less discriminating than close air 
                                                 
28R.B. Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare: The US Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a 
Tactical Doctrine 1775-1990, Appendix A, University Press of Florida, 2003.  
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support (CAS).  In order to ensure its own survival, the riverine force had to overcome its 
inherent vulnerability to attack by increasing its rate of fire and survivability.  “A tradeoff 
between protection, speed, draft, firepower, and armor, led to a composite force of 
riverine assault craft,” and found that “rate of delivery and volume of superior firepower 
to destroy the enemy” provided the most significant payoff for riverine success29.  
  When air support and direct artillery support were not available, the RF 
could not risk massing fires on the enemy.  Instead, changes in tactics were instituted so 
that the force operated in smaller independent units that depended on stealth vice massed 
firepower.  As a result, many of these units operated under the cover of darkness to 
ambush and surprise the enemy.   
b. Scouting 
  Scouting was essential to the success of riverine operations.  Small boat 
operators depended on intelligence gathered from reconnaissance missions that were 
conducted hours or sometimes, days before the mission. Intelligence on enemy strength, 
location, river characteristics, the local population and possible helicopter landing spots 
was gathered by helicopters, Navy assault group boats, and ground forces.  
Reconnaissance missions often yielded inaccurate information about the location of 
enemy bases and weapons caches.  They were difficult to discern in photography because 
of the thick layers of foliage that covered river banks.  The rapidly changing jungle 
environment caused much of this intelligence to quickly become outdated or unreliable so 
commanders did not place confidence in it when preparing missions.  On the other hand, 
when reconnaissance missions were timely and informative, the riverine commander was 
directed to the exact location of the enemy where he could overwhelm him by surprise 
and massed firepower.   
  At night, scouting proved more of a challenge to the riverine force.  
Although night vision devices gave the RF a distinct advantage over the enemy, the 
technology was still new and suffered many of the bugs and kinks typical of new 
technologies.  Electronic sensing devices provided bearings to enemy concentrations, but 
the RF needed a confirmed identity of the source of electronic transmission before it 
could engage the enemy.  The most proven method for gaining intelligence on enemy 
 
29 M. Freitas, & B.W. Treadway, Stygian Myth:  US Riverine Operations Against the Guerilla, Naval 
Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, December 1994, p. 72. 
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locations was through the use of guides. Guides were either anti-communist Vietnamese 
in support of the operation or members of American ground forces that had experience in 
a certain region.  Guides came from the local population and usually provided the best 
information on enemy locations, movement, lines of communication (LOC), and other 
information that could be used to plan future operations.  However, as with most human 
intelligence (HUMINT) sources, families of informants were vulnerable to intimidation 
by local Vietcong and many no longer chose to support U.S. forces.  Although HUMINT 
provided the most accurate and up-to-date intelligence for the riverine force commanders, 
it could not always be relied upon.   
The lack of sufficient means for identifying the enemy meant that riverine 
forces had to rely on ROE to justify using firepower.  For example, during Game Warden 
the rules of engagement “explained that a nighttime curfew existed on the inland 
waterways of South Vietnam; this meant that all craft transiting canals or rivers after dark 
were considered enemy boats.”30 Once this ROE was established, the riverine forces had 
permission to search and seize boats that were operating after dark and worked under the 
assumption that the boats were enemy vessels.  This method of assigning identification to 
unknown vessels was inefficient and had the potential to cause undue destruction to 
legitimate commerce.  Vietnam riverine forces needed a way to identify enemy forces at 
night and in real time so they could direct their forces efficiently.   
4. Colombia (1980-Present) 
Colombia is a country scarred by a war that has been passed on through the 
generations.  Since the early 1930’s, Colombia maintained a democratic system of 
government (with a few years of military dictatorship in between) that led to prosperity 
for its citizens.  In 1946, a vicious battle between the liberal and conservative parties 
eventually brought the country to civil war.  The scope and intensity of the 20 year battle 
was so great than many Colombians termed it La Volencia.  The liberal party assumed 
control of the land as fighting progressed which resulted in enormous economic disparity 
 
30 R.B. Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare:  The US Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a 
Tactical Doctrine, 1775-1970, p. 130, University Press of Florida, 2003. 
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between the two groups.31 Over time, the economic imbalance and lack of government 
intervention took its toll on the disadvantaged groups. 
As a new generation began to emerge, underground markets for weapons, drugs, 
and other contraband items became well established avenues for economic trade.  Wealth 
gained from these markets provided the money for poor peasants to fund their own 
educational, military and governmental institutions.  The Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolutionarias de Colombia (FARC) was born as a result of the economic disparities 
between the social classes in Colombia and was monetarily supported by these 
underground markets.  The FARC was just one of several insurgent organizations that 
emerged during La Volencia.  The FARC still functions in Colombia as a medium for 
drug and weapon sales because of its energetic sympathizers and plentiful funding.  The 
local populace supplies the FARC with shelter, recruits, food, money from drug sales, 
and money paid for protection from the drug lords.32  Therefore, when the United States 
deemed it necessary to fight the War on Drugs, it used Colombia as one of its major 
battlegrounds. 
 Rivers in Colombia are a main mode of transportation between villages.  
Approximately 18,140 km of waterways within the country are navigable by river boats. 
The boats remain the most common form of transportation between towns in rural 
Colombia.  Waterways are also key enablers for the passage of illegal goods within and 
to the borders of the country.  In 1989, former President Bush established the Andean 
Ridge Initiative which established a RF, with the assistance of the Colombian military, to 
help fulfill the United States’ counter drug policy in Colombia.   
 The Colombian river program was implemented in 1990 with the Untied States 
Marine Corps taking the lead for the mission.  US Marines worked closely with the 
Columbian Marine Force to confiscate drugs and imprison those involved with the 
production and distribution of narcotics.   
 Not long after the Marines assumed the riverine mission in Columbia, it became 
clear that the Corps did not have the “capability to teach or implement the operational art 
 
31 P.F. Wiley, The Art of Riverine Warfare from an Asymmetrical Approach, Naval Postgraduate 
School Masters Thesis, March 2004, p. 29.  
32 P.F. Wiley, The Art of Riverine Warfare from an Asymmetrical Approach, Naval Postgraduate 
School Masters Thesis, March 2004, p. 30 
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of riverine warfare.”33 Naval Special Warfare assumed the counter-narcotics mission in 
Colombia by continuing the Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) which educated the 
Columbian Marines (COLMAR), a subset of the Colombian Navy (COLNAV), on the art 
of riverine warfare, particularly as it applies to defeating an insurgency.  Over time, the 
COLMAR developed a robust riverine program with the following mission: 
to increase, recover, and maintain the control of the maritime, riverine, 
and land spaces under responsibility of the COLNAV, and to neutralize 
the NTOs that act in those areas; and to contribute to restore the 
democratic security for the people of Columbia.34
 The overarching goal of the COLNAV is to protect the citizens and resources of 
the nation of Colombia, to combat the illegal movement of drugs, weapons, and 
contraband, and to destroy the logistics structure of the Narco-terrorists   In order to do 
this, the COLNAV must gain control of its area of operation and prohibit the movement 
of Narco Terrorist Organizations (NTO) along the coast, across seas and on the rivers.35  
This strategy, called “Closing the Gap,” is a combined initiative that closes trade routes 
used by NTOs to transport narcotics and precursor chemicals required to produce drugs.  
It is understood that the government of Colombia (with the backing of the U.S.) will 
provide the funding necessary for carrying out the “Gap” strategy.   
a. Firepower 
  Colombian riverine forces operate on 15,774 kilometers of the country’s 
waterways.  Five battalions are responsible for their respective areas of operation on the 
waterways.  No one force structure is adequate for all operations in Colombia due to the 
differences in terrain, climate, and waterways within the country.  The COLNAV does 
not have, nor does it use, advanced technology to fight the FARC.  They rely on 
conventional weapons, knowledge of the operational environment, a semi-constant 
presence, and tactics that best utilize their resources to carry out their missions. 
 
33 P.F. Wiley, The Art of Riverine Warfare from an Asymmetrical Approach, Naval Postgraduate 
School Masters Thesis, March 2004, p. 35. 
34  Armada Nacional Republica de Colombia, The Columbian Navy in the Fight against Narco- 
Terrorism, Retrieved 29 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=30009&.
35 Armada Nacional Republica de Colombia, The Columbian Navy in the Fight against Narco- 
Terrorism, Retrieved 29 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=30009&.
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b. Scouting 
  The jungle environment in Colombia is not conducive to systems that rely 
on unobstructed line of sight communications.  Foliage is very thick, can limit visibility 
to less than 50 meters,36 and can provide concealment to enemy forces.  The use of 
helicopters, or other air assets, is of little use because the jungle canopy obstructs the 
view from the air, even with powerful infrared (IR) cameras.  Therefore, the COLNAV 
must rely on HUMINT to detect the FARC and their logistics routes.      
 Scouting takes a different form in the Narco-Terrorism mission in the 
Colombian jungles.  Instead of searching for a high-cost technological solution to the 
sensor problem, COLMAR maintained a constant presence on the waterways to gain 
intelligence on the FARC.  Constant presence enabled the government to earn the trust of 
the people because, unlike 20 years ago, the people could now navigate the waterways 
without fear of extortion. Over time, the constant presence of COLMAR on the rivers 
showed the people that the government actually does care for its people.37  As the 
COLNAV forces extended their presence in the region, they began to establish close ties 
with the members of the local population.  As the relationships began to build, the locals 
saw the benefit of having COLNAV in their region and provided HUMINT to the 
COLNAV on the locations and troop strength of the FARC.  This form of scouting 
continues to provide the intelligence needed for rooting out the FARC and waging the 
war on drugs in Columbia. 
5. Historical Summary 
Historical analysis was conducted and potential functions were validated for 
relevance and feasibility to modern riverine operators.  SEA-10 contacted stakeholders 
and riverine operators with a list of historically feasible and verifiable riverine functions, 
and asked them to prioritize these functions.  Generic missions typically associated with 
the RF included conducting maritime security operations, control and denial of the 
riverine area, insertion and extraction of conventional forces, providing fire support and 
 
36 Department of the Army Headquarters, Field Manual 90-5 Jungle Operations, Washington, DC, 16 
August 1982.  Retrieved 29 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-5/index.html
37 P.F. Wiley, The Art of Riverine Warfare from an Assymetrical Approach, Naval Postgraduate 
School Masters Thesis, March 2004, p. 39 
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conducting theater security cooperation.38  SEA-10 chose five functions that are common 
to all of these missions and presented themselves as traceable, measurable, and 
quantifiable.  These functions were C4ISR, engage, move, sustain, and defend.   
The RF must be able to: 
• Detect, identify, and assess enemy movements, positions, and units in the riverine 
environment 
• Engage enemy positions and units in the riverine environment 
• Move the RF from theater to theater and within theaters 
• Sustain the RF (provide supplies, combat logistics) 
• Defend the RF tactical operations center (TOC) and non-combatant units 
Detect (a sub function of conduct C4ISR operations) and engage were deemed 
most important and both present quantifiable measurable data points such as range, 
probability of detection, and probability of kill.  Detect and engage were also judged as 
the two functions that would have the greatest effect on the RF of 2010. 
 
38 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(DRAFT), pp. 8-10, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. 30 August 2006.  
II. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A.  FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE 
A functional architecture represents the functions, tasks, and activities that a 
system must accomplish to be successful and the interactions that exist between them.  
SEA-10’s approach to generating a functional architecture was similar to Buede’s model; 
however, an existing list of system activities and functions was not available.  The RF of 
2007 is not yet in the field, the mission set is malleable, and there are no concrete 
performance requirements.  As described previously, SEA-10 conducted a historical 
analysis to better understand traditional riverine technologies, missions, and tactics, as 
well as to identify critical RF functions.  Figure 1 depicts SEA-10’s top down perspective 
of the functional architecture through a hierarchical model of the functions performed by 
the system, the flow of functions through the system, a revised problem statement for 
riverine warfare, and a tracing of system inputs and outputs to both functions and 
entities39.  The elements of the functional architecture led to the formulation of system 
objectives and quantifiable measures of effectiveness.  
    
Figure 1. SEA-10 Top-Down Approach to Functional Architecture Formulation. 
 
                                                 




                                                
B. SYSTEM DECOMPOSITION 
Historical analysis provided knowledge of riverine missions and activities.  This 
knowledge enabled detailed system decomposition.  Decomposition of these functions 
and elements and analysis of their interrelationships provided SEA-10 with top down 
perspective of a generic RF by designating what the RF must do to accomplish a 
historically feasible mission.  A top down perspective was critical in extracting a 
relevant, feasible, quantifiable problem from the amorphous topic of “riverine warfare.” 
SEA-10 examined system functions, components, and their interrelationships with 
respect to where they occur within the hierarchical structure of super systems, lateral 
systems, and sub systems.  Examination of the riverine system hierarchical structure 
yielded system functions and likely components.  A function is a definite purposeful 
action that a system must accomplish to achieve success.40  Components such as input, 
process, and output are the moving parts of a system.  Structural components are static, 
operating components perform system processing, and flow components are the material, 
energy, or information being altered.41
The states of the system are static snapshots of the system’s capabilities to 
perform the system’s functions at any certain time.  The system progresses through a 
constantly changing series of states as time progresses.  State variables define the 
condition of the system’s state at a specific point in time.  This list of state variables 
contains information needed to determine the system’s ability to perform the systems 
functions at that point in time.42
Initial decomposition of the riverine force, based upon the Draft U.S. Navy 
Riverine Force Concept of Operations prepared by NECC for Commander Fleet Forces 
Command dated 18 May 2006, is found in Figure 2.  SEA-10 decomposed the RF 




40 A.P. Sage, & J.E. Armstrong, Introduction to Systems Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000.  
41 B.S. Blanchard, & W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed, Pearson Education, 
Inc., 2006. 
42 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems: Model and Methods, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2000. 
 Figure 2. SEA-10 Initial Riverine System Decomposition43. 
 
1. Functions 
Functions enabled the transformation process of input to output, and ask the 
question, “What does the riverine system do?”  The functions listed in Figure 2 are the 
initial missions that NECC tasked the riverine force to perform.  Functions/missions 
included: control and denial of the riverine area, conducting maritime security operations, 
insertion and extraction of conventional forces, providing fire support, and engaging in 
theater security operations44.  
2. Components 
Components provide the physical breakdown of the RF and were separated into 
several component categories.  Structural components comprise the physical aspect of the 
RF.  Structural components that SEA-10 examined were: the number of riverine vessels 
NECC is willing to purchase and provide the RF (or the number inherited from the 
USMC), the number and the ratings of the sailors that will man the vessels, and the 
associated weapons issued to the crew or mounted on riverine vessels to provide 
                                                 
43 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 




                                                
offensive and defensive capabilities.  Operating components encompass entities that are 
required for specific RF missions.  Examples of operating components include the RF’s 
Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) teams, intelligence and exploitation teams, 
linguists, and organic C4ISR capabilities.  Flow components enable the RF to interact 
with agencies outside its own force structure.  Examples of flow components include sea 
basing and logistics support to the RF, integrated C4ISR capabilities that enable the RF to 
share information with other services, and Joint Forces coordination that allows the RF to 
call for fire.  
3. Hierarchical Structure 
 Hierarchal Structure outlines the make up or the top to bottom organization that 
comprise the riverine force.  The RF hierarchical structure has three levels.  Super 
systems are top-level organizations and/or the Chain of Command that make up the 
riverine force.  These are Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) who has 
overall responsibility for expeditionary combat and aligning the Navy's expeditionary 
capable elements so that the Navy is more capable, responsive and effective in the global 
war on terrorism (GWOT)45, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
(JFMCC), and the Sea Base Commander.   Lateral systems are second tier organizations 
that support and make up the riverine force.  Examples include Small Boat Units (SBUs), 
aviation squadrons that provide close air support, the US Coast Guard (USCG) who 
provides law enforcement detachment support for boarding, harbor police who aid in 
protecting and defending key operational areas, and US Customs who inspects cargo.  
These lateral sub-systems support and make up the riverine force indirectly with varying 
levels of interaction.  Sub-systems are organizations and entities that support and make 
up the riverine force directly.  Examples are supply and sustainment of the riverine force, 
support functions such as administrative, maintenance, medical, transportation and 
training support, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (ATFP), and hotel services.  
4. States 
 States are the operational conditions that the RF progresses through during 
different phases of development and employment.  States that apply to the RF: 
• Professional development or school house training (initial phases of training)   
 
45 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Retrieved 27 September 2006 from the World Wide Web 
at http://www.necc.navy.mil/about.htm.
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• Unit-level training where the team trains and qualifies in unit oriented 
missions (intermediate phases of training)   
• Integrated training where the RF is evaluated on its ability to work with and 
employ other forces and assets available to them 
• Deployment represents the final state where the RF executes a real-world 
operational mission 
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
System decomposition identified critical capabilities that a RF must have, and 
these capabilities were further categorized into functional blocks.  SEA-10 determined 
core riverine missions from analysis of the RF CONOPS.  Within each mission: Patrol 
and Interdiction, Theater Security Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Anti-Piracy and 
Maritime Security Operations, there are overlapping required riverine competencies.  
From these, SEA-10 derived the following critical global RF functions:  
• Conduct Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations  
• Move  
• Defend  
• Engage  
• Sustain   
Each function was defined using standard military definitions from Joint Pub 1-
0246.  These definitions enabled SEA-10 to derive questions about the baseline capability 
of the proposed RF.  These questions served as a starting point with stakeholders and 
were designed to promote feedback and generate a collaborative atmosphere during 
research visits.  Stakeholder feedback generated by these questions identified capability 
gaps of the proposed riverine force.  Specifically named capability gaps helped identify 
the technologies, techniques, tactics, procedures (TTP’s), and platforms SEA-10 should 
consider in creating RF physical and operational architectures.       
Stakeholder analysis identifies the clients, analysts, resources, and users that will 
be affected by or contribute to the design process.  Stakeholder input and guidance from 
 
46 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 
April 2001.    
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core documents, individuals, and organizations influenced design efforts and ensured the 
end result, recommendations for improving the Navy’s capability to conduct riverine 
operations, were relevant and applicable.  Buede states that stakeholder feedback and 
input are critical during the development of the functional architecture because it 
validates function conceptualization and reduces the chance of focusing on unimportant 
functions as areas that require analysis47. 
Initial efforts focused on a literature review to identify core documents that 
provide a baseline of current and historical riverine operations (as discussed in the 
Historical Analysis section of this thesis), requirements, and challenges.  SEA-10 
identified the organizations and individuals that have conducted riverine missions in the 
past and looked for relevant lessons that can be applied to increase future Navy Riverine 
Force capabilities. 
1. Primary Stakeholders     
SEA-10’s primary clients were Rear Admiral Bullard, the commander of Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), as well as Commodore Jordan, commander of 
River Group One (RIVGRU ONE), and the RIVGRU ONE staff.  System users included 
river squadron operators and other NECC and Joint forces personnel who will work with 
composite river squadrons.  Coalition partners are also affected by the Riverine Training 
Team (RTT) program.  The operators at the Special Missions Training Center, small boat 
teams, and Coast Guard units may benefit from SEA-10’s analysis of riverine warfare.    
Primary analysts for the design project are SEA-10, which consisted of two Naval Flight 
Officers and four Surface Warfare Officers.  No member of SEA-10 had experience as a 
riverine operator.  Collaborative efforts of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty and 
students provided insights gained from ongoing studies conducted by Tactical Network 
Topology (TNT) field experiments on tactical remote sensing systems (TRSS), and 
sensor networking for surveillance in collaboration with Coalition Operating Area 




47 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems: Model and Methods, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2000, p.129. 
2. Core Documentation 
Numerous core documents were used to gain a broad understanding of RF 
Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment (POE) 
in 2010.  SEA-10 referenced three core documents during the initial research phase of the 
project.  The first of these documents was the U.S. Navy Riverine Force Concept of 
Operations that was promulgated by RIVGRU ONE and NECC to define the current 
baseline and better understand the RF roles and missions proposed by NECC48.   The 
Center for Naval Analyses’ Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Force Capability: A Preliminary 
Examination of the Past Current and Future Capabilities provided historical references 
and examined required capabilities along with potential gaps (see Figure 3).  The most 
recent documentation on Riverine operations at the tactical level came from the Marine 
Corps Center for Lessons Learned in the document Small Craft Company’s Deployment 
in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II: A summary of lessons and observations49.  




Figure 3. CNA Projected Riverine Capability50. 
                                                 
48 R. Benbow, P. Ensminger, S. Swartz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis Report, Renewal of 
Riverine’s Capability:  A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, pp 85-100, 
January 2006.  
49 US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), 4 April 2006. 
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D. STAKEHOLDER INPUT 
1. RADM Bullard, Commander NECC 
 In May of 2006, just after initial thesis topic assignment, SEA-10 was fortunate to 
have the Commander of NECC, Rear Admiral (RADM) Bullard, as a guest and presented 
him with an interim review and solicited his feedback.  RADM Bullard told SEA-10 the 
project had immense potential for value and that he was looking for a “biggest bang for 
the buck” recommendation in terms of technology or force packages that returned the 
greatest improvement in mission performance.  He also emphasized the need to 
understand the nature of engagements in the riverine environment and recommended 
SEA-10 study Vietnam air support and indirect fire methods.  RADM Bullard was 
realistic about what could be accomplished during the course of SEA-10’s thesis work 
and commented that a sound recommendation on a single piece of the riverine problem 
would be tremendously useful to him.  He also pointed out that the RF should be 
examined as an extension of the battle group so there is an expectation of mutually 
supporting forces, and the realignment of the core expeditionary warfare competencies 
under NECC (see Figure 4) will facilitate that mutual support capability.  
 
50 R. Benbow, P. Ensminger, S. Swartz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis Report, Renewal of 
Riverine’s Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, p. 65, January 
2006. 
 Figure 4. NECC Force Structure51. 
 
2. East Coast Stakeholder Meetings 
 SEA-10 felt face to face meetings were important to foster trust and solicit buy-in 
to the project.  In early July, 2006 two SEA-10 team members traveled to meet with 
personnel at the Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR) Naval Station in Chesapeake, 
Virginia, River Group One (RIVGRU ONE) at Little Creek Amphibious Base in 
Virginia, and finally the Special Missions Training Center (SMTC) at Camp Lejeune, 
North Carolina. 
a. Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR)    
  SEA-10 spoke to retired Marine Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Joshua Iversen at 
CENSECFOR.  Mr. Iversen was a member of the Marine Small Craft Company (SCCo) 
and completed two deployments to Colombia as part of a Riverine Training Team (RTT) 
and two deployments to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  He was a boat 
captain for SCCo during his last tour in Iraq.  He is a technical expert on the weapons, 
platforms, and tactics used by SCCo and was an invaluable source of information. 
                                                 
51 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Riverine Force Concept of Operations Brief, Naval 
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 3 March 2006.  
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Mr. Iversen explained that during Operation Iraqi Freedom SCCo was 
fully supported through the regional area of operations (AO) commander and able to 
support major combat operations (MCO).   Areas where SCCo was supported included, 
but were not limited to, combat logistics (POL) support, combined supporting arms 
(Close Air Support (CAS), quick reaction force (QRF)), ground combat element (GCE), 
explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), linguists, and forward area controller (FAC) 
personnel as required by the mission profile (i.e., EOD for cache detection and 
destruction, Special Forces (SF) for High Value Target raids).  Mr. Iversen presented the 
SCCo lessons learned brief covering SCCo platoon organization, TTPs, and his 
assessment of capabilities and deficiencies for SCCo including areas of concern for the 
Riverine squadrons (RIVRONs).  A summary of the lessons learned included: 
• The Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC), the SCCo riverine platform, proved to 
be extremely robust and able to perform missions after taking battle damage.  
• Dedicated air support and quick reaction force assets were essential in 
destroying defended riverbank positions.  
• POL support proved to be critical in maintaining patrol tempo. 
• Hydrographic and visual surveys of operational area were extremely 
important to preplan missions and ensure that units knew the river 
environment and locations of riverbank obstructions. 
• There were no significant waterborne IED threats to date; therefore, doctrine 
has not been generated to combat waterborne IEDs. 
• Linguists were useful only if they were trustworthy and could communicate to 
SCCo personnel effectively. 
• The lead riverine vessel was always the target and detection usually occurred 
simultaneously with engagement. 
• AO commanders must understand and trust RF capabilities if they are to be 
effectively integrated in the battle space. 
b. River Group One (RIVGRU ONE) 
SEA-10’s focus at River Group One (RIVGRU ONE) was to determine 
the baseline capabilities of the proposed RF.  At RIVGRU ONE, SEA-10 met with 
Commodore Jordan, Commander of RIVGRU ONE, and two of his civilian staff, both 
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prior military, Mr. Russ Baker and Mr. Tom Lafferty.  Mr. Baker is a former Navy small 
boat unit operator and Mr. Lafferty was an enlisted small boat unit operator and was later 
commissioned as a Surface Warfare Officer.  Mr. Baker gave a brief overview of the 
types of technologies RIVGRU and NECC are interested in, including Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV’s), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV’s), Unmanned Ground Sensors 
(UGS’s), and platforms to augment the SURC’s and crew served weapons that the river 
squadrons (RIVRONs) have inherited from Small Craft Company.  Mr. Lafferty provided 
the RIVGRU training plan, draft Navy Mission Essential Task List (NMETL), doctrinal 
documentation including the latest draft of the NECC Riverine Concept of Operations 
and NWP 3-06M, along with lessons learned from SCCo in Iraq.  Takeaways from 
RIVGRU ONE included:  
• RF support (Logistics, CAS, Intel), in scenarios involving less than major 
combat operations conducted in remote environments, is not clearly defined 
(Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), Anti-Piracy).   
• Use SCCo to determine the baseline platform, weapons, communications, and 
sensor capability for the US Navy’s Riverine Force.   
Mr. Lafferty also confirmed that the first RIVRON will inherit the SURC’s from SCCo. 
Follow on squadrons will consist of six SURC, four Special Operations Craft Riverine 
(SOC-R), and two command and control craft (likely to be 11m RHIBs). 
c. Special Missions Training Center (SMTC) 
Former SCCo members SSGT Czernewski and SGT Philips hosted SEA-
10 at SMTC.  They provided excellent feedback on baseline capabilities and went over 
the list of stake holder questions.  Key takeaways included: 
• There are no waterborne IED’s to date; therefore, no TTP was developed, but 
IEDs/waterborne mines are a likely area for concern. 
• The typical SCCo communication package requires improvement.  Units are 
using Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, Ultra 
High Frequency (UHF) radios, and Tactical Satellite communications 
(TACSAT).  The RF used Global Positioning System (GPS) for position 
updates and communication with CAS units.   
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• Operators expressed a strong desire for Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 
or a similar system, based on its projected ability to call for indirect fire 
support. 
• Preventive and daily maintenance of SURC’s and crew served weapons was 
not mission impacting.  SURC crews maintained both platform and weapons 
with minimal contractor support.   
• The SURC is a robust platform as proven by a battlefield example where a 
SURC sustained a direct RPG hit and was still able to return to the extraction 
point.   
• Major SURC parts, engine, communication systems, and weapons, are “plug 
and play” for ease of use. 
• All missions began with 3 days water and food ration.    
• Boat captains must be equipped with Night Vision Goggles (NVG), and 
thermal imagers are necessary for night operations.   
• Heavy Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) necessitated multiple sets of 
equipment to be carried on board, despite original tasking.  For example, night 
raiding equipment would be taken on early morning missions because time 
tables may change and returning to an extraction point or base may prove 
infeasible or impossible. 
• SURC’s require a fuel additive for use with JP-5/JP-8 versus diesel, and this 
could be a limiting factor for logistics/supply. 
• Hydrographic data was critical to understand, identify, and avoid hazardous 
river obstacles and conditions. 
3. Stakeholder Conclusions 
Stakeholder feedback narrowed the focus of historical research and validated 
SEA-10’s initial system decomposition.  The flexibility of the RF to conduct operations 
effectively in multiple environments was a concern at all stakeholder levels.  One of the 
primary concerns stakeholders had was RF vulnerability to attack from the riverbanks 
and its ability to detect and neutralize this type of threat.  SEA-10 found this problem 
interesting, relevant, and feasible enough to make it the focus of the remaining systems 
architecting process.  The RF has a need for increased ability to achieve battle space 
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awareness beyond the visual range and a corresponding organic engagement capability.  
Achieving both are critical to fielding a survivable and effective RF. 
E. INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
Input-output modeling is used to scope and bound a problem52.  The input-output 
model defines the boundaries and boundary conditions of the system.  It does so by 
analyzing inputs and focusing on what outputs are either intentionally or unintentionally 
generated by the system.  SEA-10 examined the controllable and uncontrollable inputs to 
the global RF system and evaluated the potential for intended and unintended outputs 
from the system.  Figure 5 illustrates the inputs and outputs considered by SEA-10.  
Consider a controllable input such as sensor coverage.  In jungle environments, a likely 
riverine environment, increased sensor coverage could aid the RF to track potential 
hostile forces or remotely monitor sections of the riverine environment.  This increase in 
sensor coverage could lead to increased situational awareness (SA).  Conversely, it could 
lead the enemy to adapt tactics and change smuggling routes or force employment to 
offset the RF’s increased SA.  The ability to hypothesize and trace input flow and output 
effects adds great value to functional analysis. 
 
52 E.P. Paulo, SI4001 Systems Engineering and Architecture Course Notes;Needs Analysis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Delivered 10 January 2006. 
 Figure 5. SEA-10 Riverine Input-Output Model. 
 
F. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
After system decomposition of the riverine problem, stakeholder feedback to 
validate ideas on global riverine system functions and components, and input output 
analysis, SEA-10 bound the riverine problem to the global functions which the RF must 
accomplish to succeed in missions assigned in the CONOPS.  These missions include 
conducting maritime security operations, control and denial of the riverine area, insertion 
and extraction of conventional forces, providing fire support and conducting theater 
security cooperation.  From these missions SEA-10 composed a functional hierarchy 
consisting of five global functions: conduct C4ISR operations, move, defend, engage, and 
sustain as shown in Figure 6.  Identifying these global functions helped provide insight 
on whether the potential solution would involve the use of equipment, software, people, 
facilities, or data.  Each function was defined using standard military definitions from 





























Figure 6. SEA-10 Primitive Riverine Functional Hierarchy. 
 
1. Conduct C4ISR Operations 
C4ISR operations include the authority and responsibility for effectively using 
available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned 
missions.  Sub-functions of C4ISR include: 
Command and Control 
• Deliver the commander’s intent 
• Exchange tactical data 
• Direct supporting arms 
Detect is the perception of an object of possible military interest53.  Awareness and 
knowledge of identity are key elements of detect.  Sub-functions of detect include: 
• Exchange Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
• Search 
• Find 




                                                 
53 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term, 12 
April 2001.  
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2. Move 
Move is to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in position of advantage over the 
enemy.  It is the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and cargo 
movements over lines of communications54. Sub-functions of move include: 
• Sortie of the riverine force or deploy 
• Lifting of troops and equipment 
• Insertion and extraction of troops and vital personnel 
3. Defend 
To defend is to absorb or repulse attacks, progressively weaken an attack, prevent 
initial observations of the whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to 
maneuver the reserve55.  Sub-functions of defend include: 
• Provide AT/FP 
• Escort units of interests 
• Patrol areas of interests  
4. Engage 
Engage to bring the enemy under fire.  It is a series of related military operations 
aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and 
space56.  Sub-functions of engage include: 





Sustain is the provision of personnel, logistics and other support required to 
maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision 
of the mission or the objective57.  Sub-functions of sustain include: 
• Training of the RF 
 
54 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term, 12 





                                                
• Outfitting the RF 
• Maintaining equipment  
• Repairing equipment 
• Combat supply of the RF 
G. FOCUS ON DETECT AND ENGAGE FUNCTIONS 
Interaction with stakeholders and needs analysis provided the necessary focus to 
reduce the number of functions and sub functions to investigate in the project.  
Stakeholder interaction specifically directed concern and emphasis toward study of 
defeating the “bend in the river” or ambush problem.  The primary problem in the 
ambush scenario is to transform unidentified or hidden targets within the battlespace into 
neutralized targets while the RF avoids damage.   
The RF’s near term February 2007 Iraq deployment timeline motivated SEA-10 
to focus on combat critical functions for this thesis.  Even though the RF is deploying in 
2007, stakeholder analysis focused on capabilities and budget funding that were available 
in the near term.  Therefore, SEA-10’s goal was to make recommendations to NECC and 
RIVGRU ONE on the needs of a RF in a sight constrained battlespace for 2010.   
The basic need to improve the RF’s ability to “see the enemy before they were 
seen,” and to “kill the enemy before they were killed” became the focus of research after 
system decomposition and initial stakeholder feedback.  With this need in mind, the 
functions of the riverine system were analyzed by looking at the kill chain functional 
hierarchy as shown in Figure 758.  Within this hierarchy SEA-10 chose to focus on the 
combat critical functions of detect and engage and sought to determine the mechanisms 
by which the RF system could be designed to affect overall system performance.  
 
 
58 The National Academies Press "C4ISR For Future Naval Strike Groups" Retrieved 05 September 












Figure 7. Refined Functional Hierarchy with the Detect-to-Engage Sequence. 
 
H. FUNCTIONAL FLOW DIAGRAM AND CONTEXT MODEL 
SEA-10 examined the system using a Functional Flow Diagram (FFD) and a 
corresponding Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) that represents the kill chain. 
These diagrams illustrate how the functions interact to allow total system operations 
(Figure 8 and 9).  Analysis further devolved top level functions into second level 
functions (1.1 and 5.1 series in Figure 9).  Second level functions were broken down into 
third level functions (1.3.1 through 1.3.2 in Figure 9).  From this level, sub functions 
were down to the level necessary to adequately describe the system and its various 
elements in functional terms, to show functional interrelationships, and to identify the 
resources needed for functional implementation.  Block numbers are used to show 
sequential and parallel relationships and provide top-down traceability through functions.  
Later in the development of RF global physical architectures, these block numbers also 
demonstrate bottom-up traceability and justification of the physical resources necessary 
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The final step in functional analysis was to build a context diagram that dissects 
the RF global detect and engage system into simpler parts and examines where 
interactions were taking place.  Since SEA-10 was constrained by a timeline and 
modeling limitations, the choice was made to focus efforts on the relationships between 
the two functions in order to provide relevant insight.  The two direct combat related 
functions of detect and engage were chosen on the basis that SEA-10 would be able to 
model each function during the time allotted with traceable measures of effectiveness and 
provide meaningful results to NECC and RIVGRU ONE in their consideration of 
alternatives for the 2010 RF.  Each block in Figure 10 represents an operational function 
that must be performed for the system to accomplish its designated mission.   
Each function (as shown in previous figures) was defined in terms of inputs, 
outputs, controls and/or constraints, and enabling mechanisms.  Activities transform 
inputs into outputs.  Inputs enter the left side of the box and are the information or 
material used to produce the activity’s output.  Mechanisms enter the bottom of the box 
and are the resources that perform processing or provide energy to the activity.     
Mechanisms lead to identification of physical resources necessary to accomplish the 
function, evolving from the “whats” to the “hows.”  For example, SEA-10 identified the 
detect mechanisms as sensors, computers and personnel while engagement mechanisms 
were identified as the employment of maneuver, decoys, weapons or countermeasures.  
Controls regulate an activity as it converts inputs to outputs.  Outputs exit the box from 
the right and are the results of an activity. 
 Figure 10. Riverine Context Diagram. 
 
I. REVISED PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 The initial problem statement, stakeholder inputs, and functional analysis resulted 
in an improved definition of riverine warfare.  SEA-10 used these elements of the 
functional architecture to generate the following revised problem statement: 
“Define, analyze, and recommend a cost effective alternative from competing 
architectures that increases the US Navy’s proposed riverine force’s battle space 
awareness and situational responsiveness utilizing technologies currently in use 
or available for use by 2010.” 
The critical function detect is best represented by the term battlespace awareness.  
Battlespace awareness encompasses sensor coverage and detection, communication 
ability, and the time a commander has to make a tactical decision.  The critical function 
engage is best represented by the term situational responsiveness.  Situational 
responsiveness encompasses the options available to a commander to bring weapons to 
bear upon enemy forces. 
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J. OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
1. Introduction 
 An objectives hierarchy is defined by Buede as, “the hierarchy of objectives that 
are important to the system’s stakeholders in a value sense; that is, the stakeholders 
would (should) be willing to pay to obtain increased performance (or decreased cost) in 
any one of these objectives.59”  SEA-10 used the revised problem statement as the top 
level objective that must be achieved.  This resulted in an easily understandable, non-
redundant objectives hierarchy, supported by lower tier evaluation measures that 
adequately covered all evaluation concerns.  Figure 11 illustrates the objectives hierarchy 
for this design problem.  This section details the components, logic, and takeaways 
represented by the objective hierarchy.   
 




                                                 
59 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods, p. 147, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
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2. Objectives Hierarchy Composition 
 The revised problem statement was decomposed into two separate objectives: 
increase situational awareness and increase situational responsiveness.  These objectives 
were analyzed separately.  The objectives hierarchy was limited to those portions 
determined to be most critical to the RF.  This allowed the objectives hierarchy to be 
effectively communicated to stakeholders and used fewer resources to evaluate60
3. Increase Battlespace Awareness 
SEA-10 determined that increased battlespace awareness can be accomplished by 
increased information processing, increased detection ability, and/or improved 
communications.  SEA-10 chose to scope this objective down by only examining 
increased detection capability.  Detection capability’s importance was emphasized in 
both historical literature reviews and feedback from stakeholders.  Detection technology 
is mature and could be implemented into the RF of 2010.  Increased detection capability 
could be accomplished by increasing the number and types of sensors used, increasing 
sensor range, and increasing sensor performance as shown in Figure 12.   
 
Figure 12. Increased Detection Capability Objective Breakdown. 
 
4. Increase Response Capability 
SEA-10 determined that increased response capability can be achieved by 
increased interoperability (of units and equipment) or by increased engagement                                                  
60 E.P. Paulo, SI4001 Systems Engineering and Architecture Course Notes, Value (or Objectives) 
Hierarchy: Functions, Attributes, and Metrics Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 23 January 
2005. 
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capability.  Increased engagement capability could be accomplished by increasing the 
number and types of weapons employed, increasing weapons range, and increasing the 
effectiveness or lethality of the weapons used as shown in Figure 13.  Again, SEA-10 
chose engagement over interoperability because engagement technologies are mature and 
fit the 2010 timeframe of this thesis.  Engagement technologies also bypass the doctrinal 
and parochial issues that accompany interoperability.  Engagement also pointed to 
distinct quantifiable measures of effectiveness.    
 
Figure 13. Increased Engagement Capability Objective Breakdown. 
 
5 Operational Suitability 
The third branch of the objectives hierarchy addressed operational suitability 
requirements shown in Figure 14.  Operational suitability is another set of values that 
represent physical “ilities” that are critical to every system’s efficiency.  However, 
operational suitability was not considered for quantitative analysis in this thesis because 
SEA-10 did not want to limit the scope of the physical architecture by using any of the 
“ilities” as constraints.  For example, SEA-10 did not want to constrain physical 
architecture alternatives by transportability because NECC’s transport capability has not 
yet been defined.  Limiting options by this constraint may result in a less effective 
analysis.  SEA-10 did conduct a qualitative discussion of reliability (based on existing 
equipment) of the components of the various alternative force packages in chapter VII 
Riverine System Reliability.   
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 Figure 14. Operational Suitability Values. 
 
K. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The RF objectives hierarchy designated which objectives were measured and 
which design criteria were used to evaluate system designs61.  A measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) expresses the extent to which a system accomplishes an operational objective62.  
MOE’s also provide the decision maker with a way to measure the degree that one 
alternative is superior to the other alternatives.  MOE’s are recorded and analyzed in the 
modeling and analysis phase.  MOE must be quantifiable, relevant to the problem, and 
feasible.  In order to generate MOE that met these criteria, SEA-10 conducted 
stakeholder and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) campus interviews with riverine 
operators to evaluate MOE suitability.  The end goal was to generate MOE that present a 
clear indication of the alternative architecture’s ability to achieve design objectives of 
improved battle space awareness and response capability. 
1. MOE Collaboration 
SEA-10 added credibility to the MOE listed in Figure 11 (MOE’s are indicated by 
the light green boxes) by interviewing NPS students with past operational riverine 
experience (but were not experts on MOE).  Five students replied to the request for 
information and provided insight on MOE feasibility and priority.  The students had a 
                                                 
61 A.P. Sage & J.E. Armstrong, Introduction to Systems Engineering, pp. 112-113, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 2000. 
62 D.H. Wagner, W.C. Mylander, & T.J. Sanders, Naval Operations Analysis. 3rd Edition, p. 12, Naval 
Institute Press, 1999. 
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wealth of knowledge and came from different operational backgrounds.  Table 4 
summarizes each student’s operational experience. 
 
Table 4. NPS Riverine Operator Experience. 
 
2. MOE Prioritization 
 Prioritization of MOE took place through an interview process with the student 
volunteers.  Interviews of the students consisted of a one-on-one discussion with an SEA-
10 member to record their professional opinions on how to prioritize a pre-determined list 
of MOE’s.  The students were then asked to prioritize a list of alternative force packages 
which were developed by SEA-10 members.  Table 5 is the list of MOE given to the 
student participants. 
 
Table 5. Riverine MOE with Focus on Detect and Engage. 
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 The following scenario was developed to place the MOE in context for the 
student volunteers, and based on scenarios that stakeholders reported were feasible RF 
missions. 
You are the commander of the section of four SURC’s and are on patrol in 
a river that is located in a populated region and whose banks are 
obstructed by foliage.  Two of the SURC’s are designated as the scout 
boats, the 3rd SURC is the command and control boat and the 4th SURC 
provides security for the C2 boat.  You are in one of the lead scout boats 
and are going around a bend of the river where the enemy has recently 
carried out ambushes on riverine forces. What do you consider are the 
most important measures of effectiveness that will allow SEA-10 to 
adequately assess the best alternative for increasing detection and 
engagement capability of your section of SURC’s in this scenario? 
Students were permitted to ask questions about the scenario and were then asked 
to prioritize the MOE’s.  Students were instructed to designate the most important MOE 
with #1.  The students were also given the opportunity to ask questions about the 
meanings of the MOE’s and were given the option to subjugate an MOE if they felt it 
should reside as a subset of another MOE.  Table 6 lists the results of student operator 
MOE preferences.  One of the student participants did not respond to SEA-10’s request 
for MOE preferences.   
 
Table 6. NPS Riverine Operator MOE Preferences. 
 
3. MOE Derivation 
Analysis of the MOE lists indicated that having the ability to detect the target was 
a high priority for all of the students.  Combat power and weapons accuracy also 
achieved a high priority among all four of the students.  Most of the students mentioned 
mobility as a significant factor for mission success during the interviews, but they did not 
rank it as such.  Due to the small sample size of participants, there was little point in 
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conducting a robust statistical analysis of the results; however, SEA-10 felt that the 
interviews provided militarily significant information.  
 MOE displayed in Table 7 were derived from the RF objectives hierarchy and 
refined by student interviews.  They are intended to scope the analysis and act as a basis 
for evaluation between competing alternatives.     Measures of Performance (MOP) are 
listed with their corresponding MOE and are quantitative or qualitative measures of a 
system’s performance63.  MOE chosen for this thesis are in context with the scenarios 
and may not be adequate for all circumstances the RF may encounter.   
 
Table 7. RF Objectives, Measures of Effectiveness, and Measures of Performance. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The objectives hierarchy provided the traceability and design guidance necessary 
to transition into the RF physical architecture.  It described how the group chose to scope 
the problem and bounded the type of data needed to evaluate the alternative architectures 
and the ability of those architectures to achieve the stated objectives.  SEA-10 focused its 
efforts in the combat critical skills of detect and engage to give the RF powerful high 
level insight into the types of architectures in which to invest.   
                                                 
63 D.H. Wagner, W.C. Mylander, & T.J. Sanders, Naval Operations Analysis. 3rd Edition, p. 12, Naval 
Institute Press, 1999. 
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III. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE 
The physical architecture of a system is a hierarchical description of the resources 
that comprise the system64.  The physical architecture provides resources for every 
function identified in the functional architecture65.  The objectives hierarchy serves as a 
link between the functional and physical architectures by identifying physical entities that 
may satisfy needs identified in the functional architecture.  The SEA-10 RF physical 
architecture consists of an analysis of the proposed NECC RF, and an analysis of SEA-10 
generated alternatives of RF technologies and employment options.  Each alternative was 
created with the overarching objectives of “increase battlespace awareness” and “increase 
situational responsiveness” in mind.  MOE and MOP are traceable through each 
alternative to the overarching RF objectives. 
B. NECC PROPOSED RF STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYMENT  
1. NECC Proposed Riverine Force 
The current U.S. Navy Riverine Force Concept of Operations specifies that the 
force will consist of three squadrons of 12 Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC).  The 
smaller force structure dictates that NECC RF elements be interoperable with other battle 
space assets in order to prosecute potential targets and maintain awareness.  The proposed 
force’s smaller size was one of the major reasons SEA-10 chose detect and engage as 
critical functions to study because of the limited number of organic combat assets 
available to the RF. 
2. The Worthington Study 
Analysis of RF size and hypothetical capability has been done before.  In 1990, 
the Navy/Marine Corps Board commissioned the Worthington study on riverine warfare 
which explained the need for a RF and suggested a force layout66.  The study examined 
potential missions for a RF and designed a brigade sized, joint Navy/Marine Corps force 
 
64 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods, p. 216, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
65 D.M. Buede, The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods, p. 217, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
66 R. Benbow, P. Ensminger, S. Swartz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis Report, Renewal of 
Riverine’s Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, January 2006. 
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that would be composed of approximately 3000 personnel, 75 riverine craft, and both 
rotary and fixed wing air assets.  A similar force structure was utilized in Vietnam and 
found necessary in order to maintain battle space awareness in the riverine environment, 
mount a formidable assault, sustain the force for regular operations, and maintain riverine 
base security67.  The Worthington Study differs significantly with the NECC proposed 
RF in that GCE, CAS, and other supporting elements are organic to the Worthington 
Study force, while all of these elements are alluded to as supporting forces in the NECC 
RF CONOPS.  A full understanding of RF structure and employment capability was 
necessary to accurately develop a comprehensive physical architecture. 
3. Conduct of Riverine Operations 
The RF of 2007 is constructed around security missions on the Euphrates River 
and around Haditha Dam, a major source of hydroelectric power to central Iraq, 
approximately 140 miles northwest of Baghdad68.  Even with the well understood 
immediate mission in Iraq, it was difficult to find an encompassing mission statement for 
the RF of 2007.  Riverine operations in 2010 are more ambiguous and are subject to 
speculation on the future of world affairs.  The River Squadron ONE (RIVRON ONE) 
website states that the mission of the riverine force is to “conduct Shaping and Stability 
Operations, to provide Maritime Security, train coalition partners in riverine operations, 
conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and limited combined 
operations.”69 According to the Riverine CONOPS to Fleet Forces Command the focus 
of the riverine force “will be on conducting maritime security operations and theater 
security cooperation in a riverine area of operations or other suitable area.”70  The 
language used to describe the physical mission requirements, or the actual tasks that the 
RF would have to perform, was difficult to discern from these sources.  Therefore, SEA-
 
67 R. Benbow, P. Ensminger, S. Swartz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis Report, Renewal of 
Riverine’s Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, p. 18, January 
2006.  
68 Global Security, Haditha. Retrieved 20 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
[www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/haditha.htm.]. 
69 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command.  Retrieved 5 October 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/rivronone/index.htm.  
70 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(FINAL), Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 28 September 2006. 
10 developed a ‘long view’71 of the RF’s operating requirements and environment in 
2010.    SEA-10’s interpretation of the RF’s mission in 2010 is based on literature 
searches, interviews with stakeholders and educated judgment. 
4. NECC Proposed Baseline Force   
SEA-10 utilized the U.S. Navy Riverine Warfare Concept of Operations RF 
structure as the baseline for alternatives.  This force structure will deploy to Iraq in the 
near term, a desert environment.  SEA-10’s scenarios are based in the Niger Delta, a 
jungle environment.  SEA-10 chose this environment on the assumption that the RF will 
need to augment itself for missions in varying environments.  The proposed RF is a single 
environment one dimensional force, shown in Table 8, while the force of 2010 will need 
to operate in multiple environments.   
 
Table 8. Estimated NECC Baseline RF Capability72,73. 
 
Substantiation of SEA-10’s interpretation of the proposed baseline was critical to 
the overall credibility of alternatives and, ultimately, to the proposed system of systems.  
SEA-10’s interpretation of the proposed baseline serves as the basis for comparison in 
analysis of alternatives because of the lack of operational data available for the proposed 
                                                 
71 P. Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1991. 
72 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations – US Navy Riverine Force 
(FINAL), Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 28 September 2006.  
73 US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), 4 April 2006. 
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RF.  SEA-10’s interpretation of the baseline force was endorsed by RIVGRU ONE, 
because it accurately represents the actual RF that will deploy to Iraq in February 200774.   
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. Analysis of Alternatives and the Physical Architecture 
The purpose of analysis of alternatives is to develop an understanding of “how 
each alternative impacts the needs, constraints, alterables, and objectives that were 
specified as part of the issue formulation effort.”75  In plain terms, analysis of alternatives 
looks at all of the ways to accomplish a goal or complete a mission, and then chooses the 
most effective method to do so.  A commander may think that he or she needs a bridge to 
cross a river, but a bridge may not actually be the most effective or efficient means of 
transporting people and equipment across.  Instead of “needing a bridge”, what the 
commander truly desires is “the best way to cross the river”.  Comprehensive analysis 
depends on two products of problem formulation: a detailed description of feasible 
alternatives and a set of criteria to evaluate the alternatives.”76  Evaluation criteria were 
generated in the functional architecture, while the generation of alternative physical 
system architectures substantiates the conceptual RF solutions generated in the functional 
architecture.  This section examines the logic that SEA-10 used to develop objective 
criteria necessary for comparing alternative force packages, and which force packages 
were chosen for system modeling and analysis.  
2. Need for Alternatives Generation 
The Navy’s proposed RF advertises itself as more capable than USMC Small 
Craft Company (SCCo) in that the Navy RF will act as an independent force capable of 
conducting boat operations 24 hours per day.77 Analysis of previous riverine forces led 
SEA-10 to determine that the detection and engagement capability of the Navy’s 
proposed RF may be less than that of SCCo.  SCCo was supported by USMC Ground 
Combat Element (GCE) and Air Combat Element (ACE) units which enabled immediate 
deployable area control and integrated air support.  Both GCE and ACE units trained 
 
74 Video Teleconference between RIVGRU ONE and SEA-10, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 
C.A., 6 October 2006. 
75 A.P. Sage & J.E. Armstrong, Introduction to Systems Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000. 
76 A.P. Sage & J.E. Armstrong, Introduction to Systems Engineering, p. 179,  John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
77 Interview US Navy, RIVGRU ONE N2 and SEA-10, Camp Roberts C.A., 16 August 2006. 
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with and were familiar with SCCo operators and tactics.  This level of combat integration 
is not present in the Navy’s proposed RF as stated in the CONOPs.  If the proposed RF is 
a “supported” force, fluidity of operations may be disjointed at times because of the lack 
of familiarity between joint forces.  This analysis ultimately led to our revised problem 
statement that the proposed RF must have the capability to detect and engage enemy 
forces beyond visual range.  Therefore SEA-10 chose alternatives that should enhance the 
detection and engagement capability of the proposed RF.   
3. Alternative Generation Methodology 
Alternatives must be feasible and significantly different from one another. 
Alternatives must also yield results that are quantifiable and may be assessed using 
measures of effectiveness that are traceable to the original problem statement.  These 
criteria led SEA-10 to compose a set of alternatives that look at competing ways to 
increase detection and engagement capability for the RF of 2010 as compared to the 
baseline force of 2007.   
Alternatives were the product of open group discussions that included 
stakeholders, past and current riverine operators, and technical experts in detection and 
engagement technologies.  These discussions encompassed current and near term 
detection and engagement technology, as well as recently employed detection and 
engagement tactics.  SEA-10 imposed the 2010 time constraint to add feasibility to this 
study in that only mature technology would be considered for alternative systems. 
The lack of concrete RF performance requirements led to variability in the 
definition of mission “success” or “improvement” from one alternative to another.  None 
of the current riverine source documents78,79 state any definite performance standards 
that a force would have to meet for detection or engagement ranges and times.  This issue 
was further confounded by the vast quantity of technological options available for both 
detection and engagement.  This led to the development of a scaling process for select 
technological augments.   
4. Proposed RF Mission for 2010 
 
78 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(DRAFT),  Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 30 August 2006. 
79 US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), MCB Quantico, VA, 4 April 2006. 
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A succinct mission enables analysis of mission functions previously discussed in 
this thesis.  Finding a specific mission statement for the RF was difficult because there is 
ambiguity among decision makers on the actual roles the RF will play in the future.  
SEA-10 developed plausible scenarios for future riverine operational environments to test 
alternative force packages.   
SEA-10’s mission for the Niger Delta RF of 2010 was based on scenarios that 
require the RF to patrol the Niger River over a 15 kilometer x 25 kilometer area, interdict 
contraband from rebel forces using the river as a means for transportation of illicit 
material, protect the lines of communication for the indigenous people, and defend 
against ambush.  These scenarios are further explained in the RF operational architecture   
section. 
5. Technologies Considered 
Technologies considered for alternatives had to be feasible to the selected mission 
sets, technologically mature, obtainable, and employable by the United States.  There are 
dozens of unmanned systems available to the defense department.  SEA-10 examined 
these technologies from a broad standpoint of performance and chose systems that have 
been deployed or thoroughly field tested.  Platforms were chosen based on the number 
and types of sensors they carried and the associated detection ranges of these sensors, 
whether or not they could provide targeting data rather than simply observation data, and 
overall physical and operational characteristics such as flight altitude, size, endurance, 
and controllability.   
SEA-10 chose platform characteristics based on the average capability of 
platforms likely to be procured by NECC.  For example, Predator or Global Hawk were 
not considered because of their cost.  One Predator UAV system cost 24.4 million dollars 
(FY04$), and is not feasible for the budget of the RF.80  UAV’s like Dragoneye were also 
eliminated from consideration because of waterproofing, launch and retrieval problems, 
and lack of endurance.81  UAV’s with capabilities similar to Scan Eagle or Shadow 200 
were chosen as the most likely platforms for wide area search.  Spartan Scout, Sea Fox, 
and High Speed Surface Target all possessed characteristics that the RF may desire in a 
 
80  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Road Map 2005-2030, p. 38, 2005.  
81 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Road Map 2005-2030, p. 26, 2005.  
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USV.  Tactical Remote Sensor System was chosen as a likely candidate for a UGS 
because of its maturity and field testing level.82  SEA-10 chose unmanned sensor 
platforms that were not cost prohibitive to the RF, and that could produce a quantifiable 
gain in either detection or engagement capability.  These sensor platforms were then 
integrated into five different force packages. 
D. FORCE PACKAGES  
Five individual force packages, other than the baseline force, were compared 
against each other using MOE and MOP to determine whether the force package 
adequately enhanced the detection and or engagement capability of the RF.    The 
military significance of each force package is described below, as well as brief qualitative 
assessments of each force package’s limitations and potential benefits.  A summarization 
of how each alternative is significantly different from other alternatives is included for 
force package distinction, and to trace the logic of each alternative from functional 
objectives to physical employment options.  Table 9, at the end of this section, 
summarizes the detection and engagement elements of all the force packages. 
1. Baseline + Sensors 
In the baseline + sensors alternative, a singular unmanned system (UAV, USV, or 
UGS) is paired with the previously described baseline force.  Detect and engage elements 
of the baseline are augmented by the individual strengths of one unmanned system.  
Several assumptions accompany this alternative.  The most critical assumption is that 
each unmanned system will be able to communicate with baseline forces via data link.  
Without data link capability, the information gathered by any of the unmanned systems 
would be useless to the RF.  Unmanned system storage and maintenance are also 
assumed to integrate into baseline force elements.  UGS would require accurate 
intelligence reports of target areas prior to distribution in order to monitor hostile forces.  
Random distribution of UGS over a wide unknown area is expected to produce few 
viable contacts.  This alternative is limited by the robustness, baud rate, and penetration 
capability of the unmanned system data link.  USV’s are limited by fuel capacity and 
their ability to maintain station ahead of the baseline force.  UAV’s are limited by altitude 
 
82 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-2.3, Remote Sensor Operations, p. 1-2, 17 April 
1997. 
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required for stable flight, altitude required for visibility and detection of targets, weather, 
canopy cover, and recovery operations.  Field of view is also a concern for UAV’s and is 
a major limitation for employing a singular detection system for wide area search.  Again, 
accurate intelligence of enemy force concentrations and movements would greatly 
increase UAV effectiveness.    This alternative is significantly different from the baseline 
in that it has the potential to significantly extend the detection capability of the RF and 
enable the RF to bring its organic firepower to bear at maximum range.   
2. Baseline + Engagement 
RIVGRU ONE has expressed an interest in employing a ground combat element 
(GCE) for insertion and extraction operations.  However, no GCE is currently assigned to 
the RF83.  SEA-10 assumed that the GCE would be company strength and based the GCE 
on USA FM-3-21.11.84  SEA-10 also assumed that the GCE would not have organic air 
support or major indirect fire support (artillery).  The GCE will be able to employ 
mortars.  Tactical insertion and extraction of the GCE will be similar to tactics used by 
SCCo.  This alternative is limited by its detection capability in areas constrained by sharp 
river bends that create blind turns and dense canopy that prohibits a complete field of 
view.  GCE soldiers embarked on SURC’s are just as limited in their field of view as 
SURC crewmembers.  Once disembarked, GCE members can spread out and increase the 
detection radius of the force, but also expose themselves to separate attacks.  Data link 
between the GCE and SURC’s are critical.  Without communication between the two 
forces, the risk of fratricide exists, and combat accountability of forces would be 
extremely difficult.  This alternative is significantly different from the baseline and other 
alternatives because it enables the RF to reconnoiter and attack targets from two 
directions.  It also brings some remote fire support capability that extends the engage 




83 Video Teleconference between CAPT Jordan, US Navy and RIVGRU personnel and SEA-10, 
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, C.A., 5 October 2006. 
84 Global Security. US Army Field Manual 3-21.11: The SBCT Rifle Company. Retrieved from the 
World Wide Web on September 07, 2006 at: 
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-21.11/index.html]. 
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3. Baseline + Networked Sensors 
This alternative utilizes all three unmanned systems (UAV, USV, UGS) operating 
simultaneously with the baseline force.  Again, data link capabilities are critical in this 
alternative’s success.  This alternative is significantly different from other alternatives in 
that it emphasizes the strengths of multiple semi-redundant unmanned sensors while 
reducing their weaknesses. The need for intelligence information of an unknown area 
decreases somewhat when multiple sensor systems work in conjunction with one another.  
The inefficiency of UAV’s as wide area search platforms is minimized by the interaction 
with USV’s and UGS.  Potential targets detected by USV’s or UGS can be relayed to 
UAV’s and further evaluated.  This depth of detection and classification ability does not 
exist in the other alternatives, and enables the baseline force to engage at the maximum 
range of their weapons.   
4. Baseline + Networked Sensors + Indirect Fire 
This alternative utilizes all three unmanned systems operating simultaneously 
with the baseline force and a separate indirect fire support system.  This alternative is 
based on the same assumptions and limitations as the networked sensors alternative, 
except that it has a more robust engagement capability.  Should the RF be unable to 
engage a detected target at maximum range, it can call in indirect fire support and safely 
engage the target from afar.  Again, the importance of a reliable data link cannot be 
stressed enough.  In this alternative, not only the baseline force needs to have an accurate 
picture of the battlespace, but the indirect fire support system needs an accurate picture as 
well.   
5. Baseline + Dedicated Helicopter Support 
This alternative forgoes unmanned systems in lieu of dedicated patrolling and on 
call helicopter support.  This alternative assumes that helicopters supporting this mission 
will have fuel capacity, weapons, and range to adequately perform search, patrol, attack, 
and medical evacuation operations for the RF.  This alternative is limited by the number 
of helicopters ready at any given time to support RF operations.  However, unlike an 
unmanned system that requires man-in-the-loop target evaluation and classification (or 
special ROE), manned helicopters put a human on scene to evaluate and classify potential 
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targets immediately.  On the scene presence brings risk to helicopter pilots, but may be 
offset by the standoff engagement range that some helicopter launched weapons possess.   
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IV. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE 
The operational architecture integrates the system decomposition with the 
functional and physical architectures85.  The operational architecture facilitates modeling, 
analysis, estimates system performance, and enables trade-off decisions86.  Objectives 
derived in the functional architecture must be assigned to entities identified in the 
physical architecture to operationalize the RF system.  In plain terms, SEA-10’s mission 
essential objectives: increase battlespace awareness (key function detect) and increase 
situational responsiveness (key function engage); need to be directly associated with 
entities encompassed within the force packages described in the physical architecture.  
SEA-10 used two scenarios to present the force packages described in the physical 
architecture in situations that test each force package’s detect and engage capability.  
Further analysis of operational feasibility was conducted through modeling and analysis.  
SEA-10 utilized agent based models to simulate each force package in the two scenarios, 
generate performance data, and analyze the results to make a performance based 
recommendation on which force package best satisfies SEA-10’s RF objectives.   SEA-
10 also conducted cost estimation for the force packages described in the physical 
architecture.  This cost estimation was compared with risk analysis for each force 
package to determine which would most benefit the RF of 2010.   
B. RIVERINE SCENARIOS 
Scenarios provide a structured avenue for operators to share operational 
experience and insights.  Scenarios also provide a physical link to substantiate functions 
in a tactical real world environment.  They examine physical features that may have been 
overlooked in functional analysis.  Feasible operational scenarios were required to pare 
broad RF missions into succinct situations which test SEA-10’s RF objectives of increase 
battlespace awareness and increase situational responsiveness.  NECC promulgated 
scenarios of surveillance, barrier patrol, assault preparations, and assault in the Niger 
 




                                                
River Delta87.  SEA-10 felt these scenarios too broad for extraction of quantifiable 
effects, and composed two specific scenarios.  SEA-10 chose scenarios that represented 
the most likely or frequently occurring situation (patrol), and the potential worst case 
situation (ambush) for study.  Scenario specific parameters were derived from historical 
references and riverine operator experience88.  Both scenarios operationalize SEA-10 RF 
objectives and enable evaluation of the force packages generated in the physical 
architecture.   
Each scenario must have a relevant feasible operational setting.  Through 
interaction with stakeholders and riverine operators, SEA-10 determined that any riverine 
system should be evaluated in a jungle environment.  A jungle or heavy deciduous forest 
is both the most likely and worst case operational setting for RF operations because of the 
line of sight and concealment challenges that it imposes.   
SEA-10 developed scenarios in the Niger River delta.  A resource rich region in 
Western Africa, the rivers of Niger River delta have often been referred to as “Oil 
Rivers” because of the vast amount of petroleum and date oil found there.  Disputes over 
the rights to the natural resources have caused political instability and economic 
hardship89 for the indigenous people.  As a result, militant groups continue to terrorize 
this region by kidnapping oil workers for ransom and causing damage to oil facilities.  It 
is reasonable to believe that the political landscape of 2010 will result in competition for 
resources.  Therefore, this region appeared to be a likely candidate for future RF 
employment.  The terrain modeled is an area of the Niger Delta region, and is further 
elaborated upon in the modeling and analysis section of this thesis.   
1. Scenario Operational Setting 
The RF is operating in support of maritime security operations in Nigeria.  The 
RF conducts routine daytime patrols on the Niger River looking for contraband 
smugglers.  Weather (wind, rain, fog) was not an included variable in the scenarios.  The 
Niger River Delta region is densely populated with approximately 200,000 people of 
 
87 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(DRAFT), pg 49-51, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. 30 August 2006. 
88 See Chapter 2, Functional Architecture p. 42-44. 
89 D. Mahtani & S. Inskeep, “Militant Group Targets Oil Producers in Nigeria,” Retrieved, 11 
November 2006 from the World Wide Web at: 
[http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5162952]. 
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whom only 47% live in cities.90  The Niger River has a length of 4350 km from head 
waters to the mouth of the delta91 and has significant variation in width (from 1 kilometer 
to 150 meters) and depth (from 12 meters to less than 0.5 meters).  Average line of sight 
on the Niger River is 150 meters, but can be as little as 50 meters because of low hanging 
jungle canopy, mangroves and brackish water.  
2. Red Force Composition 
Insurgent forces challenging the legitimate Nigerian government are present in the 
Niger River Delta region.  Insurgent forces are known to smuggle opiates on the Niger 
River to support their insurgency.  Insurgent forces operate at near company strength and 
utilize automatic weapons, sampan type small boats, rocket propelled grenades, and 
vehicle mounted crew served weapons.  Insurgent groups have mortars, artillery, and 
recoilless weapons from national army formations which have been defeated in previous 
conflicts or disbanded.  External powers have previously backed factions by supplying 
arms, ammunition, and equipment.  However, insurgents mainly subsist by acquiring 
food and supplies from the countryside.  Insurgent forces have mounted complex 
ambushes against Nigerian forces in the past and are likely to do so along the entire 
length of the Niger River.  
3. Blue Force Composition 
An entire riverine squadron is deployed to Nigeria in support of maritime security 
operations in accordance with NECC’s Riverine Warfare CONOPS.  The RF consists of 
12 Small Unit River Craft (SURC) and approximately 230 operators and support 
personnel92.  SURC’s are armed with crew served weapons, detailed previously in Table 
8, and each can be loaded with armed boarding teams or ground combat elements of up to 
sixteen personnel.  There are no blue force air assets available, nor is there any inorganic 
fire support available.  SURC’s do have communications with the Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC), but real time unit and personnel tracking are not yet available.   
 
 
90 Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Nigeria, Retrieved 11 October 2006 from the World Wide 
Web at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761557915_3/Nigeria.html. 
91 R. Benbow, P. Ensminger, S. Swartz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis Report, Renewal of 
Riverine’s Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, p. 157, 
January 2006.    
92 Internal source document, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, supplied by Tom Lafferty. 
4. Neutral Forces 
Today’s military operations must not only neutralize hostile forces, but also 
minimize civilian casualties.   Neutral agents were included in RF models to simulate the 
civilian population of the Niger River Delta.  Neutral agents degrade the detection and 
classification ability of both Red and Blue forces, and add realism to the scenarios and 
later simulations.  The number of neutral agents was determined by examining the 
relationship between total population and Manpower Fit for Military Duty93.  SEA-10 
divided the total population of each country bordering the Niger River by the number of 
men fit for military duty in each country.  The average of these ratios was taken and 
determined that 8 neutral agents would exist in the scenarios for every Red agent.  
Therefore SEA-10 entered 8 neutral agents into the model for every hostile agent to 
represent the proportion of background personnel in the region.  Neutral agents were 
limited in their ability to maneuver in the terrain of the riverine environment.  Unlike Red 
and Blue agents, neutral agents were not given any hostile characteristics, traits, or 
tendencies that favor either Red or Blue.  Table 10 illustrates the populations of the 
countries considered and their respective neutral to hostile ratios. 
 
Table 10. Neutral-to-Hostile Force Ratio Determination for Riverine Scenarios. 
 
C. SCENARIO SUMMARIES 
1. Scenario One: Patrol 
You are the commander of a four SURC section and are on patrol in a 
populated region of the Niger River.  Both river banks are at least 
partially obstructed by foliage.  Two SURC’s are designated as scouts.  
                                                 




                                                
One SURC is the command and control boat and the remaining SURC 
provides supporting fires and security for the C2 boat94.  The river is wide 
and relatively straight but there are numerous civilian water craft and 
high foot traffic along the shore.  Insurgent forces frequently operate 
among the civilian populace for cover and concealment. 
2. Scenario Two: Ambush    
You are the commander of a four SURC section and are on patrol in a 
populated region of the Niger River.  Both river banks are at least 
partially obstructed by foliage.  Two SURC’s are designated as scouts.  
One SURC is the command and control boat and the remaining SURC 
provides supporting fires and security for the C2 boat95.  The river is wide 
and relatively straight but there are numerous civilian water craft and 
high foot traffic along the shore.  You are in one of the lead scouts and are 
going around a bend of the Niger River where the enemy has recently 
carried out ambushes on riverine forces. 
 
94 US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), MCB Quantico, VA, 4 April 2006. 
95 US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
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V. MODELING OVERVIEW 
A. MODELING: PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
Modeling provided SEA-10 with the capacity to test the baseline force and 
selected alternative force packages against the previously described operational scenarios.  
Modeling provides the data from which a quantitative analysis of how each physical 
architecture or force package performs to achieve the objectives set forth in the functional 
architecture.  This section details the model setup, outputs, and software processes chosen 
to compare the proposed operational architectures. 
B. SOFTWARE: MAP-AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) 
While the Department of Defense (DoD) favors high-resolution, complex and 
resource intensive modeling techniques and procedures to support decision makers, SEA-
10 chose the low-resolution agent based simulation (ABS) Map-Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA).  MANA was recommended to SEA-10 by the U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC-Monterey). 
High resolution modeling is data and time intensive.  Time constraints limited the 
extent of data entry and MOE extraction.  MANA provides useful results, requires a 
small learning curve, and is capable of rigorous iterations.  MANA was the solution to 
time limitations and resource intensive data input requirements of physics-based models.  
MANA was scaleable to a geographic size that enabled detailed extraction of MOP such 
as range and time of engagement.  Larger physics based programs did not offer the small 
scale granularity of MANA. 
ABS, like MANA, contain entities that are controlled by decision-making 
algorithms. ABS combat models contain entities representing military units that make 
their own decisions, as opposed to the modeller explicitly programming and determining 
their behavior in advance.  MANA and similar programs are often called complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) because of the way the entities within them react to their 
surroundings.  Properties of MANA and CAS combat models are:  
• The “global” behavior of the system “emerges” as the result of many local 
interactions.  
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• CAS is an example of a process of feedback that is not present in 
“reductionist”, top-down models.  
• CAS cannot be analysed by decomposition into simple independent parts.  
• Agents interact with each other in non-linear ways, and “adapt” to their local 
environment.  
The MANA model is an attempt to create a complex adaptive system for 
important real-world factors of combat such as: 
• Spontaneous change of plans due to the evolving battle conditions.  
• The influence of situational awareness on units when deciding on a course of 
action.  
• The importance of sensors and how to use them to best advantage96  
MANA allows agents at individual and squad level to be aware of and respond to 
the geographic characteristics of their surroundings.  The agents respond independently to 
events determined by individual or squad predetermined behavior tendencies.  Agents 
may react differently from modeling run to modeling run because of the variable stimulus 
of motivations programmed into the modeled environment.  MANA models personalities, 
communication links, sensor and weapon characteristics, and engagements at an 
individual and squad level.  The individual traits, data entry, and justification are 
discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
C. MANA MODELING SETUP 
SEA-10 could not model all the scenarios that the RF could possibly encounter 
and, instead, chose scenarios based on two criteria discussed previously: severity and 
likelihood.  The ambush scenario is the most severe scenario that the RF will likely 
encounter.  The patrol scenario is the most likely scenario that the RF will likely 
encounter.  These scenarios operationalized the competing physical architectures, or force 
packages, to determine which provides the most significant increase in detection and 
engagement capabilities.   
 
96 D. Galligan, et al.,”MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) Compressed Help File.” Version 
3.0.39. Operations Analysis Section, Defense Technology Agency, New Zealand, April 2005. 
A comprehensive and detail oriented data entry process provided the backbone of 
the simulation and provided insights to increase the RF’s battlespace awareness and 
situational responsiveness.  All data was gathered and analyzed from unclassified 
sources.  The RF will not deploy until February 2007.  Therefore, baseline force 
structure, weapons, and sensor capability were hypothetically modeled since no 
performance data existed at the time of this thesis.  SEA-10 developed MOE and MOP to 
determine the impact of the varying physical architectures on the objectives of increased 
battlespace awareness and increased situational responsiveness.  The digital battlefield 
had to be established, and squad properties had to be assigned before MOE and MOP 
data was gathered and objectives could be evaluated. 
1. Battlefield 
SEA-10 chose a random area of the Niger River (Figure 15) that reflects the 
environment in which the RF may operate in 2010.  MANA allows for a portrayal of 
terrain effects on detection and line of sight.  The scenario portrayed in MANA was built 
by the design team and was intended to represent actual terrain and foliage of the Niger 
River.   
 
Figure 15. SEA-10 Niger River Scenario Map97. 
 
                                                 
97 Google Earth.  Retrieved 18 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://earth.google.com. 
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The map dimensions were scaled from miles to grids for MANA to process.  The 
24 X 15 mile sample map was converted into a 38.64 by 36.60 meters per grid box using 
the following conversion factor. The MANA modeling screen is 1000 grids long and 660 
grids wide.   Equation 1 and 2 outline the steps to convert the 24 mile length into meters 
per grid. 
 
Equation 1. 24 Mile to Kilometer Conversion. 
 
Equation 2. Converts Meters to MANA Grids in X Direction. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 outline the steps to convert the 15 mile length into meters per grid.   
 
Equation 3. 15 Mile to Kilometer Conversion. 
 
Equation 4. Converts Meters to MANA Grids in Y Direction. 
 
The original riverine scenario map represented by Figure 15, was modified and 
palletized into an 8-bit color scheme as shown in Figure 16.  8-bit palletization not only 
allowed MANA to process the map, but also provided realism by incorporating detailed 






 Figure 16. 8-bit Palletized Version of SEA-10 Niger River Scenario Map98. 
 
The Red-Green-Blue (RGB) values were sampled from Figure 16 and translated 
into MANA-recognizable terrain.  This image is not simply an image of the area.  Each 
grid may be assigned a value for cover, concealment, and movement impact based upon 
the RGB value of the individual grid. Hills, rivers, and roads were assigned different 
ratings in MANA’s scenario map editor.  The concealment factor affects the probability 
of detection and of being detected.  When an agent lies in a grid-square with a non-zero 
concealment value, the terrain concealment factor for that square is combined with the 
agent’s personal concealment factor in determining whether the agent is seen.99
MANA recognizes line of sight as a battlefield constraint.  Cover affects whether 
or not a unit is exposed and therefore visible to another agent’s line of sight.  Foliage was 
broken down into three levels that reflects real world jungle landscape:  Light canopy 
(Light Bush), Medium canopy (Medium Bush), and Heavy canopy (Dense Bush) to 
simulate different forest or jungle canopy characteristics.  This serves two purposes.  
First, it allows forces given increased cover and concealment properties to favor usage of 
heavier covered forest areas when traversing or engaging.  Second, it provides realism to 
                                                 
98 Google Earth.  Retrieved 18 September 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://earth.google.com. 
99 D, Galligan, et al.,”MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) Compressed Help File.” Version 
3.0.39. Operations Analysis Section, Defense Technology Agency, New Zealand, April 2005. 
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the detection capabilities of forces by restricting detection capabilities in heavier covered 
areas or hills as shown in Figure 17.  The Red agents are not within Blue force detection 
arcs because of terrain that blocks the detection sensor.  Cover and concealment also 
affect detection capability. 
 
Figure 17. Terrain Effects on MANA Detection Ranges. 
 
For example, in the palletized map, terrain was scored for the amount of cover it 
could offer.  Hilltops and Light Bush provide only minimal cover yielding a cover value 
of .10.  Medium Bush and Dense Bush provide increasingly higher coverage (.20 and .30 
respectively) The Wall provided the highest Cover value at 1.0, yielding a complete 
block to line of sight.  Roads and rivers provided the least resistance to movement while 
Dense Bush provided the most.  Figure 18 outlines the different landscape parameters 
entered into the terrain properties menu.  Hills (Hilltop) show differences in elevation and 
when possible, allowed individual forces to avoid or choose hills while traversing.     
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 Figure 18. MANA Terrain Characteristics. 
 
2. Platform Properties 
 SEA-10 modeled 12 distinct agent platforms within MANA.  Each of the 
platforms’ squad settings are discussed in the following section and specific situational 
awareness and range settings are available in Appendix A. 
a. Tactical Operations Center (TOC) 
The TOC provided no offensive or defensive capability.  It served as the 
hub for network communications.  All units capable of network operations relayed 
messages through the TOC when not in direct communication with each other. 
b. Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) 
The SURC is designed to provide tactical waterborne lift in support of 
military operations in a riverine environment (MORE).  The primary function of the 
SURC is to provide tactical mobility and serve as a waterborne weapons platform.  The 
SURC provides the mobility, speed, endurance, firepower, payload, survivability, and 
command and control capabilities to support sustained operations in riverine 
environments.  Specific capabilities include: 
• SURC can accelerate from motionless to 25 knots in 15 seconds.  
• Maintains an average speed of 30 knots (threshold), 35 knots (objective).  
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• SURC has ballistic protection around the engine compartment.  
• SURC has a combat radius of 250 nautical miles.  
• SURC C2 systems integrate with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for 
location information.  
• Integrates with currently fielded and future Combat Net Radio Systems (CNR) 
systems. 
• Is interoperable with current and future universal weapon mounts and pintle 
adapters for tactical vehicles.  
• Is capable of beaching bow first on unobstructed shorelines with mud, sand, 
silt, and gravel surfaces (threshold) at one-quarter cruising speed (objective).  
• SURC remains afloat as a survival platform when filled with water. 
• SURC has a hull and propulsion system with a draft of 24 inches or less when 
operationally loaded in a stationary position. 
• Transports 13 combat loaded soldiers or Marines plus 2 crew (threshold) and 
18 combat loaded soldiers or Marines with 2 crew (objective).  
• Has an organic heavy machinegun (threshold) mount(s) to integrate both 
organic medium and heavy machineguns (objective).  
• Capable of external tactical lift by a CH-53D (threshold) and MV-22 
(objective).100  
c. Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) 
The VBSS agent is the fourth unit of the SURC section which hosts a 7 
man boarding team.  It is modeled similar to the SURC with the exception of an 
increased ability to sustain damage due to increased crew size. 
d. Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS) 
The Tactical Remote Sensor System provides continuous monitoring of 
activity within its area of operation and all weather location information.  It provides a 
graphic depiction of MASINT (Measurement and Signals Intelligence) derived from 
targets’ composite seismic, magnetic, infrared, thermal, and graphic images.  TRSS may 
 
100 Global Security. Small Unit Riverine Craft, Retrieved 07 October 2006 from the World Wide Web 
at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/surc.htm. 
73 
                                                
provide direction, location, relative speed, quantity, length of column, and classification 
type through hand emplaced or air delivered sensors.  
e. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
This agent was modeled after the Shadow 200 Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (TUAV) system.  It is designed as a ground commander's primary day or night 
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment system.  
Shadow 200 is more robust than the procured system of the RF (SilverFox).  However, 
the model was constructed around Shadow 200 parameters because performance is 
similar and data was available for analysis. 
The Shadow 200 is a small, lightweight, tactical UAV system.  The 
system is composed of airframes, modular mission payloads, ground control stations, 
launch and recovery equipment, and communications equipment.  It will carry enough 
supplies and spares for an initial 72 hours of operation. It will be transportable in two 
high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with shelters, and two 
additional HMMWVs with trailers as troop carriers.  
The airframe is constructed of composite materials, with a wingspan of 
12.3 feet, and length of 11.2 feet.  Power is provided by a commercial 38-horsepower 
rotary engine that uses motor gasoline (MOGAS).  The payload has a commercially 
available electro-optic and infrared camera, and communications equipment for 
command and control and imagery dissemination.  Onboard global positioning system 
instrumentation provides navigation information.  
Shadow 200 is intended to provide coverage of a brigade area of interest 
for up to seven hours, at 65 kilometers from the launch and recovery site.  The maximum 
range is 125 kilometers (limited by data link capability), and operations are generally 
conducted from 8,000 to 10,000 feet above ground level during the day and 6,000 to 
8,000 feet above ground level at night.  Operations may even occur as low as 1,000 feet.  
The air vehicle uses a pneumatic launcher and is recovered by a tactical automatic 
landing system without pilot intervention on the runway.  The air vehicle is recovered 
using an arresting hook and cable system.101  
 
101 Global Security, RQ-7 Shadow Tactical UAV, Retrieved 07 October 2006 from the World Wide 
Web at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/shadow.htm 
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f. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) 
The MANA modeled USV is an amalgam of existing USV platforms 
based mostly on SeaFox.  The modeled system is an integrated, remotely controlled 
combat system which provides detection and identification support in barrier or focused 
area searches.  Fast and highly maneuverable, this unmanned vehicle identifies its targets 
through a multi-sensor, electro-optical (EO) system with day and night targeting 
capabilities.  MANA can discriminate and portray daytime or nighttime vision 
capabilities.  The EO camera’s zoom capability was quantified in MANA grids, input 
into MANA as a USV performance parameter, and served as its maximum detection 
range.  The USV also hosts navigation radar.  Potentially a highly accurate stabilized 
weapon station, a USV could provide immediate engagement capability and powerful 
lethality at stand-off ranges.  A weapon bearing USV was not used in our model.  The 
USV must be able to conduct sustained operations with parameters similar to the SURC. 
g. Ground Combat Element (GCE) 
The mission of the GCE is to close with the enemy and defeat, capture, or 
repel assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.  The fire squad is organized into 4-
man fire teams consisting of a team leader, a grenadier, and an automatic rifleman. The 
fourth member within each fire team is either the squad's antitank specialist or the squad's 
designated marksman.  The two weapons squads each consist of a squad leader and two 
3-man machine gun teams.  The weapons squad provides the primary base of fire for the 
maneuver of the GCE squads with highly accurate short- and long-range, direct, and 
small-arms fires against enemy personnel and equipment.  The two machine gun teams 
consist of the gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer.  Each team is equipped 
with the M240B 7.62-mm medium machine gun. 
h. Mortar Team 
The primary role of the riverine mortar team is to provide immediate 
responsive indirect fires that support the maneuver of the RF and that reinforce direct 
fires during close combat.  The MANA modeled team consists of two 81 millimeter 
mortars.  Each mortar team consists of four infantry indirect fire specialists.  The 81-mm 
mortar systems enable the mortar team to provide dismounted mortar support to the RF 
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patrol during assault and infiltration operations.  SURC’s improve the survivability of the 
mortar team and equipment by providing increased flexibility, responsiveness, mobility, 
and protected transportation.  The TOC controls and directs the mortar team’s maneuver 
and fires.  Specifically, the mortar team provides the commander the ability to support the 
RF’s close fight with indirect fires that102: 
• Shape the conditions for maneuver.  
• Provide close supporting fires for assaulting forces in restricted and severely 
restricted terrain.  
• Destroy, neutralize, suppress, degrade, or disrupt enemy forces and force 
armored vehicles to button up.  
• Break up enemy troop concentrations (mounted and dismounted) and destroy 
the enemy's synchronization.  
• Fix enemy forces or reduce the enemy's mobility and canalize his assault 
forces into engagement areas.  
• Deny the enemy the advantage of defile terrain and force him into areas 
covered by direct fire weapons.  
• Provide standoff fires against light armored vehicles.  
• Optimize indirect fires in urban terrain.  
• Significantly improve the dismounted infantry’s lethality and survivability 
against a close dismounted assault.  
• SEA -10 limited the model to use only HE rounds. 
i. Mortar Barge 
The specifications for a modern and compact unmanned turret mortar 
system derived from New Efficient Mortar System (NEMO).  NEMO is adaptable to light 
high speed vessels due to its low weight.  In addition to indirect fire support NEMO has 
the capability of direct and Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) fire.  The 
NEMO system is compatible with all standard 120mm smoothbore mortar ammunition as 
well as smart guided ammunition.  MANA is currently modeled using only an 81mm 
mortar for standardization of forces between the waterborne vessel and the deployable 
 
102 Global Security.Org; Fire Support Planning and Coordination, Retrieved 17 October 2006 from 
the World Wide Web at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-90/Ch3.htm#s2pl 
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mortar team.  The hull was modeled after a 14.1m WATERCAT M-12 high speed 
amphibious troop carrier, with the turret mounted on the forecastle in lieu of the troop 
compartment.103
j. HH-60 Armed Helicopter 
The HH-60H armed helicopter is a variant of the SH-60F, specifically 
designed for combat search and rescue (CSAR) and naval special warfare support.  It can 
operate from aircraft carriers, and a variety of other naval and merchant vessels, as well 
as land bases.  The HH-60H retains the same basic airframe, core avionics, inherent sea-
basing capability of the SH-60F, and incorporates many of the ballistic tolerance 
attributes of the Army UH-60, which are ideally suited for the CSAR mission. 
The largely empty cabin area of the HH-60H allows room for rescued 
personnel, SEAL teams in support of special operations, or potentially a GCE.  HH-60H 
aircrews employ high-tech devices such as Night Vision Devices (NVD’s) for increased 
detection capability.  In addition, the HH-60H has recently been outfitted with Forward 
Looking InfraRed (FLIR) technology, and the capability to fire Hellfire missiles.  The 
FLIR incorporates an integrated laser designator which is used to assist with 
classification of targets at long ranges, and provide laser guidance for Hellfire missiles.  
Additionally, they are armed with M-240 or GAU-17 machine guns used to suppress 
enemy fire during a rescue, or during a special operations troop insertion.  It is capable of 
carrying M60 or M240 machine guns, a GCAL-50 machine gun, 2.75 inch Zuni rockets, 
Stinger, Maverick, or Hellfire missiles.104
k. Red Rifle and RPG-22 
Scenarios are based upon a smaller-scale contingency (SSC) which is an 
operation, limited in terms of duration and geography, which is short of a major theater 
war (MTW). Left unchecked, an SSC can quickly escalate into an MTW.  The political 
situation in the operational area may be uncertain, with varying levels of acceptance 
among local populations and a range of participation by coalition, interagency, and 
 
103 Patria, New Efficient Mortar System, Retrieved 13 November 2006 as found on the World Wide 
Web at [www.partria.fi/modules/NEMO] 
104 Global Security; HH-60H Sea Hawk Helicopter, Retrieved 13 November 2006 as found on the 
World Wide Web at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/hh-60h.htm] 
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nongovernmental organizations partners.105 SEA-10 modeled enemy forces as middle to 
low-end industrial-age forces based predominately on motorized infantry. Guerrillas, 
terrorists, paramilitary units, special purpose forces, special police, and local militias will 
be present in the environment.  These forces are primarily equipped with rocket propelled 
grenades, mortars, machine guns, and explosives.  These forces are expected to have 
robust communications using conventional military devices augmented by commercial 
equipment such as cell phones.  These forces are not capable of long term, sustained, high 
tempo combat operations.  They are capable of conducting long term, sustained, 
unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations.   
l. Neutral Agents 
Neutral forces representing an indigenous population were placed within 
the model to provide a real world limitation specifically hampering target acquisition and 
the ability of ranged fires.  No specific offensive or defensive capabilities were granted to 
the neutral forces.  They were programmed with a desire to seek ease of movement which 
would create a desire to seek out roadways, rivers, and population centers. 
3. Squad Properties 
a. General 
MANA offers a multitude of choices in programming squad behavior.  
Behavior areas are separated into tabs.  The following sections review tab contents and 
how they are important to model performance.  General settings permitted assignment of 
squad names, number of agents per squad, the icon representing an agent, and fuel.  Fuel 
was not constrained within our model.  
b. Map 
Each agent was assigned a home point to establish the spawning location 
or starting point in the model.  Waypoints could also be used to establish a movement 
pattern consistent with scenario objectives.  Waypoints served as guides for agents and 
added realism to patrol routes.  For example, waypoints prevented SURC’s from 
patrolling over land. 
 
 
105 Global Security; Chapter 1: Overview of the Styker Brigade Combat Team; Retrieved 02 




 Red force agent properties are loosely modeled after rifle platoon 
characteristics from United States Army (USA) Field Manuals 3-21.9 Infantry Rifle 
Platoon and Squad and 3-21.11 Infantry Rifle Company.  SEA-10 was uncertain about 
the training and force structure of potential insurgent forces that the RF may face, but 
found that enemy forces in the delta region operate at near platoon level strength while 
sometimes approaching company level strength106.  Since no enemy field manuals were 
available, SEA-10 chose agent parameters from USA sources so Red agents would 
simulate realistic units.  SEA-10 referred to these documents to outline Red force 
structure as well as capabilities and limitations in organic communications and weapons.  
Red and Blue agent detection and engagement capabilities were affected by terrain, time, 
and velocity restrictions imposed by MANA.   
Each agent was assigned a specific set of traits that defined its character 
and motivations within the scenario.  SEA-10 claims that these settings are best applied 
after mathematically determining the other parameter settings for each squad’s sensor, 
detection, communication, and weapon capabilities. A thorough understanding of an 
agent’s capabilities and accurate entry of these capabilities into MANA enables the 
program to make decisions regarding the agent’s ability to engage weaker, equivalent, or 
superior threats.  Agent capabilities are compared against requirements for cover, 
concealment, ease of movement, and the desire to follow an intended route.  Agent 
motivation is determined by setting behavior values from -100 to 100.  For example, by 
setting an agent’s waypoint value to greater than zero MANA simulates the agent’s 
tactical decision to maintain a designated February route.  An increased value of the 
agent’s desire to go towards the enemy simulates the agent’s tactical decision to engage 
the enemy.  Negative values have the reverse effect upon each agent. 
Examples of key traits that SEA-10 chose MANA to influence are: 
• A Red force agent is assigned an increased concealment value to allow it to 
seek out areas of higher concealment (DenseBush) and avoid detection while 
transiting from one area to another.   
                                                 
106 C. Timburg. “In Fight Over Oil-Rich Delta, Firepower Grows Sophisticated” Retrieved 11 
November 2006 from the World Wide Web at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/05/AR2006030500961.html] 
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• A Red force agent has no motivation (given a zero value) to remain near 
injured or dead Red units.  
• A Blue force agent is motivated (given an increased value) to remain within or 
near the center of the river while on patrol.  
• A Blue force agent is not motivated (given a zero value) to engage neutrals.   
• UAV/USV’s were given increased data network capability to illustrate their 
ability to provide near instantaneous battlefield data to Blue force agents.  
• Red and Blue force agents were motivated (given a greater than zero value) to 
travel in close formation. 
• Red and Blue force agents were not motivated (given lesser than zero value) 
to run from an engagement.   
These traits allowed SEA-10 to create agents that exhibit historically 
feasible real world behavior.  Appendix A contains a detailed description of individual 
and specific trait inputs used to affect agent actions.  SEA-10 attempted to simulate each 
individual agent’s personality, traits, and behaviors to reflect those of real world 
operators and players.  Each Red or Blue Force agent personality varied depending on the 
operational scenarios modeled.  Agent personalities were modified in two ways.  Natural 
modifications simulated the most likely reaction that the Red or Blue Force agent would 
exhibit given a certain motivation entered into MANA.  Artificial modifications were 
used in order to force the Red or Blue Force agent to mimic the natural reaction.  
Examples of natural modifications were: 
• The “Enemies” value would motivate Red and Blue agents to seek out and 
engage opposing forces.  
• Friendly, enemy, and unknown situational awareness would increase an 





                                                
• Cover and concealment enabled transiting or engaging agents to find cover 
and concealment.  Neutral agents were not assigned a value for cover and 
concealment.  Red and Blue agents were given cover and concealment values 
to reflect real world tendencies.   
• UGS, UAV’s, and USV’s were given values to provide situational awareness 
on friendly, enemy, and unknown agents.   
Examples of artificial modifications were: 
• Agents programmed to protect an injured friendly unit would not engage the 
enemy and further expose themselves to damage.  Initial modeling and 
analysis determined that assigning value to this piece prohibited the Blue 
Forces from engaging the enemy and prevented SEA-10 from gathering data 
that would answer MOP’s and MOE’s.  Real world Blue forces would stay 
near injured forces while still engaging the enemy. 
• Agents were programmed to go to the next waypoint, stay near the center of 
the waypoint route (line center), or find the easiest route to travel.  SURC’s 
stayed in one area especially if given a high cover and concealment value.  
They tended to look for a high covered and concealed area and remain there 
without patrolling.  Therefore SURC agents were given high waypoint values 
in order to force them to patrol. 
d. Time 
 Model range inputs directed sensor range, movement speed, fuel rate, 
concealment, threat levels, icons and other interaction parameters.  Each MANA run was 
scaled to represent a 24 hour period depicting a 24 hour RF mission107.  SEA-10 
determined that one MANA time step needed to equal one minute for model accuracy 
and to enable enough granularities for MOE/MOP extraction.  There are 1440 time steps 
in a MANA 24 hour time period.  This conversion was critical to run the model since 
MANA uses the time set as the basic factor for determining all velocity data.  Equation 5 
outlines the steps to convert a 24 hour period into time steps.   
 
107 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(FINAL), 28 September 2006, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, p. 27.   
 
Equation 5. MANA Time Step Conversion. 
 
e. Range 
Each platform or agent in the RF scenarios was assigned a detection and 
classification range.  Detection range is the radius in cells that an agent can see targets 
around it. Detection does not imply classification or identification and contacts are 
recorded as unknown on the situational awareness maps if they are recorded in an area 
where the detection range extends beyond the classification range.  Classification range is 
the radius in cells that an agent can detect and classify targets around it.  SEA-10 used the 
horizon equation108 to determine each unit or platform’s straight line visual detection and 
classification range.  Equation 6, a sample calculation for a human (height of sensor 2 
meters), is worked out below. 
 
3 feet/yard 2985.56 meters1.14* sensor height (2 meters)  nautical miles * 2000 yards * 78 grids
3.24 meters 38.31 meters/grid
= = =
                                                
 
Equation 6. Horizon Equation. 
 
SEA-10 determined the maximum detection range is twice the distance to 
the horizon if both sensors are of equal height.  The maximum detection range is twice 
the distance to the horizon, or 156 grids as shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
108 T. DiGiulian & L.D. Morris, Distance to the Horizon.  Retrieved 20 September 2006 from the 
World Wide Web at http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-011.htm. 
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 Figure 19. SEA-10 Model Horizon Interpretation. 
 
However, based on operational experience under typical conditions SEA-
10 determined that the maximum classification range is one eighth the maximum 
detection range.  For example, the maximum classification range of a human 2 meters tall 
is 1/8 its maximum detection range or about 20 grids.  Non-visual detection and 
classification ranges were derived from platform specifications. 
f. Speed 
Transiting personnel move slower than a patrol boat in a real-world 
environment, and to capture this relationship it was necessary to identify the speed of 
each agent.  Different forces move specific distances within a given time period.   The 
major entities modeled were personnel, SURC, helicopters, UAV’s, and USV’s.  MANA 
uses a ratio for the probability that a unit will cross 1 grid in 1 time step.  USA Field 
Manual 90-5 Jungle Operations stated that a typical US Army soldier given his physical 
condition, carried load, danger of enemy contact, and type of jungle growth will travel at 
a rate of 1 km per hour through a tropical forest during daylight.109  This translates to a 
MANA velocity of .43 grids per time step.  Equation 7 outlines the steps to convert a 
common foot soldier transiting at 1 kilometer per hour into MANA speed. 
                                                 
109 Global Security. Department of the Army Headquarters, Field Manual 90-5 Jungle Operations, 




Equation 7. Velocity to MANA Speed Conversion. 
 
Therefore, in the model personnel will travel .43 grids per time step or approximately 
16.6 meters per minute.   
Helicopters and UAV’s usually travel at a greater velocity than a common 
foot soldier.  Both air assets were assigned a velocity 100km/hr based on medium 
capacity UAV flight characteristics and HH-60 fuel conservation cruising speeds.  
Unfortunately, MANA’s operating manual specifically states that the velocity ratio must 
not exceed 1000 grids per 100 time steps or random side effects may skew model results.  
The simulation was restricted in that it could not have any vehicle moving at speeds 
greater than 22km per hour, and therefore any vehicle, airborne or waterborne, is limited 
to a maximum movement ratio of 9.53 grids per time step.  All vehicles traveling greater 
than 9.53 grids per time step were rounded to 10 grids per time step.  The following 
process outlines the Helicopter and UAV velocity conversion: 
 
Equation 8. Helicopter and UAV MANA Velocity Conversion. 
 
A SURC capable of 40 knots was restricted to 10 grids per time step.  Equation 9 
outlines the unit conversion for knots per hour to MANA speed: 
 
Equation 9. Knots to MANA Speed Conversion. 
Equation 10 outlines the SURC velocity conversion: 
 
Equation 10. MANA SURC Velocity Conversion. 
83 
4. Weapons 
a. Kinetic Weapons 
MANA captured several important quantifiable weapons characteristics. 
MANA differentiates between kinetic or projectile weapons and explosive or area 
weapons.  The ranges, rate of fire, and armor penetration capability for kinetic weapons 
are detailed in Table 11 below110.  Ranges were converted from meters to MANA grids 
using the conversion equation explained previously.  Rate of fire was converted into time 
steps, and each agent was limited in the amount of ammunition they could carry for a 
particular weapon.  Red and Blue agent detection and engagement capabilities were 
affected by terrain, time, and velocity restrictions imposed by the MANA program.   
 
Table 11. Kinetic Weapons Characteristics for Red and Blue Forces. 
 
b. Explosive Weapons 
MANA also modeled explosive or area weapons.  These weapons inflicted 
damage over an area, and this area had to be converted into MANA grids.  A summary of 
the explosive weapons used, their ranges, shot radius, rates of fire, amount of ammunition 
carried, and armor penetration capability is detailed in Table 12. 
                                                 









5. Weapons Selection, Assignment, and Summary 
SEA-10 simulated likely Red force weapon employment based on number of 
agents in the field, weight considerations (how much weight historically an infantry 
soldier or insurgent can carry for a day), and movement constraints (how fast the agent 
needed to traverse terrain for a given mission).  MANA permits each Red or Blue squad 
multiple types of weapons.  Red forces were limited to rifles and rocket propelled 
grenades (RPG).  For example, a ten agent Red rifle company was modeled with ten AK-
47’s and three RPG-22’s.  Weapon types are selectable in MANA, as shown by the red 
outline in Figure 20.  This MANA capability permitted agents to carry and employ 
weapons in a manner that reflects real world tactics.  Each agent was assigned a specific 
role within a squad and MANA was programmed to determine the primary and secondary 
use of each weapon based on their specific capabilities (probability of hit, range, number 
of rounds).  For example, an RPG team imbedded in a squad used RPG first (the primary 
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weapon), before using assault rifles (the secondary weapon) weapons during an 
engagement.  The green outline in Figure 20 highlights the weapons designation feature.   
The blue outline in Figure 20 highlights the agent protect contact feature.  This 
feature permits weapon specific ROE to minimize the damage to friendly, neutral, or 
unidentified forces, especially when using indirect fire weapons.  Red forces were 
granted a more permissive ROE while Blue forces were constrained to minimize civilian 
casualties and fratricide. 
 
 
Figure 20. Weapons Selection Fields in MANA. 
 
Individual weapons have specific capabilities that are not common to all available 
weapons.  An M-16 assault rifle can be more effective than an AK-47 assault rifle 
because MANA allows modification of individual weapon effectiveness. Key parameters 
required for feasible weapons data entry were the minimum, effective, and maximum 
ranges of each weapon, the weapon’s rate of fire, and the number of rounds carried by the 
86 
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agent.   Minimum range is the shortest distance which an agent can safely fire the weapon 
without risking damage to itself.  Effective range is the maximum distance at which a 
weapon may be expected to be accurate and achieve the desired result.  It is the distance 
from a weapon system at which a 50 percent probability of target hit is expected, or the 
tracer burnout range.  Maximum range is the greatest distance a weapon can fire without 
consideration of dispersion111.  Minimum, effective, and maximum ranges provide a 
probability of hit matrix and more realism for the simulation.   SEA-10 chose to enter 
minimum, effective, and maximum ranges and their associated probability of hit into the 
highlighted “Hit Rate Per Discharge” section of Figure 21.  The minimum range of zero 
was assigned a value of 1 or 100% probability of hit.  A value of .5 or 50% probability of 
hit was assigned at the weapon’s effective range, and a zero value was assigned for 
probability of hit at maximum range.  SEA-10 programmed MANA to interpolate the 
values between the minimum, effective, and maximum ranges.  Appendix A contains all 
the individual weapon traits used in MANA.   
 
111 Global Security. Department of the Army Headquarters, Field Manual 101-5-1 Operational Terms 
and Graphics, Washington, DC, 30 September 1997.  Retrieved 29 September 2006 from the World Wide 
Web at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/101-5-1/index.html. 
 Figure 21. Hit Rate Per Discharge for Individual Weapons in MANA. 
   
6. Communications and Situational Awareness within MANA 
MANA permits control of the flow of situational awareness between squads using 
communications links as carriers of information.  Outbound communications may be 
given specific settings for Range, Capacity, Buffer, Latency, Self, Reliability, Accuracy, 
Maximum Age, Rank Filter, Include, and Delivery. 
a. Range 
  Range:  Range is defined as the maximum range between the center of the 
transmitting and receiving squads.  Messages are queued if this range is exceeded and the 
“Guaranteed Delivery” option is selected – otherwise they disappear (i.e., fail to 
transmit), just as in real world systems. 
b. Capacity 





  Buffer:  The buffer represents maximum queue size. While at maximum 
buffer capacity, new messages are discarded.  The default value for this parameter is -1, 
which means no size limit is imposed. (Buffer≥-1) 
d. Latency 
  Latency:  The number of time steps taken for each message to reach the 
receiving squad. 
e. Self 
  Self:  The number of time steps between transmitted position messages for 
each of the members of the transmitting squad.  Only used when the “Pass Self” option is 
checked. 
f. Reliability 
  Reliability:  The likelihood that a given message will be successfully sent 
on the link per transmission attempt.  Unsuccessfully transmitted messages will be resent 
until they are successfully transmitted. (0%–100%) 
g. Accuracy 
  Accuracy:  This parameter sets the probability that a contact’s identity 
(friendly, hostile, neutral) will be passed correctly.  When a link is inaccurate an incorrect 
classification may be sent for the contact.  An accuracy of 0% means always send as 
incorrect contact type and 100% means always send as correct contact type.  The 
accuracy parameter is particularly useful for studies on friendly fire prevention and 
occurrence. (0%–100%) 
h. Max Age 
  Max Age:  This setting defines the maximum age or time that a contact 
can remain in the link queue.  Age is measured from the time of initial organic sensor 
detection and not from arrival at the transmission queue.  This parameter allows the user 
to prevent stale information from curtailing the flow of newer information in the first in 
first out (FIFO) queue. The default of value of -1 designates that there is no age limit on 
messages. The queue is processed at each step of the model, and any stale messages are 
eliminated. (MaxAge≥-1) 
 
i. Link Reported Contact Types 
  Table 13 displays the contact types that are passed between agents as 
messages detection and classification identities on the link.  
 
Table 13 . MANA Contact Messages112. 
 
j. Delivery 
  Delivery:  Guaranteed Delivery causes messages to be queued when the 
receiving squad is out of communications range.  In such cases messages are lost if Fire-
N-Forget is enabled.  The following communications equipment was considered as viable 
riverine equipment. 
• Cell phone or equivalent VHF Limited Reliability 
• Basic Radio or equivalent UHF LOS 
• Personal Role Radio (PRR) or equivalent UHF Intra-Team Communications 
• PRC 148 or equivalent VHF/UHF Platoon – Squad – Team C2 - CAS Control 
• JTRS Cluster (8 channel) or equivalent Digital Future Internet Networked 
Protocol System  
• JTRS Cluster (4 channel) or equivalent Digital Future Internet Networked 
Protocol System  
• JTRS Cluster 5 SFF-D-E-G or equivalent Digital Future Internet Networked 
Protocol System  
• PRC 117 or equivalent VHF / UHF / Satellite Communications 
• Squad – Plat – HHQ CAS/Fires Control (OTH - Digital) 
                                                 
112 D. Galligan et al.,”MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) Compressed Help File.” Version 
3.0.39. Operations Analysis Section, Defense Technology Agency, New Zealand, April 2005 
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The RF was primarily modeled using JTRS, PRC 117 or equivalent, and cellular phones 
as the basic tools to maintain situational awareness between units.  Specific settings are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
7. Stop Conditions 
 An individual model run was terminated upon the defeat of all RED forces, the 
defeat of all BLUE forces, or the termination of 1440 time steps (24 hours). 
D. DATA OUTPUTS 
 SEA-10 conducted 30 simulation runs for each of the 11 alternatives set within 
the two scenarios of ambush and patrol.  The following output data files were recorded.   
• Step by Step Data.  This option saves a separate result file for each run 
containing step-by-step casualties, enemy contacts, and situational awareness 
activity.  
• Casualty Location Data.  This option saves a separate result file for each run 
containing the x and y coordinates and time step of each casualty.  
• Agent State Data.  This option saves a separate result file for each run 
containing data on each agent’s state at the end of that run.  Each row is an 
output for a separate agent.  
• Detections.  This option saves a separate result file for each run containing 
data for detections that occur on situational awareness maps.  
• Multi-Contact Detections.  This option saves a separate result file for each 
run containing data on detections that occur on situational awareness maps.  
• Red Detections per Step.  This option saves a separate result file for each run 
containing data on number of unique Red units detected each time step in each 
run of a multi-run.  
• First Enemy Detections. This option records the time of first enemy 
detection on either of the situational awareness maps of each of the squads in 




                                                
E. SOFTWARE PROCESSES, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
MANA processes interactions between agents and squads of agents at each 
modelled time step. In some cases, there is a systematic order of processing and in other 
cases the order is randomised to prevent bias. It is important for the modeller to 
understand which scheme is being used as it may affect the way they parameterise their 
scenario.  The following tasks were carried out in strict order at each time-step 
throughout the entirety of the modelling process. 
• All squads update their situational awareness maps to remove expired 
contacts.  Agent ordering occurs by squad number. 
• Agents are selected (one agent per time step) randomly from the pool of all 
agents present on the battlefield.  A selected agent carries out the following 
tasks during its turn: 
• It registers any contacts present within sensor range.  It adds these contacts to 
the situational awareness map and onto any appropriate outgoing 
communications messages.  Every agent on the battlefield is probed to see if it 
is within sensor range, the order of this probing is random to ensure that there 
is no systematic ordering of contacts arriving at communications links queues. 
• The agent fires its weapons upon any valid targets.  Enabled weapons are fired 
in order of weapon priority and number. 
• It refuels any agents for which refuelling is specified and that are within 
range. Agents are refuelled in order of agent identification number. 
• The agent moves. 
• Each squad is selected once in random order to process its communications 
queues. 113 
F. MANA SYSTEM LIMITATIONS 
SEA-10 had to make assumptions on system characteristics to capture the nature 
of the scenario and provide realism to the models.   Every attempt was made to minimize 
MANA limitations.  Key limitations dealt with during model development are described 
in the following section.   
 
113 D. Galligan et al.,”MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) Compressed Help File.” Version 
3.0.39. Operations Analysis Section, Defense Technology Agency, New Zealand, April 2005 
1. LIMITATION: Disembarkation of Forces 
The GCE and the various unmanned systems used in the models presented 
programming challenges.  MANA cannot debark the GCE from a SURC, and a 
compromise solution was required.  To simulate the baseline + engagement force 
package, the GCE had to be artificially placed ahead of the SURC and placed into an 
inactive state until refueled.  The SURC had to locate and “refuel” the GCE agents in 
order to simulate disembarking GCE agents and perform the mission.   
2. LIMITATION: Erratic UAV/USV Movement 
 Unmanned systems patrolled irregular patterns and were of little value in initial 
models.  UAV’s and USV’s were given waypoints similar to SURC in order to simulate 
the UAV/USV patrolling the riverine environment under operator guidance and prevent 
random behavior.   
3. LIMITATION: SURC Damage Mitigation 
The robustness of the SURC was difficult to capture with MANA.  A SURC can 
absorb more than one bullet, but when modeled as an individual agent in MANA, it could 
not.  In order to capture the SURC’s durability and simulate individual agents onboard 
the SURC, SEA-10 increased SURC No. Hits to Kill by a factor that included the number 
of crew available, a sixty percent multiplier of exposed crew profile representing the 
additional armor hit capability.  This prevented a single shot from destroying a SURC.  
Equation 11 was used to generate the value given to increase SURC armor. 
4 crew (exposed) (7 ) 7 crew (total) = 11 Hits to Kill
7 crew (total)
crew× +  
Equation 11. SURC Armor Augment Calculation. 
 
SURC without the VBSS team embarked onboard received 11 Hits to Kill.  SURC with 
the VBSS team embarked onboard received 22 Hits to Kill (to account for more 
personnel onboard).  The VBSS SURC has a total of 14 crewmembers embarked.  Again, 
the 0.6 multiplier represents the percentage of a body that is not covered by SURC armor 




14 crew + (14 crew * .6) = 22 Hits to Kill  
Equation 12. SURC Damage Capacity Equation. 
 
Although the method of adding extra damage mitigation to the SURC seemed 
rudimentary, the method was consistent, and provided the SURC with an increased armor 
value that stayed consistent throughout modeling runs.   
4. LIMITATION: Modeling Velocity 
The model was limited by the scaling capabilities of MANA.  Real world velocity 
could not be processed by MANA due to scale.  Vehicles which traveled at a rate of 





VI. COST ESTIMATION 
A. COST ESTIMATE PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
This cost estimation was conducted to describe the potential procurement and 
operating and support costs of the alternative force packages derived from SEA-10’s 
functional and physical architectures.  Individual technologies that compose the force 
packages were examined in detail and then combined as necessary for each complete 
force package estimate.  The purpose of this cost estimate is to assist the decision maker 
in determining which alternative provides the best capability for the most acceptable cost.  
It is ultimately up to the decision maker to weight the importance of each capability as a 
function of the cost.  This section is designed to provide insight into the potential life 
cycle cost of each force package.   
B. COST ESTIMATES OF TECHNOLOGIES CONSIDERED 
Cost was a critical factor in considering alternative force packages for the RF of 
2010.  Cost was not the sole variable for choosing one alternative over the others, but it 
was factored into SEA-10’s recommendations for a preferred operational architecture.  
Procurement costs and operations and support costs were estimated over a 10 year period 
(2010-2020).   All costs were derived from open source documents and, to the best of 
SEA-10’s knowledge, are representative of actual contractor costs.  No proprietary or for 
official use only documentation was used in the cost estimation in effort to make this 
thesis widely available.  
C. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES  
 Since the late 1980’s, UAV programs received funding from the Department of 
Defense.  UAV’s have evolved to become viable agents of the DoD as a result of 
advances in microprocessor speed and light weight composite material.  These 
advancements enabled UAV’s to assume combat roles that were previously impossible 
for an unmanned system.  Evidence of DoD’s interest in UAV’s is shown by increase in 
funding for UAV programs since the late 1980’s.  Until the late-1990’s, DoD spent less 
than $500 M per year on UAV development while the aforementioned technologies 
matured, as shown in Figure 22.  In 2001, annual funding for UAV’s began to increase 
significantly, largely because of the United States involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
As technology evolves and the United States continues in the GWOT, it is highly 
probable that DoD will continue to invest money into RDT&E, procurement, and 
operations and support of UAV’s. 

































































Figure 22. Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Funding 1988-2011114. 
 
1. UAV Categorization  
SEA-10 separated UAV’s into three categories:   
• Small UAV- weigh less than10 lbs with an airspeed less than 100 knots 
(Dragon Eye, Raven) 
• Tactical UAV- weight less than 500lbs with airspeed less than120 knots (Scan 
Eagle, Shadow)115 
• Theater level- large body airframe capable of 24 hour plus mission endurance 
(Global Hawk, Predator) 
SEA-10 assumed that theater level UAV’s would not be directly attached to the RF 
because of cost limitations, but RF data link systems must be interoperable with these 
                                                 
114 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p 37, 2005. 
115 Ibid. 
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platforms as they may provide intelligence in a supporting role or may be operating in the 
area of operations with RF.  Small UAV’s were excluded from estimates because of their 
short endurance, fragility, and non-waterproof systems.  Only tactical UAV’s were 
considered in the evaluation of alternatives. Tactical UAV’s have the characteristics 
required for search and detection of enemy forces.  SEA-10 modeled the RF in operation 
for a full 24 hour period, of which the UAV can provide detection support for the entire 
duration of operations.  Tactical UAV’s have a service ceiling of 16,000 feet and a 
nominal cruise speed of 80 knots.  SEA-10 assumed that UAV’s will be launched and 
recovered from the TOC (this assumption also excludes small UAV’s and theater level 
UAV’s).  As of February 2006, 224 tactical UAV’s were in the DoD’s inventory.  The 
following breakdown of tactical UAV’s is outlined in Table 14.116
    
Table 14. Tactical UAV Sponsor Organizations and Number in Service117. 
 
2. Shadow 200  
In 1999 the U.S. Army acquired the RQ-7/Shadow 200 system to support brigade 
level commanders.  In 2003 Shadow went initial operatinal capability (IOC) with an 
expected delivery of 88 systems118  and was “the first UAV in recent history to pass its 
Milestone III (full rate production) decision on 25 September 2002.”119  As of 2002, 20 
Shadow 200 UAV systems (four airframes each) are assigned to operational units. The 
RQ-7B Shadow 200 system consists of four airframes, a rail launcher, recovery system, a 
ground control unit, a remote ground data terminal, and truck transport.  Shadow is a rail 
                                                 
116 Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 06-610T Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved 
Planning and Acquisition Strategies, p. 6, April 2006. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p 37, 2005. 
119 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study, p.50, February 2002. 
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launched tactical UAV with 7 hours of endurance and an operational radius of 69 nm.  
Equipped with a gimbaled electro optical (EO) infrared (IR) sensor it is capable of real 
time video via C-band line of sight data link.  Table 15 is a breakdown of Shadow 
capabilities.  Due to increasing operational requirements, procurement of Shadow UAV 
has grown to 35 systems and the FY2006 supplemental budget requested 9 additional 
Shadow systems for use in Iraq120.   
 
Table 15. Shadow 200 performance characteristics121. 
 
Shadow UAV would be used as a detection capability for the RF.  Once launched 
from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) the Shadow is controlled by two operators: an 
AVO (Aerial Vehicle Operator) and a MPO (Mission Payload Operator), who are in 
charge of the UAV navigation, and tactical control (searching for targets and system 
monitoring)122. The UAV can be flown to pre-designated waypoints or by direct control. 
UAV data relays to the TOC via IP based networks that must be established prior to 
riverine operations.  The speed of data transmission is only limited by the availability of 
bandwidth.  Shadow cannot operate for an entire 24 hour mission, but multiple airframes 
can relieve on station and cover the duration of the RF patrol.  From an operating altitude 
of 3,000 feet, assuming a 30 degree field of view, Shadow will have a search sweep path 
of 2000 feet123.  Shadow is a detection only platform, and does not have an engagement 
capability.   
                                                 
120 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of Defense FY2006  
Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” 
Retrived 01 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html] 
121 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p 8, 2005. 
122 M.L Cummings, C.E. Nehme, & J. Crandall,  “Predicting Operator Capacity for Supervisory 
Control of Multiple UAVS,” Unpublished, Humans and Automation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  2006. 
123 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Unmanned 
Vehicles into Maritime Missions, TM 3-22-5-SW, pp. 35-36.  
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3. Shadow 200 Research Developmental Testing Evaluation and 
Procurement Costs 
 The estimated cost for a Shadow UAV for FY10 is $320,000 per airframe and 
$18.0M (FY06) per system, to include the launcher, recovery unit, ground control 
system, remote ground data terminal and truck transport and maintenance support 
facility124.   SEA-10 assumed that the RF would procure and operate two Shadow UAV 
systems.  Increases in requirements125 led to an 18% (3% with each procurement) 
increase to the cost of Shadow procurement over the 10 year period.  Figure 23 was 
derived from information in the Army’s budget request for 2007126.  Lack of 
procurement funding in FY07 and FY08 is due to the need to refit the propulsion systems 
of existing systems to meet the payload requirements.   
 
124 Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of the Army Procurement 
Programs, Other Procurement February 2006”Retrived 08 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[]http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/opa2.pdf.], p 236. 
125 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study, pp.50-51, February 
2002. 
126 Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of the Army Procurement 
Programs, Other Procurement February 2006”Retrived 08 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[]http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/opa2.pdf.]], p 236. 















Figure 23. Shadow Procurement Costs FY2003 - FY2011127. 
 
SEA-10 assumed that the RF is not responsible for any RDT&E of the Shadow 200 
system, and procured two Shadow 200 systems in 2010. 
4. Shadow 200 Operating and Support Costs 
 Estimates of operating and support costs were derived primarily from the cost to 
train and deploy UAV operators.  Yearly salaries were prorated for instructors based off 
of course length while students and operators entire yearly salaries were included.  The 
USA owns and operates the Unmanned Aerial System Training Base (USATB)128, 
therefore overhead costs, simulators, text books, and supplies were not factored into the 
training costs.  Maintenance, technical support, and spare parts were estimated between 
5% and 10% of procurement costs because much of this information was considered 
operationally and proprietarily sensitive and was not releasable from the program office 
to SEA-10.   Estimates for Shadow 200 UAV operating and support costs were taken 
                                                 
127 Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of the Army Procurement 
Programs, Other Procurement February 2006”Retrived 08 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[]http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/opa2.pdf.], p 236. 
128 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p 63, 2005. 
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from the President’s budget for 2006129.  Total yearly operating and support costs for two 
Shadow UAV systems range from $2.8 - $3.8M.  Operating and Support costs over a 10 
year period for Shadow UAV were $36.6 M.   
D. UNMANNED SURFACE SYSTEMS 
The incorporation of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle/System (USV/USS) has the 
potential to: 
• Increase battle space awareness. 
• Increase the RF’s engagement capabilities through increased ISR. 
• Preserve the force by engaging in “dull, dirty, and dangerous” but important 
missions deemed too risky for manned systems. 
The USS is the entire system, inclusive of the USV, that acts as a forward scout 
for the RF.  The USV sub-system is the self propelled water vehicle that maneuvers 
forward of the force, conducts ISR, and relays data on the tactical picture via data link.  
The USS provides the RF with an unmanned alternative to investigate potentially 
hazardous situations.  USV’s could be used to probe potential weapons caches, 
investigate suspected improvised explosives devices (IEDs), and close with suspicious 
vessels on the waterway.  A USS has the potential to increase the RF battlespace 
awareness.  A USV can preserve the force by providing information on the area around a 
river bend.  This would enable the RF to observe a potential ambush site without placing 
a boat crew inside enemy weapons range.  The USS also provides increased engagement 
capability by allowing crews to examine a potentially hostile site from a safe distance and 
allowing the RF the opportunity to exploit indirect fire options or take advantage of crew 
served weapons with greater ranges.  
 Once the decision was made on what the system must do, the critical question 
became: what capabilities must the USV have in order to successfully increase battle 
space awareness and increase engagement capability?  First, if the USV cannot keep pace 
with the supported force, it cannot contribute to local battlespace awareness.  Second, the 
USV must be able to provide feedback to the operator on the environment.  Lastly, the 
USV must have sufficient survivability to ensure it can complete its specified tasks.  
 
129 Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of the Army Procurement 
Programs, Other Procurement February 2006”Retrived 08 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[]http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/opa2.pdf.], p 236. 
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Other manned and unmanned systems can similarly contribute to increased battlespace 
awareness and increased engagement capability, but USS’s offer complimentary benefits 
to other RF systems in that they operate in the same riverine environment as the SURC’s 
and patrolling crews, and they are often controlled from the SURC itself. 
 The USV must have a robust sensor package to accomplish the mission.  In order 
to provide ISR data in a variety of conditions and operational environments, the sensor 
suite should consist of laser and point listening devices, EO and IR optical imagers with 
high power zoom capability, and an eye safe laser rangefinder to give precise range and 
bearing information to an integrated navigation and targeting system.  The sensor suite 
should also have a megaphone for safe distance communication with suspect vessels.  
The USV should also have several low-light television cameras and small navigation 
radar for safety of navigation and situational awareness. 
1. USV Categorization 
 Selection of an existing or developmental USV platform for riverine missions 
should consider payload capacity and platform capabilities (payload weight, electrical 
power generation, and stability), mobility, (size, weight, speed, and endurance), 
transportation and towing (size, weight, unit transportability, ease of launch and 
recovery), as well as a number of other issues such as stealth, survivability, host platform 
storage space, automation, and data communication.  A large USV can be a more capable 
sensor platform, but consumes a larger storage and transportation footprint.  Smaller less 
costly USV’s require less storage and transportation space, but provide a less capable 
sensor platform with lower speed and endurance capabilities.  Several candidates stood 
out as potential RF USV platforms.  For the purposes of determining which platform to 
use for this cost estimation SEA-10 categorized USV’s into small, medium, and large 
platforms.  The USV that best represents the technology modeled was the medium USV 
SeaFox built by Northwind Marine, and it is the primary platform considered in this cost 
estimate.  Small and large USV’s and their trade off capabilities are described below. 
 Jet-ski based platforms such as the RoboSki target towing drone are based on 
commercial 2-stroke gasoline powered composite fiberglass and plastic hull jet-skis.  
They offer a light weight, shallow draft, and low cost platform option.  Jet-ski based 
platforms’ speed and maneuverability capabilities are similar to the SURC.  They present 
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a low profile because of their small size, but this limits payload capacity.  Limited 
payload and electrical load capabilities of the jet-ski based platform restrict range and 
sensor capabilities.  The jet-ski may be able to support the previously outlined sensor 
system with some modifications.  While the jet-ski is a relatively light weight platform, it 
is not man portable and requires transport via trailer, and therefore extends the launch and 
recovery time of the RF and increases its vulnerability.  Also, the composite hull is 
unproven in field use or combat.   
 Other small platform options include ultra lightweight, man portable pontoon hull 
configurations with nearly silent electric drive (COTS, low speed, electric trolling 
motors).  The small pontoon USV’s offer excellent stealth but are very limited in their 
sensor capabilities.  It is not likely that these systems could support the desired sensor 
suite without significant developmental lead time.  While these platforms generally 
provided a low cost solution, they did not have the range or speed necessary to keep pace 
with the SURC.  The crews were required to stop, deploy the USV and retrieve it after it 
completed surveillance.  This placed an extra burden on the crews and increased their 
vulnerability which may negate the stealth advantages of the platform.  Lastly, the small 
craft is not very survivable in field conditions in its current light weight non-armored 
form. 
 The advanced concept technology demonstrator (ACTD) Spartan Scout is a 
standard Navy 7 meter RHIB with a remote piloting package that enables it to operate as 
either a manned or unmanned vessel.  The remote pilothouse can be applied to the SURC 
platform, and allows it to function as a manned SURC or a USV.  A SURC with such an 
external piloting system can keep pace with other SURC’s, and is able to support the 
desired sensor package.  Logistic issues should be minimized as the SURC platform will 
only differ from the manned SURC’s in its remote piloting equipment.  Additionally, if a 
manned SURC is damaged, the USV could be converted to a manned platform instantly.  
Launching the additional SURC sized boat would lengthen the vulnerability of the RF 





                                                
2. SeaFox 
The SeaFox is a 5 meter (16 foot length overall) rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) 
designed and built by Northwind Marine.  The SeaFox is a purpose-built medium USV 
platform with an aluminum hull and a 220 horsepower heavy fuel (diesel or JP-5) engine 
powering a water jet propulsion system.  The SeaFox is built for durability and heavy 
use.  It has speed, maneuverability, and range comparable to the SURC.  The larger size 
of the SeaFox requires transport via trailer and extends the RF vulnerability window of 
the launch and recovery phases.  It is not as stealthy as the small USV platform.  
However, its low profile and quiet operation at low speeds offer better stealth than the 
SURC.  The SeaFox is also able to support all elements of the desired sensor package.  
SeaFox can also employ additional systems to enhance its capabilities. 
 Another medium USV platform is the high speed mobile surface target (HSMST ) 
which is a derivative of the Navy’s standard 7 meter RHIB.  The HSMST has capabilities 
and limitations similar to SeaFox.  Both are small to medium sized RHIBs with powerful 
water jet propulsion systems.130  However, HSMST is gasoline powered and requires 
modification to operate on heavy fuels and be logistically compatible with the SURC. 
HSMST is larger than SeaFox which increases the detection signature and logistical 
footprint.  
SeaFox is the best representation of the USV that SEA-10 chose to model and 
cost estimate in this thesis.  There were two major factors that drove this decision.  The 
first was that NECC and RIVGRU ONE have set a requirement for two SeaFox vehicles 
to be delivered to the RF by late 2006 or early 2007.131  The second factor was that the 
performance parameters of the medium USV category take advantage of some stealth and 
ease of use benefits without sacrificing performance.  Since USV’s are relatively new to 
the operational scene, finding accurate information on the actual cost of training, 
maintenance, and support was challenging.  The cost of RDT&E was factored into this 
cost estimate as part of the procurement cost.  Since USV systems are not in full rate 
production, procurement costs may not be representative of actual costs. 
 
130 HSMSTs have the option of twin gasoline outboards, twin gasoline powered inboards or twin 
gasoline powered water jets.  
131 Government Supplemental Contract number: GS-07F-0416, program is administered by: Naval 
Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard. 
105 
                                                
3. SeaFox RDT&E and Procurement Costs 
 Research and development costs of the basic SeaFox vehicle were paid by the 
Office of Naval Research132.  Procurement cost of SeaFox is $300,000 per unit, and it 
was assumed that RF would need a total of three SeaFox units to support operations for a 
deployed squadron133.   This cost estimate assumed three USV’s will be purchased in 
2010.   
4. SeaFox Operations and Support Costs 
 Operations and support costs are broken down into personnel, maintenance, and 
support categories.  Personnel O&S cost were estimated based on training for typical 
RHIB crews.  Operator and maintenance personnel training requirements were the same 
for large and medium USV’s but not small USV’s.  Little to no real world operations or 
data was available to support training and operating estimates.  Therefore SEA-10 
concluded from an extensive open source internet search and literature review134 that two 
E-5 operators with a week of quarterly training and three dedicated maintainers are 
capable of maintaining the same operational availability from the USV that can be 
expected from the SURC.  All personnel pay was increased by 2% per year.  
Maintenance O&S cost included POL, consumable, and repairable spare parts.  POL 
consumption and cost were derived from fuel curves for a Cummins Mercruiser Diesel 
which is a standard engine for a RHIB.  Total cost of operations for three USV’s per 
squadron over 10 years is $3.76M.  The yearly range is $.24M to $.28M (FYO6).  The 
cost of operations and support for the proposed USV is presented in Appendix B.   
E. UNMANNED GROUND SENSORS 
Remote sensor operations expand the commander’s view of the battlefield. 
Remote sensors provide a means to economically conduct continuous 
surveillance of vast areas, contributing key information to the intelligence 
collection effort. These operations decrease the number of personnel 
required for reconnaissance and surveillance operations and reduce the 
risk associated with these operations. A remote sensor system, consisting 
of individual sensors, communications relays, and monitoring devices, 
 
132 Government Supplemental Contract number: GS-07F-0416, program is administered by: Naval 
Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard. 
133 Three USV’s are desired for continual coverage during riverine operations. Since there are three 
boat divisions, one USV will be assigned to each division.   
134 CANTRAC Website. Small Boat Instruction.  Retrieved 13 November 2006 from the World Wide 
Web at [https://cetarsweb.cnet.navy.mil/pls/cetars/main.action?V_LOC=home] 
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provides the capability to conduct remote sensor operations. Sensors, 
relays, and monitoring devices are employed in an integrated network, 
providing general surveillance, early warning, or target acquisition over 
selected areas of the battlefield. Key considerations in employing remote 
sensors are the nature of the target, characteristics of the area or 
operations, time and resources available for emplacing the sensor 
network, and the location and connectivity of the sensor monitoring 
sites135. 
 The excerpt above is from Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-2.3 (MCWP 
2-2.3) and describes a generic CONOPS for unmanned ground sensors (UGS).  SEA-10 
utilized the Marine Corps Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS) for modeling 
alternatives and this cost estimation.  MCWP 2-2.3 describes training and operating 
requirements for the system as well as providing data for modeling parameters.  The 
technology of TRSS is mature and completely feasible for SEA-10’s timeframe of 2010. 
1. Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS) 
TRSS consists of sensors, communications data relays, and monitoring systems.  
TRSS uses a string of 24 individually placed sensors with a range per sensor of up to 100 
meters for vehicle detection.  The sensors used in TRSS are seismic, magnetic, and 
infrared.136  They act as a tripwire and alert units to the presence of personnel and 
vehicles, but have limited capability for classification of contacts.  These sensors are 
ideally suited for areas of expected enemy activity or for use in critical force protection 
areas around a forward operating base or TOC.  Only one ground unit will be needed for 
riverine operations.  The ground unit requires four people to set up and monitor the UGS 
during deployment.  The average duration of operations for TRSS is 30 days per battery 
charge.  The UGS team will be integrated into the logistics and support of the RF due to 
its small size.  The TRSS UGS divided up into four man portable components: one 
ground sensor; one sensor monitoring system; one portable monitor; and one relay 
system.  The total cost of TRSS is the sum of all four components.  One UGS is 
purchased in 2010 and one will be purchased every five years thereafter.  In the non- 
 
 
135 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-2.3, Remote Sensor Operations, Chapter 1, 17 
April 1997.
136 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-2.3, Remote Sensor Operations, Chapter 2, 17 
April 1997.
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procurement years, 1% of the cost of the UGS is used for maintenance and upgrades.  
TRSS required no RDT&E estimate because it is already a technology developed and 
procured for DoD. 
The individually deployed sensors used by TRSS have the added advantage that, 
as sensor technology improves, the system can use its existing data communication and 
monitoring architecture while incorporating sensor advancements.  The Marine Corps has 
established a firm doctrinal base in its MCWP and has laid a solid organizational 
foundation for continued advancement in the efficient use of unattended sensors that will 
help other military users like RIVGRU should they choose to invest in this technology.   
2. TRSS Operations and Support Costs 
 Operations and support is accounted for in the cost of personnel.  SEA-10 
assumed that the cost of personnel is substantially greater than the cost of the 
maintenance of the system.  The basic unit for fielding a TRSS is the Marine Corps 
sensor employment team (SET) which consists of four marines and is designed to support 
a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) sized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of 
approximately 2200 Marines137.  The SET is capable of monitoring a single site 
continuously while providing first echelon maintenance for the system.  The additional 
operating and maintenance responsibilities for TRSS would require an augment to 
RIVRON TOC personnel as well as initial and periodic refresher training.  All unit cost 
values were drawn from a FY05 supplemental request for funds and the 2006 military 
basic pay scales.  Total operational cost of the system over a 10 year period is $8.03M.  
The annual cost is between $.356M and $0.404M.   
F. GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT 
The GCE increases the versatility of the RF.  The RF can engage the enemy on 
land as well as on water with a GCE embarked.  The GCE can also be used for gathering 
intelligence, insertion and extraction of units, and covert operations.  SEA-10 modeled 
the GCE to enhance the engagement capability of the RF on land.  SEA-10 modeled a 
light infantry platoon consisting of one 12 man team with one squad automatic weapon 
(SAW) and 12 M-16 assault rifles.  The modified light infantry platoon consists of two 
rifle squads with one machine gun team.  A machine gun team consists of a machine 
 
137 Global Security, Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit. Retrieved 02 November 2006 from the World 
Wide Web at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/meu.htm] 
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gunner and an assistant machine gunner.  The platoon headquarters element consists of a 
platoon commander, senior enlisted advisor and a radioman.  All individuals carry the M-
16 assault rifle and only one designated individual carried the additional SAW. 
 The cost estimate for the GCE consists of the cost of personnel, weapons, and 
equipment.  In this cost estimation, the service of the GCE was not a factor.  SEA-10 
assumed that Army or Marine Corps personnel could fill the role as the riverine GCE, 
and this assumption is supported by the NECC CONOPS for Riverine Operations138.  
Cost for training the GCE to the riverine mission was included in this estimate as the 
normal salaries of the members of the GCE.  However, instructor, schoolhouse, and 
supply cost of instruction was not included, because it is assumed that it will be 
undertaken by the parent force (USMC or USA). 
1. GCE RDT&E and Procurement Costs 
 Research and development were not considered for inclusion in the GCE cost 
estimate.  Procurement only included the purchase of weapons.  Every five years one 
SAW and 16 M-16 assault rifles are purchased at a cost that increases by 5% from the 
prior procurement.  Initial procurement of tents, field packs, medical supplies, food and 
other supplies were included because SEA-10 assumed that the RF would not inherit this 
material from the GCE’s parent force.  Information about the complete composition of 
GCE material was provided by RIVGRU ONE and listed in Appendix B.139
2. GCE Operations and Support Costs 
 Military pay was found on the official DoD military pay website and it is assumed 
that all pay increases by 2% per year140.  Personnel costs were only for the time of work 
up training and deployment (total of one year) because it was assumed that the GCE was 
assigned from a parent service and are only temporarily assigned to the RF. 
 
138 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Concept of Operations - US Navy Riverine Force 
(DRAFT), p. 37, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, 30 August 2006. 
139 Riverine Group Initial Cost Estimate, Unpublished, 26 August 2006, see also Appendix Cost 
Estimate. 
140 Interview between Dr. Daniel Nussbaum, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School,  and the author, 
October 29, 2006. 
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 Weapons costs were based on estimates found through open source websites141.  
Every five years 1 SAW and 12 M-16 assault rifles were purchased.  A cost increase of 
5% was added to each weapon that was purchased after 2010.  Additionally, cost of 
upkeep and ammunition for the weapons was included as 50% of the purchase price of 
the weapons and was part of each yearly cost, during the years when weapons were not 
procured (i.e., the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years). 
Cost of food, medical supplies, infantry equipment, and communications 
equipment was based on numbers from the initial cost estimate done by NECC for the 
RF142.   SEA-10 assumed that costs for these materials will inflate by 1% per year over 
the next 10 years because of changing operational requirements.  Total cost for 
employment of the GCE over a 10 year period is $8.03 M$ (FY06).  The yearly range for 
ground combat operations is .730M-.746M (FY06$).   
G. NETWORKED SENSORS 
The networked sensor alternative consists of one UAV, one USV, and one UGS 
system that are able to communicate with each other to detect and classify targets.  The 
concept hinges on interoperability between the sensors, TOC, and SURC’S for data 
transmission.  Not all of the sensors are able to talk to one another directly.  Some UAV’s 
and USV’s may have data link capability by 2010, but UGS’s are unlikely to have data 
link capability because of their small size.  Therefore, the networked sensor alternative 
will have man-in-the-loop oversight to ensure that data flows from the detecting sensor to 
corresponding classification sensors.  SEA 10 does not foresee the necessary cultural and 
technological changes taking place by 2010 that would enable sensors to queue directly 
off one another without human interaction.  SEA-10 chose the Joint Tactical Radio Set 
(JTRS) as the communications network of the 2010 RF.  If continued program setbacks 
and budget overruns occur, then it is possible that JTRS would not be the 
communications network of choice in this alternative.   
1. JTRS Cluster 5 
 JTRS is a DoD wide initiative to develop a common voice, data, and video 
ghout the joint battlespace.  The key element of JTRS is a  
141 Federation of American Scientists, M16A2 5.56mm Semiautomatic Rifle. Retrieved 12 November 
2006 from the World Wide Web at  [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/lcnd/m16.htm]
142 Riverine Group Initial Cost Estimate, Unpublished, 26 August 2006, see also Appendix C.   
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wideband network waveform that can provide mobile network connectivity across the 
battleground.  JTRS is divided into five clusters.  Cluster 1 will provide the warfighter 
with a multi-channel, software programmable, hardware configurable digital radio 
networking system.  Nominal range for the wideband network waveform is 
approximately 6.2 km.  JTRS was initially designed to provide a digital communications 
capability to the Army.  The program has fallen behind schedule and experienced cost 
overruns.  As an interim solution to Cluster 1, Cluster 2 was developed to provide Special 
Forces with an interoperable hand-held radio with GPS capability.  The Army created 
JTRS Cluster 5 which utilizes handheld radios that are capable of receiving multiple 
waveforms because of an increasing need for interoperable communications and 
programmatic difficulty with Cluster 1.  At $10,000 per radio, JTRS Cluster 5 program is 
a low cost alternative to Cluster 1 and 2 (Cluster 3 and 4 programs were disbanded).   
The Cluster 5 program is managed by the Army and consists of several handheld 
radios shown in Figure 24 that are capable of multiple waveform transmission.  JTRS 
waveform implementation consists of a Waveform Application Code, Radio Set Devices, 
and Radio System Applications.  Originally, there were 32 JTRS waveforms which have 
since been reduced to the following nine: 
• Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW)  
• Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW)  
• Joint Airborne Networking–Tactical Edge (JAN-TE)  
• Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 
• SINCGARS  
• Link-16  
• EPLRS  
• High Frequency (HF)  
• UHF SATCOM “143” 
 
143 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5, Retrieved 02 
November 2006 as found on the World Wide Web at 
[http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/body.cfm?type=c&category=27&subcat=80]. 
 Figure 24. JTRS Cluster 5 components.   
 
2. JTRS Operations and Support Costs 
 Operations and support costs for the unmanned systems are estimated as the same 
for the individual systems.  O & S support for the communications equipment and 
network backbone is dependent on the amount of lost equipment (i.e., handheld radio 
dropped overboard), damage and wear and tear due to operational use, software upgrades, 
and security upgrades.  Data is not available for yearly operations and support cost of 
JTRS cluster 5.  SEA-10 assumed that the operation and support costs of the system were 
10% of the procurement cost.  To estimate the cost of JTRS an analogy was drawn to 
existing communications equipment.  A 60% increase in cost was applied to JTRS 
elements because open source literature reported the cost of one JTRS cluster 5 handheld 
as $10,000.  It was also assumed that the multiple waveform capability of JTRS 
eliminated the need for the PRC 117, and that the man portable communications package 
would have an HF/SACTCOM capability.  Figure 25 depicts the basis for the analogy. 
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 Figure 25. JTRS Cluster 5 Cost Analogy Matrix. 
 
3. JTRS System Cost 
Total cost for the network sensors package is $82.0M (FY06) and includes the 
procurement and operating support costs for UAV, USV, UGS and JTRS cluster 5.  
Annual operating costs are estimated at $3M-$4.5M.   
H. INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT 
1. New Efficient Mortar System (NEMO) 
 The New Efficient Mortar System (NEMO) provides rapid accurate indirect fire 
support from a riverine platform.  NEMO is a light weight semi-automatic turreted mortar 
weapons system that uses a single gyro stabilized 120mm mortar cannon.  NEMO was 
designed by the Finnish defense company, Patria, as a coastal patrol artillery unit.  The 
hull is a 14.1 meter WATERCAT M-12 high speed amphibious troop carrier.  The 
lightweight (1500 kilograms) NEMO turret can be mounted on the forecastle in lieu of 
the standard troop compartment.  NEMO can maintain speed with the SURC’s in the boat 
division and extends the engagement capability of the force to over 10 kilometers.144  In 
                                                 
144 Patria, New Efficient Mortar System, Retrieved 13 November 2006 as found on the World Wide 
Web at [www.partria.fi/modules/NEMO] 
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addition to the indirect fire capability, NEMO has the ability to support the force using 
both direct fire and Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) fire.    
NEMO is built by Patria, a Finnish defense company; therefore exception would 
have to be made to put this system into use for American forces.  Although the company 
has not looked at the possibility of installing the turret on the SURC platform, if this 
capability is desired, it could become an area of further research.   
2. NEMO RDT&E and Procurement Costs 
 NEMO has not been sold to any country as of the writing of this thesis.  However, 
estimates were made on the cost of the Watercat M12 hull, NEMO turret, modifications 
to the SURC hull, additional C2 gear, and stabilized EO/FLIR sites.  Actual cost of 
NEMO was not available, due to the company confidentially policy. However, a similar 
system was built by ABU Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), with the assistance of 
Sweedship, a Swedish boat design company, for the cost of $2.2M (FY03) per copy145. 
The Sweedship design was about 10m larger than the Watercat M12 with a significant 
command and control suite, but has a similar aluminum hull and jet propulsion system.   
Estimated cost for one Watercat M12 is approximately $1.0M(FY06).  It is assumed that 
the RF will procure three NEMO Watercats, which will allow for one to operate with 
each boat division.   
3. NEMO Operations and Support Costs 
 NEMO Watercat O&S cost estimates are based on 12 operators (4 per crew) that 
are trained to drive the SURC and operate the NEMO Watercat system.  Although the 
turret is unmanned, the operators are responsible for reloading the turret if all of the 
mortars are fired.  Operators are also needed to drive NEMO Watercat and provide force 
protection for the vessel.  O & S costs for spare parts and POL are based on analogy to 
the riverine assault craft (RAC) platform.  O&S costs for NEMO Watercat were 
estimated as 10% of the procurement costs (this may be a low estimate for a non-U.S. 
weapons system). R&D costs for installing and testing the NEMO system were not 
included in the cost estimate.  Cost for the 120mm HE shells were found in FEDLOG; 
however, Patria sells the NEMO system and the associated ammunition, therefore the 
cost may vary depending on how the contract is authored.  Estimated total cost for 
 
145 Gulfnews.com, ADHB wins Dh100M contract, Retrieved 07 November 2006 found on the World 
Wide Web at [http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/01/23/38652.html].
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operating three NEMO Watercats over a 10 year period is $5.8M (FY06).  The estimated 
average yearly cost for three NEMO Watercats is $1.1M (FY06).   
I. DEDICATED HELICOPTER SUPPORT 
 A three helicopter detachment can potentially provide 24 hour coverage 
(assuming a 24 hour mission) for the RF.  HH-60R helicopters would increase the 
detection and engagement capability of the RF.  The range of the HH-60 is approximately 
445 nm without refueling.  The HH-60R can be armed with two Hellfire missiles and two 
.50 cal machine guns146.   
 The cost estimate for helicopter support operations consists of RDT&E and 
procurement, O&S for personnel, O&S for helicopter support, and O&S for equipment.  
The basis for this section of cost estimate stems from an informal study done at NECC on 
the required force structure size of a helicopter detachment assigned to support the 
riverine squadron.  When considering equipment needed to support a helicopter 
detachment, it was assumed that the personnel would share the camp perimeter with the 
personnel at the TOC.  Although the helicopter detachment is supplied with their own 
tents, generator, computers, and MRE’s, they are not responsible for security measures, 
medical, and water supply.   
1. Helicopter RDT&E and Procurement Costs 
Procurement cost for the HH-60R is approximately $42.3M (FY06)147.  SEA-10 
assumed that 3 HH-60R helicopters will need to be purchased to support riverine 
operations based on reliability and operational availability requirements148.  Although the 
CONOPS indicates that the helicopters will come from a standing squadron, the 10 year 
cost estimation time increment dictates that the cost of procurement of the helicopters be 
considered.  SEA-10 modeled helicopters to increase the engagement capability of the RF 
through the use of Hellfire missiles and .50 caliber machine guns.  The cost of Hellfire 
 
146 Federation of American Scientists.  MH-60R.  Retrieved on 13 November 2006 from the World 
Wide Web at [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm]. 
147 The Library of Congress Thomas, Navy Aircraft.  MH-60 Multi-mission Helicopter.  Retrieved on 
13 November 2006 from the World Wide Web at [ http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp10823vD4&refer=&r_n=sr260.108&db_id=108&item=&sel=TOC_174886&] 
148 Riverine Group Initial Helicopter Study, Unpublished,  2006. 
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missiles was estimated from open source documents,149 and SEA-10 assumed that each 
helicopter will carry two Hellfire missiles on each mission.  Initially, 10 Hellfire II 
missiles were procured for RF operations, although SEA-10 recognizes that operations 
may require more than the initial load out.  Only 10 Hellfire missiles were included for 
procurement to minimize the number of personnel needed for maintenance and support of 
the missiles. 
2. Helicopter Operations and Support Costs 
Operations and support costs were divided into three categories; O&S for 
operations, O&S for equipment and O&S for personnel.  Operations and support costs for 
personnel include the number of people required to constitute the helicopter detachment 
according to the NECC study.  Personnel costs include 12 pilots, 12 aircrew, and 15 
maintenance support personnel.  Training of personnel was not included in the cost 
estimate.  Due to the large number of personnel, it was necessary to consider lodging, 
food, and workspace equipment as part of the operating and support cost for the 
helicopter detachments.  Operations and support cost for helicopter specific operations 
were found on the VAMSOC website in the H-60 almanac150.  Although the costs may 
not be exact for the HH-60 platform, they were suitable for this cost estimate.  Operations 
and support cost for equipment were found in documents given to SEA-10 from NECC 
personnel. These documents were a draft of the original cost estimate for the RF and may 
not represent the exact equipment that was purchased for RIVRON ONE.  Helicopter 
detachment personnel were supplied with outdoor equipment (tents, electrical generators, 
etc), computers for maintenance support and operations, and food.  It is assumed that 
helicopter detachment personnel will be co-located with the TOC.  The costs for water, 
electricity, security, sandbags and other equipage that could be shared with the TOC were 




149 Lockheed Press Release. U.S. Army Awards Lockheed Martin $170 Million Contract for Hellfire 
II Missile Production. Retrieved on 5 November 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
[http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_news/pressreleases/06pressrelease/Hellfire] 
150 Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs, HH-60 Alamanac, Retrieved 05 
November 2006 from the World Wide Web at  [www.navyvamosc.com].    
116 
J. COST ESTIMATION SUMMARY AND RESULTS  
 This cost estimate was generated from open source information.  It is not all 
inclusive and care should be taken to closely research the systems mentioned before any 
acquisition decisions are made.  Care was taken to ensure that the alternative costs were 
inclusive of all equipment, platforms, and sensors that were modeled.  Special attention 
was also paid toward the notional manpower required to support scenario patrol 
operations modeled.   
The results in this section are derived only from cost.  A more descriptive analysis 
of cost versus performance is described in the analysis section of this thesis.  Decision 
makers should evaluate systems on their military application rather than solely on cost, 
because affordable systems do not necessarily have the greatest military application.  
Conversely, the most expensive force packages are not necessarily the best in terms of 
performance.  Therefore, careful consideration must be taken before deciding or 
discarding a particular force package. 
 Average operating cost is the average cost of operating the system over 9 years 
(all non-procurement years).  Table 16 is a summary of the baseline and alternative costs.  
Procurement cost is the total cost of procuring the system in 2010 (using FY06$), and is 
shown for each alternative as compared against the baseline in Figure 26.  The total 10 
year cost is the cost of procuring and operating the system, and is shown for each 
alternative as compared against the baseline in Figure 27.  Detailed break down of these 

































































































Figure 26. Procurement Costs of the Riverine Baseline and Alternatives. 
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Figure 27. Total 10 Year Cost of Riverine Baseline and Alternatives. 
 
 The mortar team is the least expensive force package in terms of the procurement 
cost, annual operating cost and total cost.  The most expensive force package alternative 
is the helicopter detachment in terms of total 10 year cost and procurement cost.  The 
most expensive force package alternative in terms of annual operating cost is the 
networked mortar barge.  Procurement cost is the driving factor in the total 10 year cost 
of the helicopter alternative. The helicopter 10 year operating cost is approximately 30% 
of the procurement cost which is inclusive of cost for personnel.  If the helicopter is not 
procured then the networked mortar barge is the most expensive alternative in terms of 
total 10 year cost.  
 Figure 28 provides a further breakdown of the cost associated with networked 
sensors.  Figure 29 includes the mortar team for the networked mortar team alternative.  
Figure 30 includes the cost of NEMO in the networked mortar barge alternative. 
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 Figure 28. Networked Sensor 10 Year Cost Breakdown Per Sensor. 
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VII. RIVERINE SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
A. SYSTEM RELIABILITY PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
SEA-10 chose to evaluate the operational suitability component reliability from 
the RF system objective hierarchy.  Reliability is critically important to the warfighter, 
yet not physically limiting like other elements of operational suitability such as 
transportability or supportability.  SEA-10 conducted a qualitative analysis of RF 
component reliability because reliability on all components of the RF and proposed 
alternatives was not available at the time of this thesis.  SEA-10 related reliability to 
availability and maintainability, other elements of operational suitability.  Performance 
data on the alternatives generated in the physical architecture is limited, but hypothetical 
values and configurations shed insight into areas which may affect the RF of 2010.  
Further reliability study could be included in later quantitative analysis of RF 
performance. 
 1. Operational Availability 
One of the primary functions of any military system is to go into harm’s way and 
return man and machine intact and ready to fight again.  Operational availability is the 
key component of combat readiness151 and is the degree to which an item is in an 
operable state at the start of any given mission at any given time.152  Operational 
availability is expressed as the expected value of system uptime divided by expected 




151 combat readiness — Synonymous with operational readiness, with respect to missions or 
functions performed in combat.  operational readiness — The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon 
system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. May be 
used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness.  Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 (as 
amended through 14 April 2006). 
152 Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 11th Edition, Defense Acquisition 
University Center for Program Management, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 2003. 






]E uptime E downtime
= +  
Equation 13. Operational Availability 
 
such that: E[uptime] = the expected value of system uptime 
  E[downtime] = the expected value of system downtime 
 
 SEA-10 reasoned that a system which performed well with respect to chosen 
MOE and MOP, but displayed poor operational availability, would be a poor choice from 
the standpoint of feasibility and cost versus performance.  A system could contribute to 
the satisfaction of MOE and MOP if it was not available.  Poor component or overall 
system availability required a large supply of components or systems as spares or 
replacements.  A large supply of components and systems assured the minimum number 
of components required to complete the mission was available, but the system was overly 
expensive or required a large logistics support network. 
 Figure 31 demonstrates the connection between availability and maintaining the 
minimum number of “up” units for mission completion.  If, in a hypothetical situation, 
SURC availability is 0.85 the probability of mission success increases as more SURC’s 
are available.  This has serious implications for the RF.  If a squadron deploys with 12 
SURC, fielding a four SURC section is not an issue.  However, as soon as two four 
SURC sections are required at the same time, availability becomes a much more serious 
consideration.  This graph also did not account for any craft that may have been in a 
scheduled maintenance or overhaul period or in a maintenance status awaiting parts. It 
only accounted for the craft ready to go at the start of a patrol. 
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Figure 31. Effects of Number of Available SURC’s on Combat Readiness. 
 
2. Maintainability  
 Maintenance is a critical component of availability.  The ability of a unit to be 
maintained in, or restored to, a specified condition to enable operations is mission 
essential.154  Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is the total elapsed time for corrective 
maintenance divided by the total number of corrective maintenance actions during a 
given period of time.  MTTR is a basic technical measure of maintainability.   
3. Reliability 
Another contributor to operational availability is reliability.  Reliability is 
arguably more important to the warfighter because it is the most direct measure of system 
performance ability.  Mean time between failures (MTBF) is the total time of system 
operation divided by the total number of failures during that time, as shown by Equation 
14.155
 
                                                 
154 Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 11th Edition, Defense Acquisition 
University Center for Program Management, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 2003. 
155 Speaks, S. “Reliability and MTBF Overview,” Unpublished. Vicor Reliability Engineering, 2006. 
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     T
R
θ =  
Equation 14. Mean Time Between Failure. 
such that : θ = MTBF 
  T = total time 
  R = number of failures 
 
MTBF applies to time, rounds, miles, events, or other measures of unit life.  Better 
system reliability translates into higher system availability, which can result in lower 
system costs and increased system performance. 
4. System and Component Reliability 
 A system is only as strong as its weakest component.  Cost versus performance 
trade offs occur during system design.  These trade offs are often made to reduce weight, 
power requirements, and/or system cost, especially in unmanned systems.  These 
decisions may affect the reliability of the components chosen and in turn overall system 
reliability.  Incorrect trade off decisions are likely without a thorough understanding of 
how individual component reliability effects overall system reliability. 
 Technology advances and increasing operational requirements have caused 
systems to become more complex, and increased the number of individual components 
responsible for overall system operation.  Series components rely on one another in a 
strict linear relationship.  If one component fails, the system fails.  Components arranged 
in series decrease the reliability of the system even if the individual components are 
highly reliable.  A convenient shorthand method to describe highly reliable systems gives 
the number of “nines” in the reliability percentage.  A component that experiences one 
failure in ten thousand cycles, time units, etc, has a 99.99% reliability or four nines 
reliability.156  Table 17 demonstrates how individual component quality affects a series 
system. 
                                                 
156 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Study, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2003.   
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 Table 17. Effect of Individual Component Quality on a Series System157
 
5. Mean Time Between Failure 
 As discussed above, the basic technical measure of reliability for most military 
systems is MTBF.  MTBF was directly related to maintainability, operational availability, 
and therefore combat readiness and mission accomplishment as shown by Equation 15.  
Equation 15 was a restatement of equation 13 using MTBF as a surrogate for E[uptime] 
and MTTR as a surrogate for E[downtime]. 
    o MTBFA
MTBF MTTR
= +  
Equation 15. Operational Availability and MTBF. 
such that : MTBF = mean time between failure 
  MTTR = mean time to repair 
 
and the overall reliability of system or component over time (R(t)) is given by158: 
  
Equation 16. System Reliability Over Time. 
such that: R(t) = reliability as a function of time 
  t = elapsed (mission) time 
  MTBF = mean time between failure 
                                                 
157 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Study, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2003.   
158 S. Speaks, “Reliability and MTBF Overview,” Unpublished. Vicor Reliability Engineering, 2006. 
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MTBF is a statistical measure of a population and is subject to the central limit 
theorem of statistics.  As the sample size gets larger the sample mean approaches a 
normal distribution about the true population mean.  Therefore, for a given MTBF, a 
single component or system will not necessarily fail 50% of the time at the given MTBF.  
Rather, the average failure time for the overall population, will occur at MTBF.  The 
distinction is subtle, but important. 
 Figure 32 illustrates that for a typical RF mission of 10 hours, 90% reliability is 
achieved by an overall system MTBF of 100 hours.  SEA-10 assumed that the probability 
of successful mission completion is equivalent to the system’s reliability.  The mission 
will succeed if there are no critical failures, and therefore system reliability becomes 
equivalent to the probability of mission success.   
 
Figure 32. System Reliability Vs. Mission Duration for Selected MTBF. 
 
When required, MTBF was determined for a given reliability by taking the natural 
logarithm of equation three, multiplying by “1/-t” and inverting both sides of the resulting 





Equation 17. Mean Time Between Failure for a Given Reliability. 
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For example, if a mission success probability of 95% is desired and the system has a 95% 
reliability over a 10 hour mission, then the mean time between (critical system) failure 
must be 195 hours. 
6. System Reliability Block Diagram 
 A system reliability block diagram is an excellent tool to model overall system 
reliability.  The networked riverine system was modeled as a built-up-series/k of n 
parallel system.  The block diagram is shown in Figure 33.   
 
Figure 33. Networked Riverine System Reliability Block Diagram. 
 
7. SURC Reliability 
 SEA-10 information searches and interviews with stakeholders indicate that the 
SURC is a reliable platform159.  Actual reliability data for SURC combat performance 
was not available, but SEA-10 made an analogy from operational tests (OT) of the Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW) 11 meter rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB).  The 11 meter NSW 
RHIB is a high speed, diesel/water jet powered craft similar in size, capabilities, and 
equipment to the SURC.  The 11 meter NSW RHIB showed 0.91 reliability in OT160.   
 
                                                 
159 Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II). A summary of lessons and observations. 4 April 2006.  
160 Federation Of American Scientists. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RIB). Retrieved form the World 
Wide Web 10 November, 2006. [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/rhib.htm]  
n 
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SURC’s were modeled as a 3 of 4 parallel system as shown in Figure 34.  Reliability for 
SURC mission success was calculated through Equation 18.161  SURC system reliability 
was calculated as 0.957. 











⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Equation 18. SURC Reliability 
 
Figure 34. SURC Parallel 3 of 4 Reliability Block Diagram. 
 
8. SEA-9 (MTR) Small Boat Availability Model Applied to SURC 
 Reliability and operational availability data for the SURC was analogous to the 
NSW 11-m RHIB.  The estimated SURC operational data is listed in Table 18.  SEA 9 
developed an effective model using EXTEND for calculating reliability which SEA-10 
modified for this study. 
                                                 
161 D. Schiffman, Commander, USN. OS4580, Logistics Systmes Analysis class notes, Chapter 3, 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability. Naval Postgraduate School, October 2006. 
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 Table 18. SURC Operational Data. 162
 
Dividing cruise speed by the operational range at cruise speed yields an 
operational cruise time of approximately 7.14 hours. This is assumed to be the period 
over which reliability for the SURC is measured. Reliability is defined as: R(t) = e(-t/λ), 
where t is time in hours, λ is the number of failures per hour. Setting t = 7.14 hours and 
R(7.14) = .91 for the SURC, then solving for λ, yields .0132 failures per operational hour. 
The reciprocal of this (1/ λ) = 75.7 operating hours until failure (approximately).  
( / )



















Equation 19. SURC Operational Time Until Failure (hours). 
A rounded value of 76 was inputed into the Extend SURC Reliability Model as 
the expected amount of time a SURC operates until failure.  This model can be viewed as 
Appendix D.  The operational life of each SURC is unknown; some of the vessels will 
require repairs sooner than others. 163  A uniform distribution of SURC operational “life” 
was used to represent a generally random distribution, with no specific mean about which 
the SURCs lifetime would fall about a standard deviation.  SURC’s have an equal 
probability of failure anytime within a 76 hour period. 
 Once “broken,” the SURC is removed from the pool of SURC’s in use and 
returned to the TOC, or maintenance facility.  A major potential limitation of the RF is 
the number of available depot level repair facilities.  Although enough civilian small boat 
                                                 
162 Federation of American Scientists, “Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat.” [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/SURC.htm] 10 February 2000, accessed November 2006 
163 Operational life of a SURC refers to the age of the SURC’s components in terms of requiring 
major service and/or replacement. 
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repair facilities may exist within the operational theater, they may or may not be available 
for repairs.  A triangular distribution is used to determine the amount of time to repair 
and return the SURC to operation.  Within the triangular distribution, a minimum value 
of 3 days, maximum value of 7 days, and most likely value of 5 days was used.  These 
times include the time it would take to receive replacement parts at the relatively remote 
TOC, conduct repairs and maintenance, and return the SURC to an operational pool. 
 The model was iterated 100 times for 360 hours; representing 15 days within a 
deployment.  SURC’s were assumed to be operated in 4 man sections, rotating every 12 
hours.  Reliability was calculated using divisions of 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 boats.   
The current baseline concept of operations offers approximately a 75 percent 
chance of being able to field 4 operational SURC’s after 360 hours.  16 SURC’s, at a 
minimum, are required to achieve an operational availability greater than 90 percent as 
indicated in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35. SURC Operational Probability after 360 Hours. 
 
The model is heavily impacted by repair times, number of operationally required 
vessels, and reliability.  A modification to any of these values would warrant further 
modeling.  For instance; if the TOC could be given depot level resources to conduct 
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repairs or if civilian repair facilities were readily available the probability would increase 
as it appears to have an inverse relationship to MTBR. 
9. UAV, USV, and UGS Reliability  
 The UAV, USV and UGS reliability was modeled as a series system as shown in 
Figure 36.  USV reliability was modeled identically to the UAV except that instead of an 
airframe, the USV has a hull. 
 
Figure 36. UAV Reliability Block Diagram. 
 
The UAV systems project office at Redstone Arsenal, AL conducted a 
reliability, availability, and maintainability initial operational test 
assessment [of the RQ-7 Shadow UAV] based on two weeks of flights in an 
operational environment. The results from this limited flight test data 
indicate a Mean Time Between System Abort (MTBSA) of 26.9 hours.164.   
 SEA-10 assumed MTBSA was a system failure causing a mission failure and for 
the purposes of this thesis a surrogate for MTBF.  SEA-10 used Equation 15 to determine 
Shadow reliability as 0.64.  However, there will be at least three UAV airframes available 
at the TOC.  If one failed another could be launched.  Therefore, UAV reliability became 
a parallel system with 95.7% reliability.   
 Discussions with the manufacturer of the SeaFox USV yielded a potential 93% 
reliability based on limited data165.  UGS is a mature and reliable system.  The main 
reliability variable is placement.  Improper placement could cause UGS units to 
malfunction or operate in a degraded capacity166.  The reliability of the UGS was 
assumed to be 0.90, a slight improvement on the operational requirement of 0.88 
                                                 
164 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Study, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2003.   
165 Telephone Interview between Mr. Bruce Reagan, President of Northwind Marine Inc., and the 
author, October 10, 2006. 
166 Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield 
Sensor System (IREMBASS), August 1999. 
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reliability for the older IREMBASS UGS.167  Taken together as a two of three parallel 
system, the unmanned sensor system had a calculated reliability of 0.97 using Equation 
18. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Reliability is a critical factor in achieving the expected performance of the force 
packages.  All of the alternative force packages addressed in this thesis are complex 
systems that depend on all of their components to function when required.  Failure of one 
of the components could lead to a complete failure of the system and degrade the 
operational robustness of the force.  If the operator cannot depend on the system to work 
as it is designed or when it is needed, then the system will not be trusted and 
consequently will not be used by the war fighter. False confidence is another 
consequence of poor reliability.  A commander may assume that the force has the 
systems’ capabilities, but if the system is unreliable, it may fail at the critical moment of 
need.  High system reliability increases the robustness of the force.  A commander that 
has reliable systems will be able to conduct a larger variety of missions.  In a riverine 
environment, the missions will continually change, and new problems will present 
themselves to the war fighters.  Strong reliability of the systems will allow the 
commander to employ them in a variety of missions.  In conclusion, without highly 
reliable systems, the alternative force packages will be of limited use to the war fighter 
and would increase the risk of the operations.  
 
167 Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield 
Sensor System (IREMBASS), August 1999. 
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VIII. ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. ANALYSIS PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
 SEA-10’s goal for modeling and analysis was to answer the following questions: 
• How does the Navy effectively perform riverine missions while minimizing 
risks to the force, i.e., what investments yield the “Most bang for the buck”?  
• Which alternatives give the greatest capability increase to the baseline force? 
• What is the effect of unmanned systems on detection and engagement? 
• What is the effect of an organic indirect engagement capability? 
• What is the effect of a dedicated ground combat element on detection and 
engagement capabilities? 
• What are the effects of dedicated helicopter support? 
• Which investment, increasing engagement or detection capability, has the 
greatest effect on overall system performance?  
Modeling and analysis of the riverine system was based on comparisons between 
the baseline force and the baseline force augmented by previously described force 
package alternative architectures.  Each alternative was formulated to satisfy RF 
objectives by increasing detection or engagement capability or both.  Out of the five 
alternatives originally planned for analysis, there were three versions of the single 
unmanned sensor, non-networked versions of a mortar team and mortar barge, and 
versions for a networked mortar team and barge.  These extra versions of the original five 
alternatives led to eleven distinct alternatives modeled over thirty runs (for each 
alternative) in two separate scenarios.  Five measures of performance (MOP) were 
gathered from each run for a total of 3300 (11 alternatives X 2 two scenarios X 5 five 
MOP’s X 30 modeling runs) data points for analysis.  The analysis was limited by the 
number of alternatives and scenarios modeled, the number of MOP’s captured, the 
number of runs per alternative/scenario combination, and the limitations of MANA.   
SEA-10 conducted three different levels of data analysis.  Initially, only the 
means were examined to evaluate alternative performance.  Alternatives were analyzed 
for overall performance and cost in order to determine which provided the most “bang for 
the buck.”  Data was collected and normalized in order to weight and rank alternatives.  
Weights were assigned to alternatives based on stakeholder feedback.  Second, sensitivity 
analysis was conducted to determine the effects weighting the alternatives had on overall 
rankings.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if significant 
differences existed between alternatives.  A non-parametric statistical tool, Kruskal-
Wallis, was used in the event that the data assumed a non-normal distribution.  
MINITAB, a statistical analysis application, was used to conduct both mean comparison 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests.   
B. REVISED MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) were derived from the objectives hierarchy and 
were a critical part of the riverine functional architecture.  MOE were quantified by 
capturing measures of performance (MOP) for each MOEs.  Table 19 represents the 
MOEs and MOPs that were initially chosen to fulfill the objectives hierarchy.   
. 
Table 19. RF Objectives, Measures of Effectiveness, an
 
 Due to the capabilities and limitations of MANA, it
the initial MOP’s because the data that best represen
unavailable, incomplete, or not applicable to the chose
information derived from loss exchange ratio was no
alternative’s overall combat effectiveness because loss
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d Measures of Performance. 
 became necessary to modify 
ted particular MOE’s was 
n scenarios.  For example, 
t truly indicative of each 
 exchange ratio was only 
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calculated when blue forces sustained damage.  In runs where blue forces completely 
destroyed red forces, yet sustained no damage, loss exchange ratio numbers were skewed.  
Therefore, percentage of no hit runs was added to the value of loss exchange ratio to 
obtain a value more indicative of each alternative’s battle space awareness and response 
capability.  Detailed explanations of the equations used to derive MOP values are 
discussed later in this section.   
Proportion of enemies detected was not an applicable MOP because of the agents’ 
pre-programmed behavioral traits.  Sensor search properties were arbitrarily programmed 
into MANA, and did not yield variable detection ranges.  MANA only reported detection 
range as the range to the sensor, not to the entire force.  Agents were motivated to seek 
each other out, and red agents were grouped in a common area in both scenarios, so once 
a single red agent was discovered, the remaining red forces were discovered nearby. 
Since neither of the two scenarios involved search algorithms, this MOP was not 
applicable.  
Range at Engagement is a valid MOP that would have been of great value to this 
thesis.  MANA, however, did not produce this data point as raw data, and SEA-10 was 
unable to devise an effective method to calculate it from other values.  Instead, time from 
first detection to time of first engagement was added as an MOP to capture the time blue 
forces had to make decisions on how to engage red forces.  If range at engagement had 
been captured, the misleading scores for the helicopter and networked mortar barge may 
have been averted.   
Length of engagement was added as a measure of performance to assign values 
for weapons’ lethality.  In retrospect, this MOP contained a number of confounding 
factors that could not be attributed directly to weapons’ effectiveness.  Therefore, length 
of engagement was weighted lower than the other MOP’s in the normalization and 
ranking of alternatives discussed later in this section.  Table 20 illustrates the changes 
made to initial MOP’s and the motivations behind the changes. 
 
 
Table 20. Revised Measures of Performance. 
 
1. Percentage of No Hit runs/Loss Exchange ratio  
Percentage of no hit runs was the percentage of runs blue agents sustained no 
damage (out of all runs).  Loss exchange ratio was calculated by dividing the total 
number of red agents killed by the total number of dead and injured blue agents.  Injuries 
were scored as partial kills because SURC armor was modeled to absorb hits and that a 
blue agent had a 0.65 chance of being hit while on a SURC (based on SURC armor and 
cover/concealment discussed previously).168  A high value in both of these responses is 
desirable and indicates a robust engagement capability.  SEA-10’s loss exchange ratio is 
shown in Equation 19: 
Loss Exchange Ratio /( ( ).65)killed killed injuredR B B+= ∑ ∑  
Equation 20. Loss Exchange Ratio. 
 
                                                 
168 As previously described on page 93. 
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2. Time to First Enemy Detection 
Time to first enemy detection was calculated as the first time step that blue forces 
detected and identified red agents as enemy.  SEA-10 used this measure to determine 
sensor range and performance.  A smaller value in this response is desirable. 
3. Time from Detection to Engagement 
Time from detection to engagement is a measure of the time it takes an agent to 
engage after first detection and identification of the enemy.  Comparison of this data 
point against the baseline and alternative force packages indicates which capabilities 
provide an increase in battle space awareness.  A larger value in this response is 
desirable, except for alternatives that pair sensor and indirect fire weapons.  Pairing 
remote detection and indirect engagement capabilities enabled nearly instantaneous 
engagement of enemy forces.  Agents were programmed to engage one another as soon 
as classification occurred.  MANA enabled both helicopter support and the networked 
mortar barge options to engage as soon as a classification took place due to the stand off 
range of their weapons.  Their weapons were able to engage the enemy almost instantly 
from the same distance as enemy detection.  Therefore, the smaller value for Detect to 
Engage time for the helicopter and indirect fire mortar barge is favorable.  In reality, this 
stand off range would create time to evaluate the battlespace and decide upon the 
appropriate action.  This value was calculated by subtracting first detection time from 
first enemy engagement.   
4.  Length of Engagement 
The intent of measuring Length of Engagement was to relate the lethality or 
effectiveness of the weapons in an alternative.  A short engagement time indicates that 
the opposing force was overwhelmed by fire.  Length of engagement was calculated from 
the first shot fired by either red or blue agents until all red forces were killed, all blue 
forces were killed, or the simulation run time ended.  Runs where all blue agents were 
killed were removed from the data since they do not represent blue force lethality or 
weapons effectiveness.  Of the 660 runs there were only 3 runs (0.5%) where all blue 
agents were killed, and therefore they were not considered statistically significant.  A low 
or high value could be desirable due to the differences in the alternatives modeled.  For 
example, the powerful area weapon of the networked mortar barge had an extremely 
short length of engagement and resulted in all red agents killed.  However, the GCE also 
killed all red agents with few blue agent losses, but the reduced lethality (as compared to 
the mortars) of blue force weapons lengthened the engagement.  
5. Maximum Classification Range 
Maximum classification range is the maximum range at which an agent may 
confirm another agent’s identity.  It does measure the range between the classifying agent 
and the main force.  It is the maximum range an agent can identify another agent without 
combining multiple sensors.  This response is used as a measure of sensor performance.  
It is important to note that this value was not the range at first enemy detection, but 
rather, it was the maximum range of detection and identification that an individual sensor 
was capable of during a given run.  A larger value in this response is desirable.   
C. DATA NORMALIZATION 
A comparison of the responses was conducted by normalizing the raw data 
gathered from MANA output.  Data had to be normalized to a common factor because of 
the difference in units among responses and because of the categorization of the 
responses by scenario.  All responses, except for percentage of no hit runs and loss 
exchange ratio, were derived from more than a single data point.  Once the values were 
normalized, the alternative force packages were ranked in order from highest to lowest 
and were compared against one another to determine the overall best alternative by 
response and scenario as shown in Table 21 and Table 22.  
 
MOP             
Alternative















TIME OF FIRST 
DETECTION TO FIRST 
ENGAGEMENT (IN MIN)
Baseline 3% 8.9 3.5 19.6 56.8 0.0
UAV 0% 12.1 21.5 17.9 26.0 20.0
USV 3% 9.6 22.2 126.3 23.8 18.4
UGS 0% 9.9 16.1 17.9 25.3 24.4
UAV+USV+UGS 0% 11.1 10.6 125.7 21.5 23.9
GCE 13% 10.7 4.3 19.9 50.6 0.0
HH60 97% 7.7 9.2 154.8 21.1 0.0
MORTAR TM 3% 8.4 2.2 19.3 41.1 0.0
MORTAR BARGE 7% 8.9 3.5 19.4 56.2 -0.2
NW MORTAR TM 3% 11.4 30.1 123.3 15.5 26.7
NW MORTAR BARGE 87% 11.8 12.7 123.1 23.6 1.9
PATROL
 
Table 21. Patrol Scenario Raw Data Matrix. 
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MOP             
Alternative














TIME OF FIRST 
DETECTION TO FIRST 
ENGAGEMENT (IN MIN)
Baseline 0% 4.6 13.6 19.8 20.5 -0.3
UAV 0% 19.3 53.5 20.1 13.4 10.1
USV 0% 9.6 20.6 155.8 7.0 14.9
UGS 3% 5.3 11.4 20.0 19.6 0.7
UAV+USV+UGS 0% 6.8 21.0 156.0 7.1 13.0
GCE 0% 12.5 36.4 20.0 27.6 0.0
HH60 80% 26.0 23.2 153.9 4.0 1.6
MORTAR TM 0% 6.0 3.5 20.0 20.4 0.0
MORTAR BARGE 0% 6.0 5.0 20.0 20.5 0.0
NW MORTAR TM 0% 5.3 15.9 155.6 7.1 12.8
NW MORTAR BARGE 20% 22.7 16.2 155.8 7.1 1.9
AMBUSH
 
Table 22. Ambush Scenario Raw Data Matrix. 
 
Data was normalized to facilitate an even comparison of the alternative force 
packages against the baseline and each other.  Once the scores for each response were 
calculated, the alternatives were ranked from highest to lowest.  Within each response, 
the highest ranking score was assigned a value of 100 while the lowest ranking score was 
assigned a value of zero.  Alternatives with scores between the high and low values were 
calculated by linear interpolation.  Calculating the response value and then normalizing it 
depended on whether or not a high or low value was considered desirable.  In responses 
where a high value was desirable (length of engagement and maximum classification 
range) Equation 20 was used. 
100AlternativeData MinDataValue
MaxDataValue MinDataValue
−⎛ ⎞ •⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
Equation 21. High Response Value Equation. 
For responses where a low value was desirable (Earliest Detection Time and Time from 
First Detection to First Engagement) Equation 21 was used: 
100MaxDataValue AlternativeData
MaxDataValue MinDataValue
−⎛ ⎞ •⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
Equation 22. Low Response Value Equation. 
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Normalization for the percentage of no hit runs and loss exchange ratio responses 
was conducted by multiplying the scores of each response by a weighting factor and 
adding them together.  Percentage of no hit runs was weighted at 75% of the total score 
while the weight for the loss exchange ratio was 25%, and is shown in Equation 22 as the 
value X. 
X ( ) ( ) ( ).75 100 .25 100AlternativeData MinDataValuePercentageOfNohitRuns
MaxDataValue MinDataValue
⎡ − ⎤⎛ ⎞= • • + • •⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
Equation 23. Percentage of No Hit Runs and Loss Exchange Ratio Normalization 
Equation. 
 This weighting scheme emphasizes the significance placed on alternatives that 
allow blue forces to dominate the battle space.  The best performance indicators of battle 
space awareness and response capability, regardless of scenario, were the ability to 
engage the enemy with no casualties and no hits.   
1. Response Weighting 
Once the values in the raw data matrix were normalized by scenario, as shown in 
Table 23 and 24, stakeholder input was used to determine the global weights, or relative 
importance, for each response.  As discussed earlier, specific responses provided suspect 
data because of the modeling dynamics required to simulate certain functions such as 
mortar team deployment and ground combat element debarkation.  As a result, responses 
such as maximum classification range and time from detection to engagement are not true 
measures of alternative architecture performance.  For example, the maximum 
classification range response was recorded as the range from the classified agent to 
detecting agent.  In the case of the UAV, maximum classification range was from the 
UAV to the red forces rather than from the red forces to the blue forces (in the boats).  
The same phenomena occurred with the USV, UGS and all of the networked sensor 
options.  Consequently, the response of maximum classification range was removed from 
consideration in the overall performance scoring, because it did not truly represent 
overall system performance.  
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A second discrepancy with data collection was found in the response of Time 
from First Detection to Time of First Engagement. In this case, the detection capabilities 
of the helicopter and the networked mortar barge were equivalent to their engagement 
capability. Since the agents were designed to engage upon enemy detection, both 
alternatives engaged as soon as the red forces were detected.  A true measure of decision 
time could not be derived in these two alternatives because of this pre-programmed agent 
behavior.  Although detect to engage was not an accurate indicator of performance for the 
helicopter and networked mortar barge, it provided too much insight with respect to the 
remaining alternatives to discard.   
NORMALIZED
MOP             
Alternative














Baseline 6 95 1 0 1
UAV 25 31 0 75 75
USV 11 28 79 80 69
UGS 10 50 0 76 92
UAV+USV+UGS 18 70 79 85 90
GCE 26 92 1 15 1
HH60 68 75 100 87 1
MORTAR TM 2 100 1 38 1
MORTAR BARGE 8 95 1 2 0
NW MORTAR TM 23 0 77 100 100
NW MORTAR 
BARGE 88 62 77 80 8
PATROL
 
Table 23. Patrol Scenario Normalized Data Matrix. 
NORMALIZED
MOP             
Alternative














Baseline 0 80 0 30 0
UAV 17 0 0 60 68
USV 6 66 100 87 100
UGS 3 84 0 34 7
UAV+USV+UGS 3 65 100 87 87
GCE 9 34 0 0 2
HH60 85 61 99 100 13
MORTAR TM 2 100 0 31 2
MORTAR BARGE 2 97 0 30 2
NW MORTAR TM 1 75 100 87 86
NW MORTAR 
BARGE 36 75 100 87 14
AMBUSH
 
Table 24. Ambush Scenario Normalized Data Matrix. 
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The remaining responses were then weighted by importance to the stakeholder.  
Response weighting was based on interviews conducted with small boat operators, 
Marine Corps personnel with riverine experience in Colombia, and other NPS Students 
with river combat experience. Operators were presented with the opportunity to rank the 
following responses in order of importance to them: 
• Loss Exchange Ratio 
• Length of Engagement 
• Earliest Detection Time 
• Time from First Detection to First Engagement 
All of the operators chose Earliest Detection Time as their top priority when 
placed in a combat scenario.  In the operator comments of the survey, one operator stated 
that the ability to know the location of the enemy would enable him to get inside the 
enemy’s decision loop and take the initiative in battle rather than having to remain on the 
defensive.  The response of percentage of no hit runs/loss exchange ratio and time from 
detection to engagement ranked second and third, respectively. Both responses are 
worthy indicators of battle space awareness and combat capability.  Length of 
engagement ranked last as a measure of performance by the operators.  Operator 
comments for length of engagement indicated that variation in this response may be 
caused by multiple confounding factors.  Therefore, attributing the value of this response 
solely to weapons effectiveness/lethality was not a very accurate method for representing 
weapon lethality.  Averaging the weights assigned to the aforementioned responses 
resulted in the global weight assignments shown in Table 25.  
 
 
Table 25. Assigned Global Weights by Response. 
 
2. Normalized Decision Matrices 
 Once global weights were established three decision matrices were constructed.  
A normalized decision matrix for each scenario was generated, as well as an overall 
decision matrix that encompassed overall performance as shown in Tables 26, 27, and 28.  
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These matrices represent the modeling and simulation results that were normalized and 
weighted to determine a total utility score.  A utility score acts as a common denominator 
by which all alternatives can be compared against one another.  Each alternative’s utility 
score was used to rank the alternative architecture within and across the scenarios. 
 
MOP           
Alternative







TIME OF FIRST 
DETECTION TO FIRST 
ENGAGEMENT
SUM
Baseline 2 10 0 0 11
UAV 7 3 30 15 55
USV 3 3 32 14 52
UGS 3 5 31 18 57
UAV+USV+UGS 6 7 34 18 65
GCE 8 9 6 0 23
HH60 20 7 35 0 63
MORTAR TM 1 10 15 0 26
MORTAR BARGE 3 10 1 0 13
NW MORTAR TM 7 0 40 20 67
NW MORTAR 
BARGE 26 6 32 2 66
PATROL
 
Table 26. Patrol Normalized Decision Matrix. 
MOP           
Alternative







TIME OF FIRST 
DETECTION TO FIRST 
ENGAGEMENT
SUM
Baseline 0 8 12 0 20
UAV 5 0 24 14 43
USV 2 7 35 20 63
UGS 1 8 14 1 24
UAV+USV+UGS 1 7 35 17 60
GCE 3 3 0 0 7
HH60 26 6 40 3 74
MORTAR TM 0 10 12 0 23
MORTAR BARGE 1 10 12 0 23
NW MORTAR TM 0 8 35 17 60
NW MORTAR 
BARGE 11 7 35 3 56
AMBUSH
 
Table 27. Ambush Normalized Decision Matrix. 
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MOP            
Alternative








TIME OF FIRST 




Baseline 1 9 6 0 16
UAV 6 2 27 14 49
USV 3 5 33 17 58
UGS 2 7 22 10 41
UAV+USV+UGS 3 7 35 18 62
GCE 5 6 3 0 15
HH60 23 7 37 1 68
MORTAR TM 1 10 14 0 25
MORTAR BARGE 2 10 6 0 18
NW MORTAR TM
4 4 37 19 63
NW MORTAR 
BARGE 19 7 33 2 61
OVERALL
 
Table 28. Overall Normalized Decision Matrix. 
 
3. Alternative Force Package Ranking  
 Ranking the alternative force packages was accomplished by summing scores 
across all responses to obtain a total utility score for each alternative.  The results of the 
ranking by scenario are shown in Figures 36, 37, and 38. 
In the patrol rankings, all single sensor upgraded alternatives ranked significantly 
higher than the baseline.  Networked sensor options and the helicopter all performed 
equally as well and better than the single sensor options.  The ground combat team and 
the mortar team ranked only marginally better than the baseline force.   
In the ambush rankings, the helicopter alternative ranked highest.  Networked 
sensor options and the USV were only fractionally less effective.  All single sensor 
options ranked higher than the baseline.  The USV was the highest ranked single sensor 
followed by the UAV and finally the UGS.  The GCE ranked the lowest among all of the 
alternatives and the baseline.  The mortar team was the only weapons-only upgrade that 
ranked marginally better than the baseline.  In the overall rankings the helicopter 






















































































































































Figure 38. Ambush Scenario Alternative Architecture Ranking. 
 











































































Figure 39. Overall Alternative Architecture Ranking Across Both Scenarios. 
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D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis focuses strictly on the extent to which the weighting of 
individual alternatives affects the outcome of overall alternative ranking.  This analysis 
indicates how sensitive the architecture rankings are to changes in global weighting.  
Sensitivity analysis is designed to provide further insight for the decision maker should it 
be determined that the metrics or indicators of effectiveness have changed or do not 
match the global weight distribution assigned in this thesis.  Table 29 is the original 
decision matrix in which weights from stakeholder interviews were assigned to each 




Time from detection to 
Engagement0.2
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Table 29. SEA-10 Global Decision/Weighting Matrix. 
 
1. Sensitivity Analysis Methodology 
 SEA-10 took the total utility score for each alternative (based on assigned 
weighting), and compared it with the total utility score that would be assigned to the 
alternative assuming 100% of the assigned weighting is based on the alternative’s 
performance in a single response.  The decision maker can evaluate how weighting one 
alternative affects the overall ranking of all the alternatives by repeating this process for 
each alternative   
Alternatives’ scores are plotted in order to determine if an alternative’s 
performance is seriously impacted by raising or lowering weights.  Plotted performance 
values are graphed as a line between two points.  The resultant line indicates whether or 
not the individual alternative is sensitive to the weighting.  The line also indicates how 
much of a shift in response weighting must occur for competing alternatives to achieve 
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parity in performance.  Parity is described as the point of intersection.  If parity in 
performance can be achieved by varying weighting within a response by 10%, or less, 
then that response is considered “sensitive.”169  Sensitivity analysis was conducted for 
each of the four responses and the results are described in the following section. 
2. Percentage of No Hit Runs/Loss Exchange Ratio  
 The helicopter and the networked sensor alternatives were the highest ranked in 
percentage of no hit runs/loss exchange ratio based on the assigned weights.  Increased 
weighting in this response only marginally strengthened the helicopter and networked 
mortar barge rankings.  Their utility scores remained fairly constant indicating that they 
were the only two alternatives that were insensitive to changes in weighting.  All of the 
other alternatives benefit from decreased weight in this response, but suffer significantly 
with an increase in weighting as shown in Figure 40.  Both networked mortar team and 
networked sensor alternatives’ points of intersection were within ten percent at 0.227 and 
0.224, respectively.  This response was considered sensitive with original weighting 
assigned at 0.3.  Should the decision maker choose to place less value on this measure of 
performance the outcome of the rankings would change, however, the family of 
alternatives at the top of the ranking would not change. 
 
169 E.P. Paulo, SI4001 Introduction to Multi Objective Decision Analysis Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 05 January 2005. 
Sensitivity Percentage of No hit runs/Loss Exchange ratio
y = 11.514x + 64.852
y = -73.636x + 85.473
y = -73.768x + 84.206
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NET GCE HH60 MORTAR TM
MORTAR BARGE NW MORTAR TM NW MORTAR BARGE
 
Figure 40. Sensitivity Curves for Percentage of No Hit Runs/Loss Exchange Ratio. 
 
3. Length of Engagement 
 Again the helicopter and the networked sensor options ranked highest with the 
original weights.  The mortar team, baseline, and mortar barge all benefited from 
increased weighting on this response as shown in Figure 41.  The UAV, USV, and 
networked mortar had lower total utility scores with increased weighting on this 
response.  The nearest point of intersection occurred with the mortar team at 0.617.  Since 
the original weighting for length of engagement was 0.1, this response was deemed 
insensitive. 
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Sensitivity Length of Engagement
y = -0.7407x + 68.38
y = -28.591x + 66.241
y = 5.9109x + 61.485
y = -11.666x + 58.761
y = 8.1577x + 60.327
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Figure 41. Sensitivity Curves for Length of Engagement. 
 
4. Time to First Enemy Detection 
 As SEA-10 expected, all sensor upgraded alternatives benefited from an increase 
in weighting in this response as shown in Figure 42.  The mortar team was the only 
alternative that did not have a sensor upgrade that ranked higher with an increase in this 
response.  The networked mortar team achieved parity with the helicopter alternative at a 
value of 0.969.  The original weight for this response was 0.4, and was therefore deemed 
insensitive. 
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Sensitivity Time to first Detection
y = 41.658x + 51.643 y = 50.304x + 43.261
y = 40.374x + 45.926
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Figure 42. Sensitivity Curves for Time to First Detection. 
 
5. Time from Detection to Engagement 
 With the exception of the helicopter and networked mortar barge, all sensor 
augmented alternatives benefit from increased weighting in this response as shown in 
Figure 43.  All weapons only upgrades rank lower with increased weighting.  The 
networked mortar team, the networked sensor, and the USV option point of intersections 
occur at 0.243, 0.257, and 0.298 respectively and the original weighting was set at 0.2.  
Increased weighting in this response would change the results of the architecture rankings 
because points of intersection indicate this response is sensitive to weight values.  This 
response is not truly indicative of the performance of the helicopter and networked 
mortar barge.  Pairing of weapons and sensors allowed the helicopter and networked 
mortar barge force packages to engage as soon as detection occurred.  Change in the 
weighting of this response has the potential to misrepresent alternative capabilities.  
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 Sensitivity Detect to Engage Time
y = -77.182x + 83.743
y = 37.274x + 55.927
y = 32.934x + 55.489
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Figure 43. Sensitivity Curves for Time from Detection to Engagement. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis Conclusion 
 Two of four responses were deemed sensitive, percentage of no hit runs/loss 
exchange ratio and time from detect to engage.  Sensitivity in the time of first detection to 
engagement response is by-product of sensor weapon pairing.  Increased weighting in 
this response could cause an inaccurate ranking of the helicopter and networked mortar 
barge alternatives.  Percentage of no hit runs shows some sensitivity, but lowering the 
weight of this response would not significantly change the ranking of alternatives.  The 
best performing alternatives in this response are closely ranked and therefore negate any 





E. DETAILED STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Description of Patrol Runs 
The patrol scenario was designed to represent the progression of blue agents north 
(toward the top of the page in Figure 44) following pre-planned waypoints.  In all of the 
force packages, the SURC units begin at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which is 
approximately 300 grids (11.5 km) south of the red agents’ location, and moved up the 
river along the pre-planned waypoints. The blue agents are designed to be highly 
aggressive toward red agents; therefore, the option of retreat or concealment was not 
desirable to them.  The model required that the agents continually progress toward the 
next waypoint.  Agents would only stop patrolling to either investigate neutral forces or 
engage red forces.   
 







2. Patrol Responses 
a. Percent of No Hit Runs/Loss Exchange Ratio 
  Loss exchange ratio was not significantly different for any alternative as 
shown in Figure 45.  However, when considered in combination with the percentage of 
no hit runs, the dedicated helicopter support and the networked mortar barge significantly 
outperformed all other alternatives as seen in Figure 46.  The baseline force with the 
ground combat element was the only other alternative architecture that yielded any 
noticeable improvement for percentage of no hit runs.  In terms of calculating loss 
exchange ratio, the helicopter and the networked mortar barge only yielded 4 and 1 data 
points, respectively, where a hit was taken by blue forces.  Due to the small sample size 
and low confidence level, these instances they were not considered indicative of the 
alternatives’ performance.  Of the remaining alternatives UAV sensor addition had the 
best impact on loss exchange ratio.   
 
 
Figure 45. Box Plot of Patrol Loss Exchange Ratios. 
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Percentage of no hit runs





























































Figure 46. Percentage of No Hit Runs Per Alternative  
 
b. Time to First Enemy Detection 
  All sensor alternatives had a significant improvement in time to first 
enemy detection and identification.  Visual inspection of the box plot shows that the 
networked mortar team had the best time to first enemy detection and all sensor upgraded 
alternatives had an average of time to first detection that was 20 minutes faster than the 
baseline and weapons only augmented options as shown in Figure 47.  A Kruskal-Wallis 
analysis (see Appendix C) of all alternatives with sensor upgrades confirmed that the 
networked mortar team afforded the earliest enemy classification with the helicopter 
alternative a close second.  The Kruskal-Wallis analysis also revealed that the improved 
performance of the networked sensors alternatives was driven by the unmanned ground 
sensor system (UGS).  UGS often acted as a queuing system for other unmanned systems.  
The communication network that existed between networked sensors enabled a contact to 
be located by UGS, and then verified and classified by a mobile unmanned system (either 
UAV or USV).  A logical conclusion is that the UGS was also responsible for the 
improved performance of the networked mortar barge and the networked mortar team.   
A plausible reason for the networked mortar team outperforming the other 
alternatives is likely due to an important modeling interaction.  In order to simulate the 
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debarkation of the mortar team from a SURC in MANA, the mortar team must be pre-
staged as an inactive agent that has to be “refueled” and activated by the SURC.170  This 
action forced the SURC’s to come into proximity with red agents early in the modeling 









































































Figure 47. Box Plot of First Enemy Detection Per Alternative. 
 
                                                 


































































95% CI for the Mean
PATROL TIME TO DETECTvs ALTERNATIVE
 
Figure 48. Time to First Enemy Detection Per Alternative for Patrol. 
 
c. Detect to Engage Time 
  The alternatives with improved sensor systems provided the largest 
increase in time from first enemy detection to first engagement.  Visual inspection of the 
box plot showed that there was a 20 minute increase in time between first enemy 
detection and engagement (see Figure 49).  This is a critical measure of battle space 
awareness.  UGS performed the best among unmanned systems and drove the 
performance of the networked sensor options.  
The change in time from detection to engagement was negligible in 
alternatives where sensors were paired to weapons.  The helicopter and networked mortar 
barge engaged immediately upon detection because their top priority of agent motivations 
was to engage enemy agents.  Their extended engagement range and standoff ability 
enabled them to attack as soon as enemy agents were identified.  Therefore, enemy agents 
were detected and engaged in the same time step, again because blue agents were 
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motivated to engage the enemy once in weapons’ range.  These options are capable of 
providing greater lead time between first enemy detection and first engagement.  There 
was no improvement over the baseline for any of the engagement augment only upgrades 
as shown in Figure 50.  The networked mortar team does not have the same response as 
the mortar barge or helicopter because of the previously mentioned pre-
staging/debarkation MANA work around.  Hence, the networked mortar team performs 
only as well as the networked sensor option.   
The baseline and engagement plus-up options have no advance warning of 
enemy attack.  In four of the alternatives, the first notice of enemy presence did not occur 
until the red force fired first.  In the case of the baseline plus mortar team and baseline 
plus mortar barge alternatives, they have indirect fire capability but no advance warning 
from sensors.  Alternatives without the combination of both sensors and indirect fire 
capability have to wait on average an additional twenty minutes after classifying an 





























































Interval Plot of DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 











































































Figure 50. Box Plot of Detect to Engage Time Per Alternative. 
 
d. Length of Engagement    
  SEA-10 expected that alternatives with weapons augments would have 
shorter length of engagement times than alternatives that did not have augments.  Adding 
only weapons did not significantly improve performance over the baseline.  However, 
analysis of the means showed that adding only sensors to the baseline extended 
engagement time as shown in Figure 51.  SEA-10 interpreted the longer engagement time 
as potentially increased battlespace awareness for blue agents.  The elongated 
engagement time may represent blue agent cautiousness because of situational awareness 
passed through the sensors.  Alternatives with paired indirect fire and sensor augments 
also increased engagement time.  Alternatives that use sensor and weapon augments have 
a longer time of engagement because of the increased range at which an enemy can be 
engaged.  However, there were outliers in most of the sensor options as shown in Figure 
52.  Visual inspection of the box plot showed the distribution was not normal, and 
therefore Kruskal-Wallis analysis was determined to be more appropriate.   
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Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed that the helicopter and networked mortar 
barge alternatives had significantly longer engagement time based on analysis of all 
alternatives’ ranked median values.  The baseline plus mortar team was the only 
alternative with a significantly shorter engagement time.  The significantly shorter 
engagement time of the mortar team alternative is likely due to the modeling constraint 
associated with the pre-staged debarkation position of the mortar team that may put it 
within firing range of enemy forces.   
There were only three runs out of all 660 runs (0.5%) for both ambush and 
patrol scenarios when red forces killed all blue forces.  Those runs were not analyzed 
with respect to length of engagement because they did not have a relationship to blue 


























































Interval Plot of LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 



















































































Figure 52. Box Plot of Length of Engagement Per Alternative. 
 
e. Max Classification Range 
Maximum classification range for alternatives was based on the 
parameters entered into the model.  The networked sensor options mirrored the maximum 
classification range of the most capable individual sensor which was the USV as shown 
in Figure 53.  It was not possible to capture the range from blue to red agents at the time 
of first detection due to modeling limitations of MANA.  Only data for the range from the 
detecting agent to the detected agent could be collected.  In other words if the UAV was 
20 grids ahead of the blue agents and detected red agents 5 grids from its position MANA 
would record a 5 grid classification range instead of 25 grids.  Data was collected to 
capture the most capable sensor capability for an alternative by taking the maximum 
range at which the blue agents were able to classify red agents during an entire run.  It is 
worth noting that although the USV has a much greater maximum classification range in 
terms of detect to engage time, length of engagement, and loss exchange ratio it 
163 
performed no better than the UAV or the UGS in the patrol scenario.  The helicopter had 






























































Boxplot of Max Classification Range by Alt
 




































































Interval Plot of Max Classification Range vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 
 
Figure 54. Maximum Classification Range Per Alternative. 
 
3. Patrol Scenario Results  
 There was no statistically significant difference between a single unmanned 
sensor alternative and the networked unmanned sensor alternatives.  The addition of 
sensors allowed blue agents more time between detection and engagement.  Adding only 
weapons capability did not improve the alternative’s performance in the patrol scenario.  
This is militarily significant, and it implies that the baseline force has significant weapons 
capability in a patrol scenario against a level II threat.  The pairing of indirect fire 





Across all responses the baseline force performed as well as alternatives that had 
only engagement and no sensor upgrades.  The ground combat element alternative 
produced a moderate improvement in percentage of no hit runs (13%) and a slight 
improvement in loss exchange ratio.   
The baseline force with dedicated helicopter support had a 97% chance of killing 
all red agents while taking no damage.  The networked mortar barge alternative had an 
87% chance of killing all red agents without taking any damage.  The helicopter and 
mortar barge results for loss exchange ratio, length of engagement, and detect to engage 
time must be interpreted differently due to the sensor weapons pairing. 
The individual sensors performed as well as the networked sensor alternative 
which indicates that a single sensor can provides battlespace awareness that is roughly 
equivalent to a networked system of sensors.  The UAV alternative had the best mean 
loss exchange ratio of the individual unmanned sensor systems, while the USV had the 
greatest maximum classification range.  The combined network of unmanned system 
assumed the best attributes of each of the individual sensors. 
4. Analysis of Ambush Runs 
 The ambush scenario is designed to test the response capability of the RF to a 
surprise enemy attack.  In each run of the scenario blue agents begin at the TOC and 
proceed north along pre-planned waypoints as they would for a standard patrol.  A red 
platoon is positioned on each bank of the river approximately 7.4 km north of the TOC.  
The enemy is located on a bend of the river, which gives them concealment and surprise.  
As in the patrol scenario, the blue agents are modeled as highly aggressive and do not 
have the option of retreat.  Figure 55 represents the relative location of the forces in the 
initial ambush scenario.  
 
Figure 55. Ambush Scenario Overview. 
 
a. Percent of No Hit Runs/Loss Exchange Ratio 
In the ambush modeling runs the helicopter and networked mortar barge 
had the best percentage of no hit runs, and the helicopter was the overall best alternative.  
The mean loss exchange ratio for the helicopter alternative was the best of the all of the 
alternative force packages as shown in Figure 56.  The loss exchange ratio for the 
helicopter was only calculated from six data points because of the helicopter alternative’s 
high percentage of no hit runs. As a result of the small sample size, the recorded loss 
exchange ratio may not accurately represent the actual loss exchange ratio of the 
helicopter.  Further runs would be needed to derive a fair representation of this data point. 
A Kruskal-Wallis analysis of the medians showed the UAV and GCE 
alternative force packages had a significantly improved loss exchange ratio response over 
the baseline as shown in Figure 57.  The networked mortar barge did not benefit from the 
paired sensor weapon upgrade because MANA artificially imposed that the mortar team 




mortar barge did not experience the same success as in the patrol scenario in terms of 
percentage of no hit runs, but had approximately the same loss exchange ratio in both 
scenarios. 
Percentage of NO hit runs




























































Figure 56. Percentage of No Hit Runs Per Alternative for the Ambush Scenario. 
 
Figure 57. Box Plot of Ambush Loss Exchange Ratios. 
 
b. Time to First Enemy Detection 
  All sensor upgrades improved the time of first detection, with the 
exception of the UGS.  Among the alternative force packages, the helicopter required the 
least amount of time to detection followed by the USV and networked sensor options, 
and finally by the UAV (see Figure 58).  The alternatives with no sensor upgrades 
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showed no improvement over the baseline.  Figure 59 displays the modal response of the 
alternative architectures with respect to the means (i.e., the programmed value was 






































































































































Interval Plot of Time to Detection(MIN) vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 59. Time to Detection Per Alternative. 
 
c. Time from Detection to Engagement 
  All sensor options, except UGS, significantly increased the length of time 
from enemy detection to engagement as shown in Figure 60.  This response measures the 
time from first enemy detection to first engagement.  A greater amount of time between 
these two events is desirable, because it implies that the war fighter will have additional 
time to make a decision on his next course of action.  
The values of this response for the helicopter and networked mortar barge 
alternatives are zero because these force packages have a sensor range that matches their 
engagement range.  By design of the model, the agents are motivated to engage the 
enemy as soon as the enemy is detected and is within engagement range. The agents in 
these two force packages engage in the same time step that the enemy is detected.  
Consequently, the values for the helicopter and the network mortar barge time from first 
detection to engagement appear low, but are actually favorable. 
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A Kruskal-Wallis analysis of medians (see Figure 61) shows that UAV, 















































































































































Interval Plot of DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 61. Interval Plot for Detect to Engage for Ambush. 
 
d. Length of Engagement 
  In the ambush scenario, adding a mortar team or mortar barge reduced 
mean engagement time to half of the baseline engagement time as shown in Figure 62.  
This indicates that in this scenario there is potentially a benefit to adding weapons with 
larger blast radii.  The helicopter, GCE, UAV, and USV alternatives’ interaction with the 
model increased engagement length while the networked mortar barge and networked 
mortar team performed no better than the baseline (see Figure 63).  This response 
reinforces that the baseline force has substantial weapons capability.  It also demonstrates 
that there is benefit in increased firepower in an ambush scenario more so than in the 









































































































































Interval Plot of LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 63. Length of Engagement Per Alternative. 
 
e. Max Classification Range 
The networked alternatives follow the performance of the most capable 
individual unmanned system.  As seen in the patrol scenario, the USV and the helicopter 
options dominate the other alternatives (see Figure 64).  Maximum classification range 
was gathered in a way that does not take into account the true distance from the classified 
enemy agent to the main blue force.  Instead, it reflects the range from the sensor 
platform to the enemy classified agent.  This response was bi-modal (see Figure 65), and 
did not reflect the range at first detection time.   SEA-10 determined this measure of 
performance to be critically flawed as an overall measure of alternative performance and 













































































































































Interval Plot of Max Classification Range vs Alt
95% CI for the Mean
 
Figure 65. Maximum Classification Range Per Alternative.  
 
5. Ambush Scenario Results 
The ambush scenario produced distinct differences from the responses in the 
patrol scenario, but it also reinforced the patrol findings.  The single USV or UAV 
performed equally well as the networked sensor alternative.  The UAV alternative 
returned the most significant improvement in loss exchange ratio of the sensor only 
upgrades.  The UGS proved ineffective in the ambush scenario due to the stationary 
nature of red agents and the sensor nodes and therefore resulted in no improvement over 
the baseline.  The mortar team and mortar barge cut engagement time in half, but had no 
other performance enhancing effect over the baseline.  The helicopter and networked 
mortar barge significantly improved the percentage of no hit runs while the combination 
of sensor and indirect fire alternatives had dramatic effects on the loss exchange ratio and 





F. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE EFFICIENCY CURVES 
Utility scores and architecture rankings tell an interesting story, but which 
architecture has the potential to give the RF the greatest improvement in overall 
capability for the best cost value, or the “Biggest Bang for the Buck?”  SEA-10 combined 
resultant utility scores with cost data described in section VI to generate efficiency 
curves.  The efficiency curve is a useful tool that plots the alternative cost along the X-
axis and the alternative utility score along the Y-axis.  The efficiency curve is created by 
moving from left to right and connecting the points of the highest utility scores.  The 
resultant line is called an efficiency curve or frontier.  The alternatives that lie to the right 
and below the curve are classified as “dominated alternatives” in that there is an 
alternative that outperforms it for a cheaper cost.   
 SEA-10 generated efficiency curves for each scenario, and an overall efficiency 
curve based on the calculated utility scores and cost estimation data.  These efficiency 
curves have commonalities and distinct differences.  All curves start at the baseline as the 
cheapest option.  The baseline RF is the foundation of all of the alternatives.  The mortar 
team alternative follows adding marginally improved performance for a small premium.  
The next point in all three curves is the USV single sensor alternative.  It either doubles 
or triples the utility score depending on the scenario for approximately the same cost as 













1. Patrol Scenario Efficiency Curve 
In the patrol scenario (Figure 66) the UGS alternative provides additional 
performance for nearly the same cost as the USV.  The next point on the curve is the 
networked mortar team at a considerable increase in cost and only a marginal increase in 
capability.  All other alternatives are dominated by these points.  It is significant to note 
that the UAV, the networked sensor, and the networked mortar barge alternatives have 
approximately the same cost and performance value. 
 










2. Ambush Scenario Efficiency Curve 
In the ambush scenario (see Figure 67) the efficiency curve runs from the USV to 
the helicopter alternative.  In the ambush the USV dominates all other alternatives except 
for the helicopter alternative which has a significantly increased utility score. The 
interaction of the helicopter against red forces in the scenario was notable, but the added 
performance resulted in a significant additional cost.  
 












3. Overall Efficiency Curve 
In the overall efficiency curve (see Figure 68) the line connects the USV 
alternative at the far left hand side to the networked mortar team in the middle and ends 
at the helicopter alternative on the far right hand side.  The overall efficiency curve shows 
that within the single sensor options the USV is the best across both scenarios for the 
cost.  All netted sensors options improve performance, but require some significant 
investment while the helicopter alternative adds only marginal performance for the 
increased cost. 
 
Figure 68. Overall Efficiency Curve. 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
There were four significant takeaways from initial data analysis.  
• The baseline force is fairly robust and occasionally achieves parity in 




• A single robust sensor gives the baseline force almost all the benefits of 
networked sensors. 
• In the ambush scenario, upgraded weapons have a significant effect in 
reducing the length of engagement. 
• The combined indirect fire and sensor pairing of the networked mortar barge 
and the helicopter option dominated all other options across all responses 
except detect to engage time (only because of model dynamics described 
previously).   
These takeaways were confirmed in detailed statistical analysis, and SEA-10 was now 
able to answer the initial research questions. 
• Which alternatives give the greatest capability increase to the baseline 
force? 
Across both scenarios the helicopter and the indirect fire networked sensor 
mortar barge dominated engagement and detection responses. 
• What is the effect of unmanned systems on detection and engagement? 
A single unmanned sensor option (USV, UAV, or UGS) performed as well as 
the networked senor option with the exception of the UGS in the ambush 
scenario due to the stationary red force positions. 
• What is the effect of an organic indirect engagement capability? 
Except in the case of the mortar barge and mortar team cutting length of 
engagement by greater than half in the ambush scenario simply adding 
weapons to the baseline had no significant effect on system performance.  The 
pairing of indirect fire and sensor upgrade found in the networked mortar 
barge and helicopter alternatives is the most potent option. 
• What is the effect of dedicated ground combat element on detection and 
engagement capabilities?   
The addition of the GCE does produce a measurable improvement in 
percentage of no hit runs and loss exchange ratio, but when limited to SEA-




• What are the effects of dedicated helicopter support? 
The dedicated helicopter support was by far the most performance enhancing 
of all the alternative architectures.  The combination of extended enemy 
detection and engagement capability dominated all the other options.  
• Which investment, increasing engagement or detection capability, has the 
greatest effect on overall system performance?  
Improving sensor capability had the greatest effect on overall system 
performance.  This may be because the baseline force had adequate weapons 
capability for the modeled scenarios. 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As described in the data normalization and detailed statistical analysis sections of 
this thesis, the helicopter and networked mortar barge detect to engage response scores do 
not accurately reflect their contribution to battle space awareness.  The following 
conclusions are written with that in mind.  
The USV returned the best bang for the buck with an overall utility score of 58 
and a nominal cost of $900K (FY06).  The USV maintained a high utility score in both 
the patrol and ambush scenarios.  The single sensor option increased battle space 
awareness and had the necessary mobility that allowed for flexibility of missions in the 
riverine environment.  As modeled, the USV had the ability to scout ahead of the other 
blue agents, find the enemy, and provide information on enemy locations to blue forces.  
With this information, blue force agents selected the correct weapons and engaged red 
forces prior to being ambushed.  In reality, this information would give blue forces the 
opportunity to decide whether to pursue their designated course and if so, prepare for 
conflict, or to simply find an alternate route.   
Given that the USV and UAV single sensor options performed about as well as 
the networked option SEA 10’s recommendation is to invest in a robust single sensor 
platform, likely a USV, rather than a complex and expensive networked system. 
Unfortunately, due to time and schedule constraints, it was not feasible to model all 
combinations of single sensor options with the increased engagement capability of a 
mortar team or barge.  Further modeling efforts could determine the feasibility and  
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affordability of pairing the USV with an inexpensive indirect fire weapon, potentially a 
mortar barge like NEMO, to obtain the maximum increase in battle space awareness and 
response capability for the RF of 2010. 
It is also important to consider alternatives that should have had a significant 
utility value at a reasonable cost, but did not.  Increased weapons alternatives did not 
significantly enhance performance, because the baseline force already has a considerable 
engagement capability without an additional weapons augment.  The networked sensor 
option performed at parity with the combined indirect fire sensor alternatives but did not 
provide any added capability. 
SEA-10 recommends looking into the feasibility of procuring USV’s comparable 
to those modeled (SeaFox) to work in tandem with riverine boat divisions.  The added 
performance capability of the system for the low cost makes this alternative a promising 
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IX. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 The Navy’s most recent version of the riverine force (RF) has presented many 
areas of study that should be addressed to help the war fighter.  SEA-10 chose to address 
the detection and engagement capability of the RF, and how to enhance these capabilities 
to give the war fighter better situational awareness and responsiveness.  Through the 
course of this study SEA-10 discovered many other areas of research beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but worthy of further study and research.  SEA-10 categorized areas for 
further study as communications, energy, modeling and simulation, movement, force 
protection, mine countermeasures, sustainment, and policy.   
1. Communications 
 All of the alternative force packages relied heavily on the use of reliable and 
robust communication and data networks.  In the models, this reliability is assumed.  
However, in the real world, network reliability is a valid concern, particularly in 
environments in which the RF will be expected to operate.  It was also assumed that the 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) would be available for use by 2010.  Due to 
significant programmatic issues and budget constraints, it would be beneficial to conduct 
further research on available networking options.  Potential areas for study include: 
• Network reliability 
• Network backbone alternatives to JTRS (i.e., ADNS, IP based mesh networks) 
• Network efficiency among the different alternatives (what is the best way to 
set up the networks for speed of information and ease of interpretation) 
• Foliage penetration of sensors and wireless networks 
2. Energy  
 Competition for natural resources will become a common cause for military 
action in resource rich regions of the world as global supplies dwindle.  The United States 
purchases a majority of its fossil fuels from abroad.  As the effects of globalization 
increase, other countries will have the ability to compete economically with the United 
States, making it more expensive to protect vital national interests.  
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 Logistics considerations should be made when applying alternative energy 
resources to riverine operations.  Riverine forces may be required to operate in remote 
locations.  Decreasing the need for fuel could greatly enhance the operational reach of the 
force and maintain the RF on station longer.  The opportunity exists to build a military 
force using alternative energy which may set a trend for future uses of alternative fuels.  
Potential areas of study include: 
• Use of alternative fuels on SURC or other small boat platform(diesel 
alternatives) 
• Use of solar/wind and compost power for TOC 
• Man portable photo-voltaic cells (solar panels) for SURC energy requirements 
• Study of battery requirements for riverine operations (on SURC, in TOC) 
3. Modeling and Simulation 
 There are almost countless alternative force packages to apply to the riverine 
model.  As technology increases the number will continue to rise.  SEA-10’s originally 
proposed to model five force packages.  Upon further evaluation, benefit was seen in 
adding six more alternative force packages.  Modeling and analysis of other force 
packages in these scenarios would certainly be of benefit to the war fighters.  However, 
in the interest of delivering a quality product within the established time constraint, SEA-
10 had to refrain from conducting more modeling runs.  The following suggestions could 
be areas of further study that use the model already established by SEA-10: 
• Model ground combat element with a single sensor plus up (UAV, USV or 
UGS) 
• Model the weapons plus-up (mortar team, mortar barge) with a single sensor 
(UAV, USV, UGS) 
• Model the capabilities and limitations of various riverine platforms: Small 
Unit Riverine Craft (SURC); RAC, SOC-R; 11m RHIB; M12 Watercat 
(Finnish) 
• Executing the architectures within more detailed models to include elevation, 
endurance restrictions, varied missions, more state levels (i.e., differing 
reactions other than aggression) 
• Day vs. night modeling and how to model illumination effects on sensors 
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4. Movement 
 The RF will operate in a variety of environments.  It is reasonable to assume that 
the RF will operate in the vicinity of an ocean or other large body of water that can 
sustain a seabase.  Investigation of rivers where the RF may operate, show that this is not 
always the case.  Therefore, careful consideration will have to be made on how to get the 
RF to its area of operation, and once there, how it will be sustained.  
• What is the most cost effective means to move the RF into theater? 
• How is the RF reconstituted after loss of equipment / personnel in remote 
regions? 
• How will the RF get to the fight? 
5. Force Protection 
 The RF is designed as a self sustained force that is required to provide its own 
force protection measures.  In an environment where the host country does not have 
control of the people within its borders the RF will be at a greater risk than in a country 
where this is not the case.   
• What are the RF force protection requirements? 
• How do you defend the RF from an AT/FP standpoint? 
• What technology can aid in implementing force protection measures? 
• What non-lethal alternatives can be employed safely?  What is the 
effectiveness of various non-lethal agents? 
• Unmanned system swarm tactics 
6. Mine Countermeasures 
 Mine countermeasures could be a subsection of force protection; however, as the 
RF continues to evolve so will the enemy.  As seen with the IED problem in Iraq, it is 
only a matter of time before the enemy realizes the importance of the waterways to the 
success for the forces and begins to employ countermeasures to hinder operations.  
Historically, mines were used in almost all conflicts that involved sustained operations on 
rivers171.  It would be dangerous to assume that the enemy would not employ mines 
 
171 R.B. Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare: The US Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a 
Tactical Doctrine 1775-1990, Appendix A, University Press of Florida, 2003.  
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against RF forces.  Steps should be taken now, before the mine threat exists, to train 
forces and design the force to counter this threat.   
• How resilient is the SURC hull towards an exploding mine? 
• What are the procedures for clearing mines in shallow water? 
• What technology can be used to counter mine threats in a river way? 
• What personnel should be employed with a RF when a mine threat is present 
(METOC, EOD, intelligence detachment, helicopter detachment)? 
7. Sustainment  
 Riverine forces are unique to the conventional navy in that they must operate 
around the land.  In the event that a Seabase is not established, the RF will be required to 
sustain itself from the land.  This is a significant area of further study that will need to be 
addressed if the RF is going to be used in remote areas.   
• What are the logistics requirements to move the RF into theater? 
• What levels of sustainment are required to support the RF in theater? 
• Where is a Seabase appropriate? 
• How do you re-supply the RF under the 1000 ship navy paradigm? 
• Fuel requirements of RF, including NEMO (see above recommendation) 
8. Policy 
 History has shown that the composition of a riverine force depends on the 
environment in which that force is operating172.  What works in Iraq will not necessarily 
work in Colombia or the Niger River Delta.  The initial RF is being equipped to work in a 
semi-arid desert environment but is also looking at employing forces elsewhere in the 
world, where the environment is vastly different.  Additionally, the RF will be in direct 
contact with a constantly evolving enemy that will continue to improve his weapons and 
tactics.  A static force, in terms of procurement will not have a chance to adapt to the 
enemy and may be required to use systems that are not suitable for the operational 
environment.   
An acquisition system similar to SOCOM would be desirable; however, it is 
understood that significant policy changes would have to take place for this to happen.  
 
172 R. Benbow, F. Ensminger, P. Swartz, S. Savitz, & D. Stimpson, Center for Naval Analysis, 
Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future 
Capabilities, January 2006.  
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SOCOM, unlike NECC, has Title 10 authority that permits the agency to purchase 
weapons and systems without being subject to the time intensive and cumbersome JCIDS 
process.  An alternative that provides a rapid acquisition process for riverine needs should 
be investigated.  
It would be advantageous that NECC use the ongoing low cost experimentation 
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APPENDIX A. MANA MODELING INPUT METHODOLOGY 
SEA-10 had to track levels of individual agent situational awareness, how much 
of the information the agent has gathered per turn, the amount of shared memory 
maintained by a squad, and the levels of information shared between squads over 
communication links.  SEA-10 also recorded various agent ranges and specific settings 
based on the agent’s state.  Weapons settings, conversions, and communications were the 
last two remaining key matrices which may provide comparison for further study. 




Table 31. General MANA Agent Settings. 
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Table 32. MANA Kinetic Weapons Settings. 
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Table 33. MANA Explosive Weapons Settings. 
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APPENDIX B. COST ESTIMATION SPREADSHEETS 
Cost estimation was conducted to describe costs associated with each of the 
alternative force packages.  The purpose is to assist the decision maker in determining 
which alternative provides the best capability with the least cost.  However, it is 
ultimately up to the decision maker to weight the importance of each capability as a 
function of the cost.  This section is designed to define the cost of each individual force 
package based on its intended use in the scenarios.  The overall cost estimated is 
presented first, followed by the individual alternative cost estimates. 
  Costs for each alternative are divided into three categories; procurement, 
operating and support for personnel, operating and support for equipment (including 
ammunition where applicable).  Throughout the 10 year period several rules were 
instated in the interest of fairness for evaluating the cost.  The following are the 
guidelines used for developing cost estimates. 
• All numbers are in FY06$ 
• All pay is increased by 2% per year 
• All procurement occurs in 2010  
• All operating and support costs for equipment are estimated at 10% of 
procurement cost.  Each year an additional 1% is added to this value to account 
for inflation 
• All information is from open source documents.   
• The vehicles/equipment chosen are not an endorsement for any one product over 
another, rather, they most closely met the requirements for the riverine force as 
seen by SEA 10. 







173 NEMO is one exception to this statement. Although the technology is available it is not a US 





Table 35. Alternative 1 Unmanned Sensor Cost Estimates. 
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Table 36. Alternative 2, 3, and 4 Cost Estimates. 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
 The cost for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is recorded in the following 
spreadsheet.  All information is open source.   
Procurement costs for Shadow UAV were estimated at $18.2M for each system. 
Based on phone interviews with personnel directly involved with the Shadow and Pioneer 
program it was found that typical deployments of UAV company’s include two UAV 
systems174.  Additionally, based on reliability data and phone interviews with operators, 
it became apparent that two Shadow UAV systems would be needed to provide 24 hour 
support to riverine forces.   
 The Shadow UAV operations and support cost includes the cost of training 
students and providing schoolhouse support.  Personnel who are trained to operate the 
Shadow are the Aerial Vehicle Operators (AVO) and Mission Payload Operators (MPO).  
The average AVO and MPO is an E3 with two years of service and an E4 with 3 years of 
service, respectfully.  The AVO’s and MPO’s attend school for 24 weeks and are then 
assigned to a Shadow company.  Maintenance and technical support personnel also are 
assigned to the Shadow company.  The maintenance personnel consist of 3 E-3s with 2 
years of service and 3 E-4s with 3 years of service and attend school for 8 weeks prior to 
assignment in the Shadow company.  Technical support for the Shadow company comes 
from a Shadow technician who is generally a Chief Warrant Officer with 10 years of 
service and who attends school for 9 weeks.   
 A Shadow company consists of one O-3 Company Commander, four O-1 platoon 
leaders, four CWO 1 technicians, one Senior NCO, three MPO’s, three AVO’s and six 
maintenance personnel.  All cost associated with the Shadow company were derived from 
military pay charts for FY-06. 
 Operations and support cost for equipment was estimated between 10% o of the 
procurement cost from the President’s budget for FY2006175.    
 
 
174 Phone interview with Shadow UAV S-3 10 October 2006 and email with Pioneer PMA 
representative  
175 Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Materials “Department of the Army Procurement 
Programs, Other Procurement February 2006”Retrived 08 November 2006 on the World Wide Web at 
[]http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/opa2.pdf.], p 236 
 
Table 38. UAV Cost Estimation Calculations. 
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Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
 
 Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) costs include procurement of the system and 
cost of operations and support of personnel and equipment.  
 Cost of procurement is 300K (FY06$) for one USV, and it is assumed that three 
USVs are procured to support each of the boat divisions.   
Operations and Support cost for personnel includes the cost of training five 
students (all E-5’s), once a quarter for five days. The personnel being trained include 
operators and maintainers for each USV.  Cost of training also includes the cost of one 
instructor who is an E-7 with 14 years of service.    
Operations and support cost for equipment includes the cost of fuel and spare 
parts. The cost of fuel was estimated using the fuel curves fro the Cummins Mercruiser 
Diesel engine, Model 2.8L ES200.  It was assumed that 80% of the time the USV will 
operate at cruising speed, 8-12 knots (1200 RPM), and 20% of the time the USV will run 
at sprint speed, 30+ knots (3600-3800 RPM).  On average, the USV would burn 3.4 
gallons/hour and over a 10 hour patrol 34 gallons of petrol (DFM) would be burned at a 
nominal cost of $2.00 per gallon.  Also included in POL cost is the cost of oil changes.   
Operations and support cost for spare parts includes both repairable and 
consumable parts.  Cost analogy was derived from the cost of the Riverine Assault Craft 




Table 40. USV Cost Estimate. 
 
Unmanned Ground Sensors 
 
 The cost for Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) is derived form the Marine Corps 
War fighting Publication (MCWP) 2-2.3.  Procurement of the UGS systems includes the 
following: 
• One unattended ground sensor (consisting of 24 nodes) 
• One Sensor Mobile Monitoring System 
• Four Portable Monitors 
• Five Relay Assemblies 
Operations and support cost for personnel includes the cost of the TRSS crew yearly pay 
and cost for training. The operational crew consists of one E-6, one E-5, two E-4’s who 
also attend the TRSS five week class.  Cost of personnel also includes the instructor cost 
of one E-7.   
 Operations and support cost for maintenance was estimated as 10% of the 








Ground Combat Element 
 
 The cost for the Ground Combat Element (GCE) is estimated from cost of 
procurement of weapons and ammunition, operations and support cost of personnel and 
equipment.  Procurement costs include the cost for 2 Squad Automatic Weapons and 16 
M-16’s.  Operations and support cost for personnel includes the cost of one year’s salary 
for each of the following individuals.  It is assumed that the parent organization (USA or 
USMC) will assume responsibility for initial training of the GCE. Additionally, although 
the nominal deployment for riverine force is six months, the GCE cost is estimated for 
one year, due to time allotted for pre-deployment training and post-deployment wrap-up.  
A ground combat element consists of 12 personnel 
• One Platoon Commander (O-2 w/ 3 years of service) 
• One Platoon Sergeant (E-7 w/ 18 years of service) 
• One Platoon RATELO (E-3 w/ 3 years of service) 
• One Squad Leader (E-6 w/ 10 years of service) 
• Two Machine Gunners (E-5 w/ 6 years of service) 
• Two Assistant Machine Gunners (E-4 w/ 4 years of service) 
• Two Anti-Armor Gunners (E-5 w/ 6 years of service) 
• 2 Assistant Anti-Armor Gunners (E-3 w/ 3 years of service) 
 
Cost of operations and support for the GCE equipment is estimated at 40% of the 
procurement cost and includes the cost of ammunition.  Cost of equipment to 
sustain the GCE such as: tents; radios; medical supplies, and food are also 
included in the O&S support  
 
 
Table 42. GCE Cost Estimate Part 1. 
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 The cost of the Network Sensors option includes procurement, operations and 
support cost for personnel, and operations and support cost for equipment. Procurement 
of all of the systems occurs in 2010. Although it is possible that the RF could procure all 
three unmanned systems in the same FYDP, it is highly unlikely.  This methodology 
standardizes procurement for comparison among alternatives vice an actual planning 
strategy for procurement.  The cost of the Networked Sensors option includes the 
procurement and O&S cost for actual network hardware.  In the model, SEA 10 made the 
assumption that the JTRS Cluster 5 system would be made available for use by the force 
in 2010.  A cost analogy was made using current RF communications equipment to 
estimate the JTRS Cluster 5 system. 
 Each year after the procurement year, 10% of the cost of the network is allotted to 
operations and support cost for network upgrades and security installations. Operations 
and support cost for the unmanned sensors is based off open source documents whose 







 It is important to note that the New Efficient MOrtar (NEMO) capability has not 
yet been openly explored for a U.S. small boat.  NEMO is waterborne direct and indirect 
fire capability that is centered on a 120mm smoothbore mortar affixed to a land or 
waterborne vehicle.  A Finnish company, Patria Systems, designed the NEMO turret to fit 
on the Finnish M12 Watercat hull, which is approximately the same size as the SURC.  In 
the event a decision maker finds this alternative worth pursuing, he must be forewarned 
of the additional cost for test and evaluation of this foreign made system. 
The cost for the Networked Mortar Barge includes the cost of procurement, 
operations and support of personnel and operations and support of equipment including 
ammunition.   In order to support RF operations, it was estimated that three NEMOs 
would be procured. The approximate procurement cost is $1.0 M for a NEMO 
waterborne system. This cost was based off of an analogy to a small boat mortar system 
design by Swedeship, which was sold to UAE.  Due to competition sensitivity of the 
NEMO, the company declined to present a cost estimate for the system. 
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The cost of operations and support for NEMO includes the cost for the crew of 
four personnel, a coxswain, a boat engineer and two people to shoot the mortar.  
Equipment O&S cost are analogous to the cost O&S of the RAC small boat for repairable 
and consumables.  POL consumption was derived from the fuel estimates for 92.8 gallons 
of POL per patrol plus an oil change every 50 hours. Fuel estimates were found in the 
Cummins Mercruiser Diesel (Model 4.2L ES320) engine information packet and 
assumed 80% of the time was spent at cruise speed (~12 knots) while the remaining 20% 
of the time was spent at sprint speed (above 40 knots).  All cost information for the 




Table 44. Mortar Barge Procurement Cost. 
 
 




Table 46. Operations and Support Costs for Equipment II. 
 
Mortar Team 
 Cost for the Mortar Team was derived from procurement cost for three 81mm 
mortars, O&S cost for personnel and O&S cost for equipment including ammunition.  It 
was assumed that the mortar team would procure three 81mm mortar systems.   
Operations and support cost for personnel includes the cost for mortar team 
personnel consisting of one E-4 team leader and 3 E-3 mortar team members.  O&S cost 
for equipment includes the maintenance and repair of the mortar tubes at 10% of the 
procurement cost, each year.  It was assumed that the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) 
would have the ability to store mortar cartridges and fuses. Therefore, in the initial 
procurement of ammunition, 500 rounds were purchased, and warehousing costs were not 
figured into the total cost estimate.  All cost information for equipment and ammunition 
was found in FEDLOG. 
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Table 47. Operations and Support Cost Personnel. 
 
 
Table 48. Total Equipment Cost. 
 
Networked Mortar Team 
  Cost for the Networked Mortar Team is broken out into procurement, O&S for 
personnel and O&S for equipment.  Cost of procurement includes the cost for all 
unmanned sensors, the mortar team and the network.  Operations and Support cost for 
personnel includes all cost for personnel who operate the Unmanned Systems and the 
individuals on the Mortar Team.  Cost of all ammunition was found on FEDLOG.  Cost 
214 
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references for the other individual systems can be found in their respective sections.  For 
dollar reference see cost summary at the beginning of this appendix. 
Networked NEMO   
 Cost for Networked Mortar Barge is broken out into procurement cost, O&S for 
personnel and O&S for equipment including ammunition.  All procurement is assumed to 
take place in 2010.  It is further assumed that all unmanned systems, the network and the 
mortar barge will be procured in the same year.  O&S cost for personnel includes the cost 
for all personnel who operate the unmanned systems, and who are on the NEMO.  For 
dollar reference see cost summary at the beginning of this appendix. 
Helicopter 
 Cost for the helicopter detachment assumes a model with 3 MH-60Rs176 
helicopters with 12 pilots, 12 maintainers and 12 crewmen.  Costs were divided up into 
procurement, operation and support for personnel and operations and support for 
equipment.  The helicopter alternative is presented with a procurement and non-
procurement option, since it is generally not typical for helicopters to be procured for one 
specific unit (other than a squadron).  The procurement cost for the MH-60 was found on 

















176 Riverine Group Initial Helicopter Study, Unpublished,  2006 
177 Federation of American Scientists.  MH-60R.  Retrieved on 13 November 2006 from the World 
Wide Web at [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm]. 
178 Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs, HH-60 Alamanac, Retrieved 05 
November 2006 from the World Wide Web at  [www.navyvamosc.com].    
 
Table 49. Helicopter Aircrew Costs. 
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Table 50. Helicopter Maintenance Personnel Costs. 
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APPENDIX C. ANOVA AND KRUSKAL-WALLIS CHARTS  
 This appendix contains the results of a one way ANOVA analysis of means and a 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of medians conducted for each of the five original responses by 
scenario using MINITAB.  These results augment the graphical depiction of the 95% 
confidence intervals and box plots contained in the text of the theses generated from the 
same data in MINITAB.  References to Kruskal-Wallis in the body of the text refer to the 
ranking of the median of an alternative against the overall median for all data points for 
all alternatives for a particular response by scenario.  The results are presented in the 




LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO 
 
One-way ANOVA: Loss Exchange Ratio versus Alt 
Source   DF       SS    MS     F      P
Alt      10    403.0  40.3  0.99  0.451
Error   254  10324.8  40.6
Total   264  10727.8
S = 6.376   R-Sq = 3.76%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean  StDev -------+---------+---------+---------+--
Alt2-UAV   30  12.094  5.767                       (--*---)
Alt2-UGS   30   9.892  6.876                    (--*--)
Alt2-USV   29   9.623  6.779                   (---*--)
Alt3-NET   30  11.114  6.364                      (--*--)
Alt4-MB    28   8.899  6.162                  (---*--)
Alt4-MT    29   8.395  6.053                  (--*--)
Alt5-GCE   26  10.747  5.867                     (--*---)
Alt6-HELO   1   7.692      *  (-----------------*-----------------)
Alt7-B-MB   4  11.795  7.170                 (--------*--------)
Alt7-B-MT  29  11.409  6.549                      (--*---)
Baseline   29   8.883  6.713                  (---*--)
-------+---------+---------+---------+--
0.0       7.0      14.0      21.0
Pooled StDev = 6.376
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: Loss Exchange Ratio versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Loss Exchange Ratio
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  15.380     153.0   1.52
Alt2-UGS    30  15.380     128.2  -0.36
Alt2-USV    29  15.380     129.6  -0.25
Alt3-NET    30  15.380     142.6   0.73
Alt4-MB     28   7.690     118.2  -1.08
Alt4-MT     29   7.690     112.7  -1.51
Alt5-GCE    26  15.380     140.9   0.55
Alt6-HELO    1   7.692     112.0  -0.27
Alt7-B-MB    4  15.380     153.6   0.54
Alt7-B-MT   29  15.380     149.2   1.21
Baseline    29   7.690     119.9  -0.97
Overall    265             133.0
H = 8.54  DF = 10  P = 0.576
H = 10.51  DF = 10  P = 0.397  (adjusted for ties)
* NOTE * One or more small samples
 TIME TO FIRST ENEMY DETECTION 
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ooled StDev = 15.95
One-way ANOVA: Patrol Time to Detect versus Alt 
Source   DF      SS    MS      F      P
Alt      10   70213  7021  27.61  0.000
Error   319   81118   254
Total   329  151331
S = 15.95   R-Sq = 46.40%   R-Sq(adj) = 44.72%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N   Mean  StDev ---+---------+---------+---------+------
Alt2-UAV   30  25.97   9.93        (---*---)
Alt2-UGS   30  25.33  18.90        (---*---)
Alt2-USV   30  23.80   1.56       (---*---)
Alt3-NET   30  21.53   2.70      (--*---)
Alt4-MB    30  56.20  32.13                             (--*---)
Alt4-MT    30  41.13   4.39                   (--*---)
Alt5-GCE   30  50.57  13.23                         (---*---)
Alt6-HELO  30  21.07   1.62     (---*---)
Alt7-B-MB  30  23.63   1.40       (---*---)
Alt7-B-MT  30  15.53   4.33  (--*---)
Baseline   30  56.83  32.89                             (---*---)
---+---------+---------+---------+------
15        30        45        60
 P 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Patrol Time to Detect versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Patrol Time to Detect
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30   23.00     143.8  -1.31
Alt2-UGS    30   19.00     104.6  -3.67
Alt2-USV    30   24.00     147.7  -1.07
Alt3-NET    30   22.50     100.9  -3.89
Alt4-MB     30   41.00     263.8   5.92
Alt4-MT     30   40.00     247.6   4.95
Alt5-GCE    30   48.00     286.4   7.28
Alt6-HELO   30   21.00      80.5  -5.12
Alt7-B-MB   30   24.00     144.1  -1.29
Alt7-B-MT   30   16.00      32.9  -7.98
Baseline    30   43.50     268.3   6.19
Overall    330             165.5
H = 248.91  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 249.83  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME 
 
One-way ANOVA: DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME versus Alt 
Source   DF       SS      MS       F      P
Alt      10  42418.4  4241.8  111.10  0.000
Error   319  12179.7    38.2
Total   329  54598.1
S = 6.179   R-Sq = 77.69%   R-Sq(adj) = 76.99%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean   StDev ---+---------+---------+---------+------
Alt2-UAV   30  19.967  10.424                           (--*--)
Alt2-UGS   30  24.400  10.836                                 (-*--)
Alt2-USV   30  18.433   6.600                         (--*--)
Alt3-NET   30  23.867   8.641                                (--*--)
Alt4-MB    30  -0.167   0.913  (--*--)
Alt4-MT    30   0.000   0.000 (--*--)
Alt5-GCE   30   0.000   0.000 (--*--)
Alt6-HELO  30   0.000   0.000 (--*--)
Alt7-B-MB  30   1.933   1.780     (-*--)
Alt7-B-MT  30  26.667   8.466                                    (-*--)
Baseline   30   0.000   0.000 (--*--)
---+---------+---------+---------+------
0.0       8.0      16.0      24.0
Pooled StDev = 6.179
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME
Alt          N       Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  1.95000E+01     242.6   4.64
Alt2-UGS    30  2.50000E+01     258.9   5.62
Alt2-USV    30  1.55000E+01     232.8   4.05
Alt3-NET    30  2.15000E+01     259.6   5.66
Alt4-MB     30  0.000000000      74.5  -5.48
Alt4-MT     30  0.000000000      77.0  -5.33
Alt5-GCE    30  0.000000000      77.0  -5.33
Alt6-HELO   30  0.000000000      77.0  -5.33
Alt7-B-MB   30  1.000000000     167.9   0.14
Alt7-B-MT   30  2.65000E+01     276.4   6.67
Baseline    30  0.000000000      77.0  -5.33
Overall    330                  165.5
H = 263.46  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 290.27  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
One-way ANOVA: LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT versus Alt 
Source   DF      SS    MS     F      P
Alt      10   25427  2543  3.48  0.000
Error   318  232316   731
Total   328  257742
S = 27.03   R-Sq = 9.87%   R-Sq(adj) = 7.03%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N   Mean  StDev ------+---------+---------+---------+---
Alt2-UAV   30  21.50  47.89                  (-------*-------)
Alt2-UGS   30  16.07  25.04             (-------*-------)
Alt2-USV   30  22.20  43.75                  (--------*-------)
Alt3-NET   29  10.62  23.90         (-------*-------)
Alt4-MB    30   3.53   3.64   (-------*-------)
Alt4-MT    30   2.17   0.79  (-------*-------)
Alt5-GCE   30   4.33   6.13    (-------*-------)
Alt6-HELO  30   9.23   4.51        (-------*-------)
Alt7-B-MB  30  12.70   8.99          (--------*-------)
Alt7-B-MT  30  30.13  49.55                         (-------*-------)
Baseline   30   3.50   4.13   (-------*-------)
------+---------+---------+---------+---
0        12        24        36
Pooled StDev = 27.03
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30   2.000     141.9  -1.40
Alt2-UGS    30   2.000     158.0  -0.42
Alt2-USV    30   3.000     177.2   0.74
Alt3-NET    29   2.000     141.2  -1.41
Alt4-MB     30   2.000     137.1  -1.69
Alt4-MT     30   2.000     112.1  -3.20
Alt5-GCE    30   2.000     148.9  -0.97
Alt6-HELO   30   8.000     249.7   5.12
Alt7-B-MB   30  10.000     247.9   5.01
Alt7-B-MT   30   2.000     161.0  -0.24
Baseline    30   2.000     139.3  -1.55
Overall    329             165.0
H = 65.79  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 69.58  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION RANGE 
 
One-way ANOVA: Max Classification Range versus Alt 
Source   DF       SS      MS        F      P
Alt      10  1041930  104193  1994.48  0.000
Error   319    16665      52
Total   329  1058595
S = 7.228   R-Sq = 98.43%   R-Sq(adj) = 98.38%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean  StDev ------+---------+---------+---------+---
Alt2-UAV   30   17.90   2.11  *)
Alt2-UGS   30   17.93   2.12  *)
Alt2-USV   30  126.33   6.84                             (*
Alt3-NET   30  125.73   2.05                             *)
Alt4-MB    30   19.40   1.00  (*
Alt4-MT    30   19.30   0.84  (*
Alt5-GCE   30   19.87   0.35  (*)
Alt6-HELO  30  154.77   2.03                                    (*
Alt7-B-MB  30  123.07  22.36                            (*
Alt7-B-MT  30  123.30   2.85                            (*
Baseline   30   19.60   0.93  (*)
------+---------+---------+---------+---
40        80       120       160
Pooled StDev = 7.23
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: Max Classification Range versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Max Classification Range
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30   19.00      60.3  -6.34
Alt2-UGS    30   18.50      63.6  -6.14
Alt2-USV    30  125.50     242.1   4.61
Alt3-NET    30  125.00     241.6   4.58
Alt4-MB     30   20.00     100.9  -3.89
Alt4-MT     30   19.00      90.1  -4.54
Alt5-GCE    30   20.00     122.0  -2.62
Alt6-HELO   30  156.00     315.3   9.02
Alt7-B-MB   30  127.00     254.9   5.38
Alt7-B-MT   30  123.00     217.6   3.14
Baseline    30   20.00     112.2  -3.21
Overall    330             165.5
H = 266.48  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 274.98  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)   
AMBUSH 
 
LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO 
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ooled StDev = 8.307
One-way ANOVA: Loss Exchange Ratio versus Alt 
Source   DF       SS      MS      F      P
Alt      10  12220.8  1222.1  17.71  0.000
Error   288  19874.6    69.0
Total   298  32095.4
S = 8.307   R-Sq = 38.08%   R-Sq(adj) = 35.93%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean   StDev --------+---------+---------+---------+-
Alt2-UAV   30  19.250  13.118 (---*---)
Alt2-UGS   29   5.292   6.368   (---*--)
Alt2-USV   30   9.649   8.934        (---*---)
Alt3-NET   30   6.756   8.477     (--*---)
Alt4-MB    30   6.046   6.065    (---*--)
Alt4-MT    30   5.306   7.210   (---*--)
Alt5-GCE   30  12.514   8.625            (---*--)
Alt6-HELO   6  26.012  11.655                        (--------*-------)
Alt7-B-MB  24  23.371   9.363 (---*---)
Alt7-B-MT  30   5.306   7.210   (---*--)
Baseline   30   4.564   3.786  (---*--)
--------+---------+---------+---------+-
8.0      16.0      24.0    32.0
 P 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Loss Exchange Ratio versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Loss Exchange Ratio
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  30.770     217.2   4.49
Alt2-UGS    29   1.940     105.6  -2.91
Alt2-USV    30  10.260     171.4   1.43
Alt3-NET    30   2.070     122.5  -1.84
Alt4-MB     30   4.045     123.7  -1.76
Alt4-MT     30   1.940     108.9  -2.75
Alt5-GCE    30  11.060     191.7   2.78
Alt6-HELO    6  30.770     252.2   2.92
Alt7-B-MB   24  30.770     248.0   5.79
Alt7-B-MT   30   1.940     108.9  -2.75
Baseline    30   1.940      99.8  -3.36
Overall    299             150.0
H = 103.32  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 104.45  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 TIME TO FIRST ENEMY DETECTION 
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ooled StDev = 1.853
One-way ANOVA: Time to Detection(MIN) versus Alt 
Source   DF        SS       MS       F      P
Alt      10  19010.85  1901.09  553.38  0.000
Error   319   1095.90     3.44
Total   329  20106.75
S = 1.853   R-Sq = 94.55%   R-Sq(adj) = 94.38%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean  StDev -----+---------+---------+---------+----
Alt2-UAV   30  13.400  4.383               (*)
Alt2-UGS   30  19.633  0.718                        (*)
Alt2-USV   30   7.033  0.183      (*)
Alt3-NET   30   7.067  0.254      (*)
Alt4-MB    30  20.500  0.820                         (*)
Alt4-MT    30  20.400  0.724                         (*)
Alt5-GCE   30  27.600  3.997                                   (*)
Alt6-HELO  30   4.033  0.183  (*)
Alt7-B-MB  30   7.100  0.305      (*)
Alt7-B-MT  30   7.067  0.254      (*)
Baseline   30  20.467  0.776                         (*)
-----+---------+---------+---------+----
7.0      14.0      21.0      28.0
 P 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Time to Detection(MIN) versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Time to Detection(MIN)
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  12.000     173.6   0.49
Alt2-UGS    30  20.000     213.4   2.88
Alt2-USV    30   7.000      88.5  -4.64
Alt3-NET    30   7.000      90.5  -4.52
Alt4-MB     30  20.000     248.7   5.01
Alt4-MT     30  20.000     245.4   4.81
Alt5-GCE    30  27.000     314.4   8.96
Alt6-HELO   30   4.000      15.5  -9.03
Alt7-B-MB   30   7.000      92.5  -4.40
Alt7-B-MT   30   7.000      90.5  -4.52
Baseline    30  20.000     247.5   4.94
Overall    330             165.5
H = 295.17  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 310.44  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME 
 
One-way ANOVA: DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME versus Alt 
Source   DF        SS       MS       F      P
Alt      10  11755.10  1175.51  246.95  0.000
Error   319   1518.47     4.76
Total   329  13273.56
S = 2.182   R-Sq = 88.56%   R-Sq(adj) = 88.20%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N    Mean  StDev --+---------+---------+---------+-------
Alt2-UAV   30  10.067  4.870                       (*-)
Alt2-UGS   30   0.733  0.450    (*-)
Alt2-USV   30  14.900  4.483                                (-*)
Alt3-NET   30  12.967  1.671                            (-*-)
Alt4-MB    30  -0.033  0.183  (-*-)
Alt4-MT    30  -0.033  0.183  (-*-)
Alt5-GCE   30   0.000  0.000 (-*-)
Alt6-HELO  30   1.600  1.958      (*-)
Alt7-B-MB  30   1.867  0.571      (-*)
Alt7-B-MT  30  12.833  0.950                            (-*)
Baseline   30  -0.300  0.651  (*-)
--+---------+---------+---------+-------
0.0       5.0      10.0      15.0
Pooled StDev = 2.182
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on DETECT TO ENGAGE TIME
Alt          N       Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  1.10000E+01     230.6   3.92
Alt2-UGS    30  1.000000000     137.5  -1.69
Alt2-USV    30  1.40000E+01     293.3   7.69
Alt3-NET    30  1.30000E+01     270.2   6.31
Alt4-MB     30  0.000000000      73.2  -5.56
Alt4-MT     30  0.000000000      73.2  -5.56
Alt5-GCE    30  0.000000000      75.5  -5.42
Alt6-HELO   30  1.000000000     148.5  -1.02
Alt7-B-MB   30  2.000000000     187.8   1.34
Alt7-B-MT   30  1.30000E+01     271.8   6.40
Baseline    30  0.000000000      59.0  -6.41
Overall    330                  165.5
H = 266.58  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 286.30  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
 LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT 
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ooled StDev = 21.24
One-way ANOVA: LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT versus Alt 
Source   DF      SS    MS      F      P
Alt      10   61176  6118  13.56  0.000
Error   317  143012   451
Total   327  204189
S = 21.24   R-Sq = 29.96%   R-Sq(adj) = 27.75%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N   Mean  StDev --+---------+---------+---------+-------
Alt2-UAV   30  53.47  43.29                           (---*---)
Alt2-UGS   29  11.45  22.12      (---*---)
Alt2-USV   30  20.60  23.87          (---*---)
Alt3-NET   30  21.00  17.14           (--*---)
Alt4-MB    30   4.97   4.08   (--*---)
Alt4-MT    30   3.53   1.80  (---*---)
Alt5-GCE   30  36.37  29.28                  (---*---)
Alt6-HELO  30  23.23   9.26            (---*--)
Alt7-B-MB  30  16.20   6.39        (---*---)
Alt7-B-MT  30  15.87  16.60        (---*---)
Baseline   29  13.55  21.41       (---*---)
--+---------+---------+---------+-------
0        20        40        60
 P 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on LENGTH OF ENGAGEMENT
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30  38.000     258.0   5.67
Alt2-UGS    29   5.000      99.6  -3.86
Alt2-USV    30   9.000     170.3   0.35
Alt3-NET    30  18.000     198.0   2.03
Alt4-MB     30   4.000      79.1  -5.18
Alt4-MT     30   3.000      53.4  -6.73
Alt5-GCE    30  22.000     240.2   4.59
Alt6-HELO   30  21.000     236.3   4.35
Alt7-B-MB   30  14.000     199.7   2.13
Alt7-B-MT   30   9.500     162.1  -0.15
Baseline    29   5.000     108.8  -3.31
Overall    328             164.5
H = 162.60  DF = 10  P = 0.000
H = 163.05  DF = 10  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties)
  
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION RANGE 
 
One-way ANOVA: Max Classification Range versus Alt 
Source   DF       SS      MS          F      P
Alt      10  1500834  150083  346931.95  0.000
Error   319      138       0
Total   329  1500972
S = 0.6577   R-Sq = 99.99%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.99%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
Level       N     Mean  StDev ----+---------+---------+---------+-----
Alt2-UAV   30   20.067  0.980  *
Alt2-UGS   30   19.967  0.556  *
Alt2-USV   30  155.800  0.407                                        (*
Alt3-NET   30  155.967  0.183                                        (*
Alt4-MB    30   20.000  0.000  *
Alt4-MT    30   20.000  0.000  *
Alt5-GCE   30   20.000  0.000  *
Alt6-HELO  30  153.933  1.484                                        *
Alt7-B-MB  30  155.767  0.430                                        (*
Alt7-B-MT  30  155.567  0.568                                        *)
Baseline   30   19.800  0.761  *
----+---------+---------+---------+-----
35        70       105       140
Pooled StDev = 0.658   
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Kruskal-Wallis Test: Max Classification Range versus Alt 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Max Classification Range
Alt          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Alt2-UAV    30   20.00      87.6  -4.69
Alt2-UGS    30   20.00      90.4  -4.52
Alt2-USV    30  156.00     267.8   6.16
Alt3-NET    30  156.00     278.8   6.82
Alt4-MB     30   20.00      93.5  -4.34
Alt4-MT     30   20.00      93.5  -4.34
Alt5-GCE    30   20.00      93.5  -4.34
Alt6-HELO   30  154.00     211.3   2.76
Alt7-B-MB   30  156.00     265.6   6.03
Alt7-B-MT   30  156.00     254.0   5.33
Baseline    30   20.00      84.6  -4.87
Overall    330             165.5
H = 254.01  DF = 10  P = 0.000
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